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Abstract
Some conflict resolution and national security professionals contend there is no shortfall
of qualitative research on Asia, China, Realism, or war. That said, this doctoral
dissertation has two overarching purposes: first, an empirical study of interstate conflict
at the regional and systematic levels. Second, is to examine the extent to which the
Correlates of War covariates associated with the People’s Republic of China’s revisionist
strategies. Combining these objectives led to the formulation of the main research
question: What is the relationship between the correlates of war and China’s revisionist
strategy in Asia? Realism contends that strong national capability and displays of
military resolve guarantees safety. A counterargument, provided by the steps-to-war
(STW) theory, is these power politics increases the chances of war. This dissertation
empirically explores the latter by examination of 461 dispute dyads that cover a fifty-year
period, an inductive statistical method was used to determine the relationship between the
correlates of war and China’s revisionism. Although there were several research findings,
three are indeed salient: 1) There was no statistical evidence that the STW theory,
territorial revisions, rivalry, alliance-making, or arms races increase war onset chances; 2)
When war onset was substituted for low-intensity interstate violence as an outcome
variable, there was strong empirical evidence that the Correlates of War were statistical
significant; and 3) China was essentially interstate war-adverse, but violence-prone. In
short, this scientific study of war expanded the correlation knowledge of war onset,
particularly in Asia.

vii
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Chapter 1: Introduction
War, the military clash of imposing wills is the greatest calamity in human
endeavors. Its conduct is riddled with volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and lethality.
The outcomes are often momentous, having imposed exuberantly high economic and
moral costs on the belligerents. History is filled with empires, great powers, and even
minor states that fell victim to this scourge of humankind, and therefore no longer exist.
Yet, despite these known facts, not only have humans managed to retain an appetite for
destruction but also have remained largely misinformed why war happens. This
dissertation is an attempt to remedy this perception. More pointedly, the research will
explore why war happens to highlight the means of avoiding it. War comes in many
guises. The typology is quite diverse. Quincy Wright is considered the father of warstudies and argues that war is comprised of international, imperial, colonial, and Civil
(Vasquez, 2009). Others claim it is either dyadic or complex (Vasquez & Valeriano,
2010). Even still, war is categorized as interstate, intrastate, or extrastate. It is pertinent
to distinguish interstate which are armed conflict between systemic, sovereign actors and
this is the focus of this dissertation (Lear, 2012).
Although there are currently more intrastate and extrastate conflict prevalent,
arguably interstate war poses the greatest threat to both the regional and international
order (Szayna et al., 2017). There are several reasons: specifically, a return to great
power competition. China and Russia in a fit of revisionism are challenging the
international status quo. In turn, the U.S. national security apparatus has declared that
near-peer competition is the new normal for foreign policy (O’Rourke, 2019). Another
rationale is destructive capacity. States have a wide range of military capabilities. For

2
example, most great powers have nuclear weapons, strategic bombers, and large-scale
expeditionary forces capable of toppling regimes and capturing territory. The abilities
are perhaps what makes them a great power. Lastly, states remain the most predominant
actor in the systemic international order. They have the preponderance of power over
their populations and the ability to externally influence other entities. One can see why
interstate conflict will drastically matter in the future.
Summary of the Topic
Upfront, this dissertation concerns war onset on the continent of Asia, specifically
as it pertains to China. More pointedly, it is a scientific endeavor to use the empirical
study of war to ascertain the correlatory impacts of how realist behavior promulgates war
between states. That said, one of the essential and foundational aspects of this
dissertation is the Correlates of War (COW) project. Founded by political scientist John
David Singer and historian Melvin Small in 1963, it is an intellectual movement of
peace-based researchers dedicated to the empirical study war and its onset attributes—
i.e., correlates. Initially charged with data collection on interstate armed conflict, Singer
and Small’s body of work (Singer & Small, 1972; Small & Singer, 1982) was published
in two seminal books that galvanized the war-studies, peace-research, and international
relations fields. In fact, the COW project grew to include empirical research that vastly
improved the scientific knowledge of war (Izmirlioglu, 2017).
Since the late-1960s, COW research has grown. It now consists of 13 datasets
that provide empirical information on war correlates that illuminate why warfare occurs
to include interstate, intrastate, and extrastate conflicts. There have been over 274
empirical scientific studies conducted base on the concepts and theories of the COW
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project (Izmirlioglu, 2017). What is important to remember is that COW research is
solely quantitative, which is in contrast to the conflict resolution and international
relations study fields mostly qualitative-based inquiries.
Equally important are the four core research activities associated with the COW
project. They are: 1) theoretical rationale and research strategy; 2) correlate construction
and data generation; 3) model/hypothesis testing and data analysis, and 4) practical
implications for policy (Suzuki, Krause, and Singer, 2002). All of them, to various
degrees, will be used through this dissertation.

Figure 1. Militarized Dispute by Country in Asia.
Asia
Some would argue that Asia, not Europe or North America, is the focal point of
this planet. It is by far the largest continent in terms of both area and population with
geography covering 17.2 million square miles, whereby 4.2 billion people live (Sawe,
2019). The continent houses five major regions and 48 states. For clarification, the
subregions are Central, East, South, Southeast, and Western Asia (Pariona, 2019).
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Regarding domain status, Asia contains great, major, and minor powers. China and
Russia are considered great powers, whereas the seven major powers are Japan, India,
South Korea, Indonesia, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. The remaining states fall into the
minor category (Rogers, 2019). Economically, Asia is equally distinct. The G-20, which
is an intergovernmental forum of finance ministers and central bankers, has eight member
states that reside on the continent (Rogers, 2019). The strongest, rising economies have
been historically in Asia. With respect to GDP, China, Japan, and India are globally
ranked in the top ten. Indeed, Asia’s aggregated GDP is a staggering $31T. This is twice
the size of the U.S.’s economy (International Monetary Fund [IMF] World Economic
Outlook, 2018).
It is also worth mentioning that Asia has a history of interstate warfare. Outside
of Europe, there has been more interstate war and battle deaths in Asia on the planet
(Singer et al. 1972; Szayna et al., 2019). In fact, three of the five great powers;
specifically, China, Russia, and the United States are in some form of violent armed
conflict on the mainland and littorals (Szayna et al., 2019; The Asia Foundation, 2017).
For further evidence, it is necessary to examine Figure 1. The chart outlaid Asian
countries by the number of militarize interstate disputes in which participated. The
orange bars are major powers; the grey is minor ones. One could easily determine that
Asiatic major powers conflict disputes outweigh those of smaller states. This disparity is
meticulously assessed throughout this doctoral study. What is more important is that
outside of Europe, Asia has the greatest number of states that have formal defense treaties
with the United States. The U.S. Department of State website identified South Korea,
Japan, Philippines, and Thailand as treated partners, which means if one is attacked the
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U.S. will come to its aid (Department of State, 2019). More voluminously, all of them
are involved in some form of militarized dispute with China (The Asia Foundation,
2019).
China
China is vital to regional and global stability. Considered by many states as a
great power, China has spread its influence and power throughout Asia and the global
community, including locales such as Africa and the Middle East. Jablonsky (1997)
contended that countries needed to increase their national power to either maintain or
increase their position in the international order. He, in turn, qualified national power as
the state’s required resources to obtain their national objectives and goals. These
resources are further defined as natural and social, which is the construct used in this
dissertation.
Using Jablonsky’s typology, Sino quest for national power could be examined on
a two-axis approach. Natural determinants, comprised of geography, population, and
natural resources, is one. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took multiple measures
to improve these power attributes. Here are a few examples. First, the CCP laid claim to
the entire South China Sea including several contested islands, and then built artificial
islands to protect it (Jablonsky, 1997; O’Rourke, 2019a, 2019b). Second, the party was
instrumental in incubating nationalist fervor within the Sino-population, a common
governmental technique to disguise bad governance and garner collective cooperation
against a perceived threat. Last, China secured natural resources near and abroad. Close
to their home borders, China built an elaborate road network through Bangladesh and
Myanmar (O’Rourke, 2019a; Pehrson, 2006). In the Middle East and Africa, scrupulous
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oil deals were made without any concern for the long-term harm to the sellers’ domestic
audience. Social determinants, which consisted of economic, military, and diplomatic
elements, was the other national power subset (Jablonsky, 1997). Although there are
significant literature and research on these topics, only the economic and defense aspects
are addressed here. China has the second-largest economy after the U.S., fueled by an
abundance of low-cost labor, manufacturing, and debt financing. Their current Gross
Domestic Product per capita is a staggering $16.8T (Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, 2019).
Militarily, the People Liberation Army (PLA) is China’s 2,000,000 person armed
forces and has made unprecedented gains. Case in point, the U.S. Office of the Secretary
of Defense reported, “China’s announced military budget increase continues more than
20 years of annual defense spending increases, sustaining China’s position as the secondlargest military spender in the world.” (U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense [OSD],
2019, p. 93) What this equates to is $170B expended on war materiel each year (U.S.
Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2019). With this type of spending, PRC has increased
its warfighting capability.
Since the turn of the century, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has increased
its national power by building offensive, expeditionary weapons. These armaments are
capital investments, which are defined by a massive expenditure of resources in terms of
dollars (i.e., $1B or more) and time. They include H-6 strategic bombers and aircraft
carriers. It is also to note that the PLA has a credible nuclear force (Defense Intelligence
Agency [DIA], 2019). In fact, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
reports the PLA Rocket Force’s nuclear arsenal is the third largest on the planet behind
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the U.S. and Russia (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2019). Although
these weapon platforms can be used for defense, their main purpose is offensive in
nature. Meaning, they allow the PRC to project power beyond their territorial borders,
allowing them means to achieve their national security aims.
With respect to the PRC, all the above actions and activities are geared toward a
myriad of geostrategic priorities. According to various international relations scholars,
they are 1) Finish building modern society under CCP control; 2) Become the global
leader in innovation, 3) Resolve the Taiwan dilemma, 4) Modernize military capability
for power projection and 5) Return to great power status (Bosbotinis, 2010; Erickson,
2016; Krepinevich, 2015). Chinese President Xi Jinping further contended, “[China is
to] become a global leader in terms of national strength and international influence.”
(Erickson, 2016, 75). The aggregation of these strategic goals indicates a grand strategy
rooted in revisionism. More important, these five objectives should be considered as
Sino vital interests; meaning, the 80 million-person strong CCP would be willing to
initiate a conflict or even war to achieve them. Figure 2 is a testament to this proposition.

Figure 2. Sino Militarized Interstate Disputes.
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The U.S. Government (USG) contends Chinese goals are two-fold. First, the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) seeks to establish China as a great power to shape the
international order to its benefit. Second, regional hegemony within its part of Eurasia.
Revisionist states’ main geopolitical and strategic aim is to change the status quo because
they are not satisfied with their position in the global construct. When it comes to China,
they have embarked on a whole-of-society approach to achieving their goals near and
abroad (Wright, April 2017).
Steps to War
The Steps-To-War (STW) theory is one of the most profound byproducts of the
COW project. John Vasquez, credited with its formulation, postulated that it is grounded
on the behavioral and relational impacts of when two states, who are initially involved in
a territorial dispute, experience repeated conflict, form alliances and increase military
capability, all of which intensifies the likelihood of war onset (Senese & Vasquez, 2005,
2008). Moreover, there are three distinct characters that distinguish the STW model from
other international relations (IR) and conflict theories. First, it is empirically based. This
construct allows for statistical evaluation of why interstate interactions are either warprone or peaceful, Second, it is dyadic. A characteristic that fosters descriptive and
inferential assessment. Last, it is not exclusively sequential. Meaning, step order is not
imperative instead it is their mutual reinforcement (Mitchell & Vasquez, 2014; Senese et
al., 2005). That said, an example will help comprehension. In one way or another, the
steps of war involve territorial disputes, rivalry, alliances, and arms races. For
clarification, the terms State A and State B is used to delineate belligerents. To start,
State A is involved in a territorial dispute with State B. They use power politics to
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address this budding security issue, making defense pacts and improving armies. The
combined effect poses a security dilemma, a stalwart in realist literature. Next, State B
feels threaten and becomes more hostile toward State A, which is now considered a rival.
As a result, State B responds in kind by making counter-alliances and building up their
own defense forces. The overall effect is a heightened level of escalation, which could
spiral into a violent interstate conflict. That said, this plausible STW scenario undeniably
outlays Chinese geopolitical activities in Asia, which is why it is the theory of choice for
this dissertation (Jones et al., 1996; Senese et al., 2005; Mitchell et al., 2014).
Need for Study
There are four key reasons why this study is necessary. The first one is renewed
great power competition. Since September 11, 2001, which fostered an era of extrastate
and intrastate warfare, the war onset study-field focused on those two phenomena. Al
Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) execution of violent conflict
captivated the international community. Regarding intrastate war, the Libyan civil war
had the same effect. Understandably, these conflicts created a demand signal for political
scientists, international relations scholars, and policymakers. However, Beijing,
Moscow, and Washington’s declaration of the return to great power interstate conflict
necessitates that the academic field follows in suit. And arguably, the conflict resolution
field should lead the way. The second rationale is Asia. For reasons previously
explained, Asia is an important region in the international order. China’s overt and
covert hostility towards the U.S. and its allies is foreboding. Equally germane is the
PRC’s revisionist alliance making and defense spending, which has had an escalating and
threatening effect on the region. In short, if war breaks out in either East or Southeast
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Asia, then it would potentially lead to widespread destruction and human suffering on a
scale not experienced since World War II. The third justification entails the COW
project and conflict resolution fields of study. The former was instrumental in war. One
must remember that Singer’s overarching goal was to prevent war and by default,
increase peace (Singer, 1979). Conflict resolution is about alleviating all forms of
disputes, from the individual to the state, in that way promoting peace. It is therefore
almost providence that both research areas should be conjoined in a dissertation. The last
key reason for the need of this dissertation beholds empirical analysis of war onset.
There is no shortfall of qualitative research on Asia, China, realist’s ideals, and war. The
adage that extremes lead to disaster is perhaps applicable here. A modern quantitative
assessment could afford different findings on war and peace, which in turn might inform
governmental leaders and policymakers.
Problem /Purpose Statement/Research Question
Taking these gaps and shortfalls in deliberation, the problem summation is there
are missing literature and empirical analysis on war onset in Asia and China. So then, the
purpose of this quantitative study is to explore the steps-to-war correlates as they pertain
to Sino power politics in Asia. At this stage in the research, steps-to-war correlates will
be generally defined as a series of power politics actions and activities between states in
response to a territory-related dispute that when aggregated increases the probability of
war onset. With the above mentioned in mind, this dissertation will answer one main
research question: What is the relationship between the correlates of war and China’s
revisionist strategy in Asia? More so, there are three supporting research questions that
are imperative to understanding that relationship. They are: 1) What is the probability of
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war onset based on associated militarized interstate disputes in Asia? 2) What revision
type causes the greatest propensity of war in Asia? and 3) What does the war onset
covariates imply for chances of war in Asia? As with most momentous endeavors,
specific goals are critical for success and the following are the goals of this project: 1)
Use COW project ideals and STW theory to evaluate how specific correlates increase the
chances of war in Asia; 2) Develop a rudimentary, reliable research design to empirically
assesses individual states and how they relate to war; 3) Introduce empirical war-studies
to the Department of Defense strategic leaders and Conflict Resolution professionals; and
4) Review war causation literature and develop empirical analysis skills.
Definition of Key Terms
Correlates of War project: A cohort of political scientists and peace researchers dedicated
to the systematic accumulation of scientific knowledge about military conflict in order to
end it. Their work is exclusively empirical in nature (Morrow, Clark, Diehl, Ray, &
Reid, 2010, p. 591).
Alliance: A formal-signed agreement between states concerning the conditions under
which they will or will not employ military force. Alliances are classified as defense
pact, neutral, and entente (Levy, 1981, p. 587).
Arms Race: A simultaneous abnormal rate of growth in the military outlays between two
or more nations, based on the competitive pressure of eternal military rivalry (Wallace,
1979, p. 5)
Challenger: A state that challenges another state over either an issue or revision (Dorf,
2004).
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Composite Index of National Capability: An index that utilizes six indicators of national
to reflect power: energy consumption, iron and steel production, military expenditures,
military personnel, total population, and urban population. The computed power
capabilities for each state in then ranked making a prioritized list.
Dyad: A pair of states who both are members of the international system. Dyads allow
the measurement and analysis of interstate behavior and other relational aspects (Senese
& Vasquez, 2008).
Dyadic Dispute: An interstate dyad engaged in a militarized interstate dispute (Senese et
al., 2008).
Dyadic-History: One interstate dyad that has been constructed from the history of dyadic
interaction. It often records the total and type of MIDs, war history, rivalry and alliance
status, and so forth (Senese et al., 2008).
Dyadic-Year: A dyad measured by what occurs in a one-year timeframe (Senese et al.,
2008).
Defender: A state that defends itself from either a challenge or attack from another state
(Dorf, 2004).
Dominant State: A hegemonic state that has the preponderance of power within either the
international system or specific region (Dorf, 2004).
Extrastate war: Wars conducted between a system member and a nonstate entity. The
U.S. fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria is an archetype (Sarkees, 2010)
Interstate war: Wars conducted between or among members of the interstate system. The
Gulf War (circa 1990), where Iraq battled the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATOR) is an example (Sarkees, 2010, p.1)
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Intrastate war: A civil war conducted between a state and a group within its borders. The
violent conflicts in Syria and Libya are examples. (Sarkees, 2010, p.2)
Great Power: A dominant state that can effectively influence the global order and
international politics with respect to domestic, economic, and security-related issues.
Operational indicators of Great Power status are 1) possession of a high level of power
capabilities (strong economies and often nuclear weapons); 2) heavy participation in the
international arena; and 3) identification as a Great Power by the international community
(Levy, 1981, p. 587). China, Russia, and the United States are great powers.
Major Power: A state with relatively superior power capabilities, has global interests, and
must be recognized by other major powers as a major power (Levy, 1981, p. 587).
France, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Japan, South Korea, and India are examples of major
powers.
Militarized Interstate Dispute: An aggressive, dyadic interaction between states that is
characterized by threat making, force displays, use of military force, and hostility—i.e.,
open warfare (Senese et al., 2008).
Minor Power: A state with relatively moderate to weak power capabilities, which can
only influence within their respective region (Levy, 1981, p. 587). Philippines, Oman,
Nigeria, and Guatemala are considered minor powers.
Revisionist State: In power transition theories, a revisionist state is defined as an actor
that is not satisfied with its circumstances and domain placement in either the
international or regional order. As such, they use power politics to change the
geopolitical dynamic to their satisfaction, and if pressed, could use military means. For

14
example, in World War II, Germany and Japan were revisionists states that sough war to
change the international order (Kohout, 2003).
Rivalry: The competitive interaction between states (i.e., rivals) that is centered spatial
consistency, duration, militarized interstate disputes, and linked conflict (Wallace, 1979,
p. 333). There are three types of rivalry: isolated (1 MID < 6 years); enduring (6 or more
MIDs <= 20 years); proto (1 MID within 10 years) (Vasquez, 2004, p.10).
Status Quo State: In power transition theories, a status quo state is defined as an actor
that is satisfied with its circumstances and domain placement in either the international or
regional order. To maintain this dynamic, they use power politics, which might include
war. Case in point, in the Gulf War, the U.S. was a status quo state and used military
force to expel Iraq out of Kuwait (Kohout, 2003).
Steps To War Theory: A realist-based theory, founded by one of the original COW
project members John Vasquez, which explains the phenomenon of interstate war onset
as either a step-wise function or simultaneous aggregation of territorial disputes, rivalry,
alliance building, and arms races (Vasquez, 1997, p. 111).
Target: A state who is the focus of either behavior, activity, or action from another state.
These attributes could be either positive or negative. For example, State A targets State
B to join then against State C is considered a positive situation for State A and B.
However, from State C’s perspective it has a negative connotation (Dorf, 2004).
Territorial Dispute: An interstate dispute over the control of salient land and maritime
terrain. It is often manifested over territorial borders, strategic access to resources,
cultural saliency, and economic value (Diehl and Goertz, 1988).
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War: The violent use of arms between states to achieve political objectives, characterized
by sustained combat, involving organized armed forces, resulting in a minimum of 1,000
battle-related fatalities in a 12-month period (Sarkees, 2010, p. 10).
Methodology
The primary research method is quantitative analysis. Herein, there are both
descriptive and inferential statistical techniques employed to answer three supporting
research questions, which allows synthesis on Sino revisionism and war causal attributes.
The research design has a straightforward, inductive quality. Each key question has
specified the research goal and associated statistical test. The first goal was to illustrate
the relationship between war onset and militarized disputes. Central tendencies and
variance analysis are used to both describe and infer facets of that interaction.
The second question’s aim is to ascertain how Asiatic revisionism correlates to
interstate military violence and warfare. Bivariate analysis will be instrumental in
assessing the concept of major powers, national capability, and power domains as they
correspond to war. Last, and the centerpiece of this research is exploring war onset as it
corresponds to the steps to war theory. Stepwise, logistic regression is imperative in
testing if Asia is congruent with the other COW research.
Limitations
Thus far, three critical limitations of this dissertation have been identified. The
first constraint involves the ability to construct a methodology to statistically examine a
specific state. After nearly 60 years of COW research, it became evident that regional and
country-specific empirical research is at a minimum. In reading and reviewing over 200
sources, one problem encountered was there are very few studies to use as an example.
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There was only one related to regions and none in which a country was the focus. What
was more troubling was the regional study, which focused on Latin America, did not
employ any inferential statistical test (Suzuki, 2002). Even though most COW peace
researchers remain concerned with the systemic level of analysis, there is indeed a
requirement for the scientific study of war within a regional framework. This
shortcoming will pose design and analytical barriers.
Validity is another limitation. By concentrating on China for a period of seven
decades, the frequency of militarized interstates disputes and war remains relatively
small. In fact, the war tally is approximately two. This circumstance will essentially
create a low-N dataset, which could negatively impact the ability to draw reliable
conclusions. After some initial research, the number of militarized disputes associated
with China totals 61 cases. As a comparison, most COW research studies have a sample
size of 380 or more cases. The low number of MID cases could cause others to question
the validity, which leads to the last limitation (Bennet & Stam, 2000; Kendrick et al,
2013; Maoz et al, 2018).
The last EUGene_v3.2 compatible MID dataset ends in 2001 (Bennet & Stam,
2000). The COW project released an updated version time-stamped 2011. Inside, there
are an additional 300 more MIDs that represent militarized incidents from 2001 to 2010
(Kendrick et al., 2013). However, there is an issue with its compatibility with the
EUGene_v3.2 dataset generating. What this means is this dissertation is currently limited
to MIDs that transpired before 2001. This circumstance will undoubtedly impact
findings. Of significance, there has been contact with the COW dataset stakeholders
concerning the matter.
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Scope
To accomplish these objectives, this remainder of this dissertation follows the
standard doctoral format. As such, there are four more chapters that require delineation.
Chapter 2 is a literature review. This dissertation’s research centerpiece entails the COW
project and the steps-to-war theory. There have been over 250 scholarly articles
published on the scientific study of war, which affords a vast repository of literature, and
therefore knowledge. That said, this chapter describes what subject material has been
previously studied, identify the linkages between various empirical studies, and establish
context on the correlates of war, steps-to-war theory, and the key analytical techniques
used in research (Hart, 2009).
Chapter 3 is the research method. All-in-all, this chapter is arguably the most vital
to this dissertation based on two key reasons. Because this research is quantitative, which
is not frequent in peace research and conflict resolution fields, there is a considerable
amount of energy expended on outlaying the data requirements, hypotheses formulation,
and statistical test. The net result is a comprehensive, research roadmap, which should
lead to insightful and impactful results on five hypothesis and five propositions (Hart,
2009).
Chapter 4 is the data analysis. Outside the introduction and conclusion sections,
this chapter is organized by research questions. As a reminder, the overall research
approach is inductive. So, findings are communicated by the three research questions.
Wherein, in addition to the statistical results, a descriptive analysis of the frequency of
militarized disputes, revision types, and wars will also be displayed in chart and table
format. Of significance, the dissertation’s main research question is also answered.

18
Through inductive reasoning and synthesis, the statistical war onset results from the ten
suppositions are integrated to formulate an answer in which the relationship between the
correlates of war attributes and Chinese revisionism (Hart, 2009).
Chapter 5 is the discussion and conclusion. Basically, the central theme here is
repetition. The purpose of the study is restated. Next, there is a summary of the
dissertation where the conceptual framework, literary review, and research methodology
are discussed. Then, findings and results are again reviewed for context and validity.
This chapter will conclude with recommendations for future research (Hart, 2009).
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Upfront, this dissertation examines peace as it relates to war. Perhaps a better
explanation is that this scientific effort involves the empirical study of war for the
purpose of peace. The research centerpiece entails the Correlates of War (COW) project
and the correlates of war, which is perhaps confusing. As a cursory primer, the former is
a cohort of political scientists and peace scholars, who exclusively concentrate on the
empirical study of war. The latter is framed by war correlates; that is, the proven factors
in which the chances of interstate war is increased.
Since 1963, there has been a plethora of literature and research on the correlates
of war. Of the 250 research studies, almost all are predicated on three constants: focus on
the interstate system, quantitative methodologies, and seek to prove that realist behavior
is war prone (Izmirlioglu, 2017). The COW project affords the most effective and
efficient mechanism to conduct applied research. By that, this dissertation attempts to
use both the COW project and steps-to-war theoretical insights and delineate a plausible
path to war on the Asian continent, thereby highlighting signposts where action could be
taken to prevent such a calamity. It is key to mention that the research goal is to explain
a credible connection between the war correlates and Chinese revisionism, with correlates
being the keyword. Simply put, this literature review will not focus on China per se but
on the empirical aspect of investigating war.
To accomplish these preliminary objectives, several explanations are required.
The literature review will describe what subject material has been studied up to this point,
identify the connections between those various empirical studies, and establish context on
the war correlates and key research techniques used. More pointedly, this literature
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review’s chief goal is to provide a comprehensive, overarching examination of the
empirical study of war within the COW historical and theoretical framework.
Before proceeding, a succinct scope of what this literature review entails is
merited. It is germane to mention that there are four primary sections, which outlay
pertinent subject material, as well as the associated COW scholars. First is a discussion
on the originators of peace research and the war study field. Aside from a brief overview
of their empirical achievements, this section details how the discipline was initially
conceptualized to include the research and validity challenges.
The next literary review area outlines the COW project. There are several topics
discussed, therein. First, a detailed view of David Singer, the COW project’s founder, is
afforded. It includes his two key seminal works and long-term goals for the empirical
study of war. Second, this section chronicles how dyadic statistical analysis became the
centerpiece for peace research within the COW community. Lastly, the
conceptualization of militarized interstate disputes is outlaid. The latter is one of the key
concepts that must be comprehended to fully understand the STW theory.
The third section defines the four tenets in which comprises the steps-to-war
theory. Using a historical timeline framework, territory, rivalry, alliances, and arms
buildups are meticulously discussed. Each concept is addressed in a two-prong manner,
whereby the key COW researcher and their respective study findings are first delineated
and then examined. More importantly, the overall goal is here to showcase the various
foundational studies and associated researchers that metastasized the COW project into
the steps-to-war theory.
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The literature review’s last area delineates and explains the steps-to-war theory.
It is the inductive culmination of the four tenets as they relate to militarized disputes and
power politics, wherein the discussion of realism occurs. This task is divided into three
steps. First, a general overview is provided that identifies the STW theory’s founder and
research rationale. Second, each tenet is described in a linear fashion, while
simultaneously stressing correlatory impacts on war onset. Third, a plausible path to war
is outlined. Here is the heart of the dissertation because the steps-to-war theory is finally
synthesized. Last, criticism is articulated. Since the COW project and STW theory is
relatively new and controversial in the IR field, it is indeed subject to many critiques.
With the literary review roadmap delineated, it is appropriate to continue by examining
the birthplace of the empirical study of war.
The Early Years
After the turmoil of World War I, the scientific study of war causation became
popular in the 1930s. It can be accredited to two social scientists. Quincy Wright and
Lewis Richardson contended that the study of war was unscientific. That is, they both
thought the field lacked empirical data and analysis to either prove or refute war
causation. Wright and Richardson, as a result, brought research techniques from the
physical and biological sciences to the social disciplines. In succession, with Wright
being the vanguard, the researchers created respective data sets that classified war and its
causes (Vasquez, 2009). What is possibly more unique is that both Englishmen were
unaware of each other’s work and the long-term radical change it would produce in the
peace and war research fields (Singer, 1981).
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Quincy Wright, a University of Chicago professor, seminal work classified wars
from the 1480-1964 time period. Using the litmus of 50,000 troops involved as
magnitude and his own war taxonomy, Wright compiled one of the most comprehensive,
groundbreaking datasets. The data included initiation/completion dates, belligerent
identity, and the number of key battles. Also, in his groundbreaking work A Study in
War, Wright provided battle frequencies, casualty totals aggregated across all major
European Powers (Singer & Diehl, 1990). Wright’s data repository had its shortfalls.
There was a question of validity because some wars were not included, while others were
summarily discounted. Another gap, according to some scholars, was that the
rudimentary dataset did not include war severity data, which is considered the number of
battle-related fatalities (Singer et al., 1990). In Wright’s defense, the severity would not
be addressed until later by another scholar.
Lewis Richardson followed in Wright’s steps. Richardson, a fellow British
scholar, expounded on Wright’s research by concentrating on the magnitude, dates of
initiation and termination in years, belligerents, and identification of initiators as a true
measure of war (Singer et al., 1990). More so, Wright, in his analysis, did not distinguish
the various forms of violence. Domestic violence was equally included with state
sponsored. Lewis did not believe this constituted war. Consequently, his research
focused on interstate violence, which also included imperial and civil wars. (Singer,
1972). Perhaps, what Richardson is most known for is incorporating interstate dyads in
his dataset and subsequent analysis. This technique would be the cornerstone for future
war study studies (Vasquez, 2009).
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The Correlates of War Project
As an extension to Wright and Richardson, the Correlates of War (COW) project
was a renaissance in data generation and quantitative war studies, particularly concerning
interstate conflicts. Suzuki, Krause, and Singer attested, “Numerous scholars conducting
quantitative empirical research in international and comparative politics have cited and
used the extensive work of the COW project.” (Suzuki, Krause, and Singer, 2002, p. 69).
The initiative was implemented in 1963 with a financial grant from the Carnegie
Corporation to the University of Michigan’s Center for Research on Conflict Resolution
(Vasquez, 1987). Its main aim was to quantify war and its causal factors. The primary
output was a holistic databank that was revolutionary in scope and size.
Two key professors and researchers are considered the forefathers of the COW
movement. David Singer was a political scientist at the University of Michigan, whereas
his colleague Melvin Small was a renowned historian and professor at Wayne State
University (Singer & Small, 1972). Singer dissatisfied with the lack of analytical rigor in
violent conflict sought to answer a simple research question: Why war? Singer
contended the best way to answer this question was to build a catalog that covered the
international system for a substantially long period and under meticulously defined
selection criteria and variables (Singer & Small, 1972).
First and foremost, to accomplish this feat, Singer and Smalls had to resolve what
is a state and what is precisely is war (The Correlates of War Project, Oct 2019). The
former was articulated in terms of international system structure, capability distribution,
and ranking states by their material possessions (Suzuki et al., 2002). More so,
researching the occurrence of war meant gathering information on various attributes of
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the international system that theorists argued were indeed the causes of war. With Smalls
amassing war data from 1815 to 1960 from historical texts, the COW founding fathers
assembled a data set, which identified characteristics such as the number of participants,
battle deaths, and duration (Singer, 1979).
According to Singer and Diehl (1990), there was also a second focus area, which
he deemed more important than constructing the COW database. The correlates of war
can be defined as those factors that are covaried and thereby associated with the
occurrence, duration, and magnitude of war. These independent variables, when properly
operationalized and statistically tested, could afford key synthesis on the dependent
variable, war and its causes. The outcome of this opening effort were two groundbreaking
books. The Wages of War was published in 1975 and later in 1982 with Resort to Arms
(Izmirlioglu, 2017). Both literary works listed the data and studies that occurred in the
early years of the COW project. Indicators and datasets on interstate membership,
incidences of war between states, military alliances, and national capability were
ascertained.
The Correlates of War project continued to expand in the 1970s. With the data
repository established, researchers conducted landmark empirical studies. These
empirical investigations used realpolitik political models at the system-level. Focusing
on primarily on polarity, military buildups and arms races, Singer and his acolytes refined
predictors to war. These findings were encapsulated in two volumes, Correlates of War
and The Correlates of War II. More importantly, a key update to the previous COW
dataset was accomplished (Suzuki et al., 2002).
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During the 1980s, progress continued. Even though testing realpolitik models
were still common, dyad-level analysis became vogue. COW scholars focused on
capability differentials, expected utility, and deterrence theory. What was different is that
predictors were garnered towards crisis short of war. This is where the term militarized
interstate dispute first entered the COW lexicon. Equally relevant was the dataset grew.
Variables such as civil war, militarized interstate disputes, crises, military allocation, and
contiguity were added (Suzuki et al., 2002; Senese, 2005).
Regarding the COW project, the 1990s proved equally productive. Multivariate
models, which encompassed alternative realist and liberal hypotheses, were used in
quantitative research (Suzuki et al., 2002; Vasquez, 1996). Dyad-level accretion was still
the preferred methodology, and the notion of different levels of aggregation was
introduced. Of further significance during this timeframe, enduring rivalries and
recurrent military escalation became critical research topics. There were also new data
sets on territorial change, trade, enduring rivalries, and an updated data repository on
militarized interstate disputes (Jones, D., Bremer, S. & Singer, J.D., 1996; Suzuki et al.,
2002).
Since the turn of the century, the COW project has become more than a dataset. It
remains a wellspring for modern war studies and correlation. According to Izmirlioglu
(2017), there are approximately thirteen datasets, providing vital detailed information on
the various indicators that illuminate state conflict. Some improvements in the COW
data repository were interstate conflict geographic locale, national material resources, and
trade flows. In totality, the current COW project variable set numbers an astounding 395
and over 250 research studies (Izmirlioglu, 2017). These attributes were lumped into
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four core research activities. They are theoretical rationale and research strategy, data
and indicator generation, model/hypothesis testing, and practical implications for policy
and teaching. As this dissertation proceeds, each one is addressed in various degrees,
with model and hypothesis testing being the most extensive.
Foundational Studies and Prominent Researchers
Over the years, delineating war causation and correlation has taken numerous
guises. This section outlines that evolution, including several milestone studies that
dictated the theoretical framework and research design many subsequent scholars
leveraged. One of Singer’s early studies sought to accelerate the scientific study of war
prior to the completion of the COW project. Based on his initial assessment, Singer
argued there were two key areas that should be immediately examined. These topics
were addressed in The Wages of War 1816-1965. As an aside, the year 1816,
coincidentally the end of the Napoleonic Era, was significant because it marked when
war records were sufficiently maintained by countries.
Continuing, Singer’s first area was the quantification of war. One should
remember that Richardson also measured this attribute (Singer & Diehl, 1999). As the
war study and peace research field grew in number, various researchers did not agree
with Richardson’s methodology and selection criteria. Singer and Small (1972) felt that
it was immediately necessary to rectify this shortfall before scholars proceeded to use the
COW dataset. To that end, they settled on three sets of indicators: magnitude, severity,
and intensity. Here is a brief synopsis. Magnitude was intended to operationalize the
spatial and temporal aspects of war by counting belligerents and how long military
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conflict lasted. It was the simplest of the three because it was merely a sum of the
months and a list of participants for each war.
Regarding severity, it was meant to gauge the toll of human suffering—the
number of combat deaths. Whereas Richardson included civilians’ deaths in his
research, Singer used only military personnel. The latter’s rationale was due to
insufficient data on civilian fatalities. He proposed a more effective methodology to
derive severity. Most nations, even during the early-1800s, kept detailed records on the
number of soldiers and sailors killed in war. Intensity, a ratio, reflected the battle deaths
against other baseline measures. For example, one might ponder if a war was brief and
bloody or vice versa. Singer and Small (1972) believed an intensity ratio would provide
key insight on that premise. To achieve this indicator, which was based on a state’s
battle-deaths, a baseline of magnitude, size of armed forces, and total population were
considered. In short, these three indicators were foundational in the scientific study of
war and peace, setting the stage for future research.
Pairwise frequency, or dyad, was the other topic. Upfront, it is worth noting that
Singer contended that war, by definition, involved at least two parties and therefore
should be examined as such. Meaning, war cannot be accurately observed in isolation but
rather as a relationship. As an example, he stated, “In many social sciences it is
becoming increasingly clear that much more is to be learned from the relationship
between and among our objects of analysis than from an exhaustive investigation of their
discrete properties.” (Singer et al., 1972, p. 299).
The methodology used by Singer was imaginative. Taking COW data into
account, he matched every country within the international system with their respective
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war-time opponent. The dependent variables were war duration in months and combined
battle-deaths. Pairs were alphabetically arranged, eventually forming a list with each
step. The result was 200 pairs with at least one war where they were collaborators. Once
complete with delineating wartime partners, Singer et al. used the same methodology to
derive opponents. The analysis provided 209 pairs sorted by one war where they fought
on opposing sides (Singer et al., 1972). In sum, these dyadic relationships afforded
tentative evidence for the idea of traditional amities and animosities (Bremer, 1992).
The Wages of War 1816-1965 was not without critics, having two major
contention points. First, some claimed this body of work was haphazard in overarching
aim and framework. Singer and Small, as previously mentioned, wanted to make their
war data available prior to the completion of the COW project. To that end, The Wages
of War 1816-1965 was heavy on data collection and selection criteria and contained
tomes of tables, which critics argued made the book tiresome (Singer, 1979; Gibler,
Miller, & Little, 2016).
Secondly, there was criticism of data validity. Other researchers questioned the
accuracy of the dataset, arguing it was impossible to collect and authenticate all military
statistics and battle-deaths, especially from the pre-industrial age. Singer and Small
countered, “if we were to refrain from doing the historical analysis because of the
unreliability of the available evidence, some of the most import work in archaeology,
zoology, and astronomy…would also come to a halt.” (Singer et al., 1972, p. 7)
According to the COW founders, one must remember the scholar's job is to sift, evaluate,
and collate procedures to satisfy their and others' skepticism. Singer et al. (1972)
proclaimed they did just that in their first book.
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In short, this foundational book was an important book because of several
reasons. It offered a roadmap that articulated future studies. Provided the foundation for
alliances, which later became a cornerstone in the steps-to-war theory. Demonstrated how
to conduct a dyadic analysis to determine behavioral and relational attributes between
states. Finally, Singer and Small’s book showed how to capture historical data accurately
and objectively. Even with these achievements, Singer believed a more historical
justification was needed. David Singer’s Correlates of War was a landmark. It
articulately defined the chronological and intellectual origins of COW. Within this book,
Singer (1979) mused over individual and nationalistic values in the international system,
subjectivity of realist theoretical thought, policy, the role of scientific knowledge, and
data/indicator generation. The last two subject areas were indeed salient to the correlates
of war.
As earlier discussed, scientific knowledge about war was a motivating influence
for the peace researcher. Singer had an interesting viewpoint on knowledge of war
studies. Knowledge, as far as he was concerned, was existential, correlational, and
explanatory. Singer stipulated that existential was merely facts. Correlation delineated
the extent two or more conditions are associated. Explanatory, the most difficult of three,
is the degree an outcome is caused by one or more conditions. Singer contended these
knowledge forms are imperative, ascertaining why states go to war. As such, fact-based
correlations and explanations were the design backdrop in subsequent peace research
(Singer, 1979).
Equally important was the question of war prediction. Singer (1979) contended
the decision to go to war was predicated on three factors. Deterministic is the first.
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These events were beyond the ability to exercise any control. Singer does not explicitly
mean that violence is impending but rather there are constraints that compel policymakers
to operate within bounds. Probabilistic factors reflect stochasticity. Since war is
inherently human, and humans are capricious, then there are unpredictable or random
factors in which a policymaker can do nothing about. Of note, some COW critics were of
this mindset.
The last element is voluntaristic. Singer contended that humans are thinking
beings. Case in point, he stated, “[P]recisely because humans are different from
lemmings, we need not act as certain scientific models predict we will act.” (Singer,
1979) Another point was that the better informed about the process by which groups enter
a violent conflict, decision-makers could determine which factors are within and beyond
control. Even so, the more accurate predictions are made, then there is an increased
chance to avoid war.
So far, the material showcased how David Singer and his viewpoints formulated
into modern peace and war study research. His first book delineated the methodology
and selection criteria that generated empirical data on interstate war. The second book
clarified what type of research is possible on that dataset. Meaning, the study of war
should be empirical, correlatory, and explanatory. Even more, Singer contended COW
scholars and practitioners should develop a theory in which hypothesis testing and other
quantitative analysis could occur. That said, it is important to explore the foundational
studies and researchers that metastasized the COW project into the steps-to-war theory.
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Dyads and Militarized Interstate Disputes
From his initial research work, Singer contended there were five areas that needed
further investigation. They are dyads, territory, militarized interstate disputes, and arms
races. The upcoming material outlay Singer’s desires, starring with a dyadic look at
interstate war, followed by the four concepts instrumental in the formulation of the STW
theory. To start, Stuart Bremer is responsible for advancing war quantification with two
landmark studies that ascertained dyadic methodology and militarized interstate disputes.
The first one, “Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War,
1816-1965” can best be explained as who fights whom. Dyad research was a major topic
that flourished from the COW project. Bremer, a colleague of Singer and early COW
contributor, sought to further explore the relational aspect between states and the
conditions that affected the likelihood of war.
To start, one must remember that a dyad is a pairing of two entities. It can be a
simple as two people or more complex such as a state. Dyadic data analysis affords the
ability to examine interactions between pairs, which early COW scholars believed was a
necessary condition (Frey, 2018). Bremer's (1992) research characterized dangerous,
war-prone states and their attributes in a dyadic construct. Although there were five
findings from his research, three are mentioned here. First, the preponderance of
empirical war studies was at the systemic level. Bremer believed that looking at war
through a nondyadic lens would render evidence, at best, inclusive (Bremer, 1992).
Second, most empirical studies were limited in the spatial-temporal domain. This
supposition that narrow temporal domains afforded a weak basis for drawing conclusive
evidence. Instead, Bremer advocated for an expansive time period to collect as much
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evidence as possible. Last, bivariate analytical methods often masked relevant statistical
associations. Despite multivariate analysis inherent shortfalls, which are war’s low
frequency and statistical degrees of freedom, Bremer (1992, 1996) strongly insisted
multivariate analysis would best answer who fights whom.
All the above-annotated issues were hold-overs from Singer’s (1972,1979) earlier
work. As such, Bremer intended to rectify by incorporating a broad timeframe, interstate
dyadic pairs, both bivariate and multivariate analysis on seven key predictors of war that
warranted empirical testing. Before continuing, it is necessary to give a brief overview of
each. Proximity is the first predictor. Here, the main point was that war occurred
between nations within close geographic proximity to another (Bremer, 1992; Johnson &
Toft, 2013).
The second indicator was the notion of power equality. There are two sides to
this argument. One is that power preponderance promotes peace; the other is that power
parity encouraged peace. According to Bremer, numerous studies have examined the
relationship between war and power, but few have done so on a dyadic level (Bremer,
1992; Braumoeller, 2008). Power status concerned major or minor powers. There is
substantial evidence that major power, who possess the industrial, population, economic,
and military capabilities, are more prone to war than minor powers (Bremer, 1992; Singer
& Small, 1972). The fourth predictor of interstate war were alliances. Here, Bremer
(1992) contended state friendships were key to the initiation of war.
Regime type is fifth. This variable tested what type of governments were likely to
pursue war. The sixth indicator involved a state’s economic status. Economically
advanced polities, according to most research rationale, possessed the necessary means to
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conduct war, thereby making it a valid variable. Bremer’s last predictor was
militarization. This measurement entailed state resources outlaid to military
preparedness. In other words, Bremer, like numerous other peace researchers, believed
that arms races were instrumental in the onset of war. (Bremer 1992; Colaresi & Thomas,
2005; Singer, 1972). Taking the seven predictor variables into account, Bremer
delineated requisite propositions to test.
The methodology was straightforward, entailing two analytical regression
techniques. Using bivariate analysis, Bremer (1992) calculated and then compared the
conditional probabilities of war initiation. To clarify, bivariate regression is arguably the
simplest form because it delineates the relationship between two discrete variables.
(Field, 2013) All seven propositions did support correlatory dyadic analysis, and some
results were indeed perceptive. From strongest to weakest, the correlation and size effect
of the factors proved profound. Here is the ranking: 1) proximity, 2) power status, 3)
alliances, 4) arms race, 5) regime type, 6) economic, and 7) power equality (Bremer,
1992). What is important, according to Bremer, was that power differentials were the
weakest predictor of war and a direct contrast to core realist thought.
The other analytical technique was multivariate. This regression form is more
advanced, involving inferential statistical tests that afford comprehension in what manner
multiple predictor variables are related to an outcome variable. (Field, 2013) Admittedly,
Bremer suggested bivariate analysis could hide relational impacts between the
aforementioned factors. Case in point, he stated, “Under this condition, apparently strong
relationships with war may be spurious and weak relationships with war may become
strong when the effects of other factors are removed.” (Bremer, 1992, p. 331) To alleviate
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this shortfall, each factor was transformed into a binary variable that correlated to a
specific dyad. For example, the alliance variable was either assigned as “1” if the dyad
was allied or “0” otherwise. This variable transformation was repeated for each variable,
allowing Bremer to implement a multivariate linear regression.
Taking the statistical ranking of each factor, a stepwise regression was completed.
The results were mainly aligned to the bivariate analysis with a few unexpected
outcomes. The war onset ranking was adjusted. Here is the new list: 1) proximity, 2)
regime type, 3) economic, 4) power status, 5) power equality, 6) alliances, and 7) arms
races (Bremer, 1992). What was more profound was the association regarding two key
independent variables. There was a negative correlation between states with advanced
economies, meaning states that have robust markets are less likely to go to war. The
other observation was alliances and arms build-up were not statistically significant, which
countered previous research results. Bremer surmised this result not necessarily valid
and dictated further research on alliances and arms races impacts on war onset (Bremer,
1992; Croco & Teo, 2005).
There were four key findings in this study. First, disputes over territory when
coupled with contiguity had the highest probability of resulting in war. Second, states
with advanced economies were not prone to fight each other. The rationale is that since
both have much to lose, they seek alternative conflict resolution techniques. Third,
democratic states were less likely than other government forms to engage in war. The
reason here is that democracies often are more developed and therefore decision-makers
are beholden to the domestic populace than oligarchies or dictatorship (Bremer, 1992;
Mitchell & Vasquez, 2014). That said, this study’s impact is it marked the first time a
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coherent, empirical explanation of the war onset correlation factors were achieved. The
development and subsequent use of dyadic research techniques were instrumental in
determining both the relational and behavioral aspects between conflict-laden states.
This accomplishment led to Bremer’s next major study.
Bremer’s second pivotal contribution was documented in the aptly titled
“Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical
Patterns”. Published in 1996, this article’s purpose was a review of the COW project's
latest dataset and improvements therein. Equally vital was that Stuart Bremer, along with
fellow researchers Daniel Jones and David Singer, developed a clear, detailed
understanding of what constitutes militarized disputes, thereby increasing correlational
knowledge thereof. Whereas Bremer’s other study examined key predictors and
inferential statistics, this one instead focused on the catalysts to conflict. Conflict and
disputes come in numerous guises; therefore, Bremer bounded them within a military
taxonomy. His rationale, “States do not engage in militarized actions unless they
perceive that the issues at stake are important.” (Jones, et al., 1996, p. 170) So, the term
militarized interstate disputes could be considered as a historical conflict case in which
there is either a threat, display, or use of force by one state directly towards another
member state. The following provides more clarification. First, a dispute is regarded as a
sharp disagreement or clash of interests between two state entities. Second, according to
the COW lexicon, disputes come in three varieties. Threats are considered verbal
indications of hostile intent, displays are a military demonstration, and force usage
summarized by a military operation.
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Lastly, another key category was added to the militarized interstate dispute
typology. When a MID escalated into open combat, resulting in 1,000 battle deaths, a
threshold was crossed, signaling the conflict was now an interstate war (Jones et al.,
1996; Singer et al., 1972). In sum, one should remember that military incidents form the
building blocks for MIDs. Bremer and his colleagues were indeed instrumental in either
defining or classifying four foundational MID tenets that would have far-reaching
implications in war onset and the steps-to-war theory.
Equally relevant, and accredited to MIDs, was two new COW research areas. The
first one involved the examination of revisionist states and interstate war correlation.
Revisionism, according to this artifact, is a government’s dissatisfaction with its
circumstantial status quo in the international order and decided to engage in conflict to
alter it (Lebow, 2010; Wright, 2015; Yoon, 2003). To classify as a revisionist state in the
COW framework, however, the state had to challenge by either: 1) making territorial
claims, 2) attempting to overthrow a regime, or 3) declaring the intention of not abiding
by either a target state or international order rules (Jones et al., 1996).
Dispute outcome was the other focus area. The correlation between conflict
outcomes and war onset was an important topic, yet non-existent. They established a
sound technique to determine this relationship. Bremer and company coded outcomes
based on the challenges made against the status quo (Bremer, 1992; Jones et al., 1996).
Although there a total of six categories, only a few are discussed. First, victory is
whenever a state secured a favorable change in the status quo by application of force.
Yield is where one state capitulated by accepting concessions from the challenger prior to
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military conflict. Last, stalemate is characterized by an unchanged status quo. (Jones et
al., 1996).
In short, the 1996’s Correlates of War MID dataset was instrumental in furthering
peace research. It was the first major update. Prior to this point, Singer and Small’s
(1972) earlier version only identified war participants, start and end dates, fatality totals,
and hostility levels. Revisionist’s claims of territory, regime overthrow, or challenging
the status quo effectively changed the paradigm in which MIDs could be evaluated.
Likewise, outcome clarification was contributory. By deriving what states won or lost,
Bremer effectively filled a knowledge gap in how dispute behavior ultimately
culminated. Settlement methodology afforded critical operationalization of variables,
thereby illuminating how negotiations, treaties, and ilk could impact MID outcomes,
thereby advancing peace research. Some pertinent information on the analytical methods
used in this study will foster greater comprehension. Bremer’s use of descriptive and
inferential statistical techniques was more advanced than previous COW research.
Bivariate & multivariate regression was improved, which resulted in five key findings.
Using explanatory statistics, Bremer correlated that the frequency of conflicts and MIDs
decreased as the number of states in the international system decreases. This finding was
justified using the Collapse of the Soviet Union as an example. The conflict duration was
equally revealing. Weibull probability distribution showed that the longer a dispute
continued, the lower its probability of termination. Bremer expounded, “They have a
feud-like quality such that the longer they last, the more difficult it is to bring them to a
close” (Jones et al., 1996, p. 181).
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Fatalities were the third finding. Here, a bivariate survival analysis, a common
statistical test in the medical field, revealed that two-thirds of all MIDs ended with no
deaths (Jones et al., 1996; Bradburn, Clark, Love, & Altman, 2003). That aside, there
were noteworthy findings regarding conflicts characterized by battle deaths. Using the
power status framework, major-major and major-minor disputes were battle deaths were
relatively low. More interesting was the fact that minor-minor conflicts had the highest
fatalities, which Bremer equated to the end of colonialism and the Cold War that fueled
numerous civil wars (Jones et al., 1996). Fourth was the size of conflict. A negative
binomial regression illustrated that most disputes are one-on-one affairs between minor
powers. Again, this circumstance is indicative of the fall of the Soviet bloc and European
imperialism (Jones et al., 1996).
The fifth finding was just as relevant. Escalation involved Singer’s taxonomy of
escalation. From lowest to highest, it is a threat, display of force, use of force, and fullscale war (Sample, 1997). Descriptive statistical tests revealed higher hostility levels
between powers signified an increased probability of escalation (Jones et al., 1996).
Meaning, most states adopted tit-for-tat strategies when dealing with issues of territory,
policy, and regime differences (Carlson, 1995; Vasquez, 1987; Senese et al., 2003).
The last key finding was dispute settlement and outcomes. Here, predicted
probabilities discerned when the conflict was between a major power and another major
power, there was a significant correlation as to it ending in a negotiated settlement.
Minor-minor clashes also resulted in the same. However, when a major state faced a
minor one the settlement ended with the latter accepting the former’s imposed will.
Perhaps, the greatest insight that Bremer and his fellow researchers determined entailed
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outcomes. There were two salient points. First is that most major powers were
victorious in war; the second was that decisive outcomes were of the past (Jones et al.,
1996; Senese et al., 2003).
To sum up Bremer’s above contributions, there are three pertinent improvements
that advanced war study research. Bremer’s main aim was to articulate new
operationalized variables and techniques used to generate them. Another improvement
was the identification of new research topics. With over 2,000 data points, there were
innumerable potential patterns in the COW militarized interstate dispute datasets. (Jones
et al., 1996). Key subjects, such as revisionism and dispute outcomes, were introduced to
the discussion. What is important is that the peace research and war study fields had
moved beyond war onset, fulfilling of Singer’s initial goal. Last was the methodology.
Bremer showcased advanced statistics in both descriptive and inferential techniques. For
example, predicted probability was key to correlating dispute settlement with power
status, as well as bivariate survival analysis regarding battle fatalities. The overall impact
was these bodies of work were instrumental in defining the connective tissue as to why
states fight.
The next four subsections inductively construct the steps-to-war theory. The
COW concepts of territory, rivalry, alliances, and arms races are first independently
analyzed and then synthesized into the theoretical framework. As with dyadic militarized
disputes and Stuart Bremer, each concept is referenced in a historical manner by the key
researcher.
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Territory
Territory was the first prominent steps-to-war subject area with roots in the COW
project. Since it had numerous researchers, it is best to examine it through a longitudinal,
thematic lens versus the researcher-based one. After compiling the war causal factors in
their earlier work, Singer and Small discerned that territory was by far the most
prominent (Singer et al., 1979). This implication was only the precipice because both
researchers surmised that further analysis was needed to unveil why it was so prevalent.
This section syntheses several territorial taxonomies, thereby showcasing the importance
of the war and peace studies field.
John Vasquez (1995) furthered the territory dialogue with “Why Do Neighbors
Fight? Proximity, Interaction, Or Territoriality.” His main premise was that the clustering
of war among neighbors may be conceptually significant; however, there is a territorial
aspect that must be accounted for. Territoriality, a term fittingly coined by Singer’s
former research assistant, is key to explaining that relationship. According to Vasquez,
there is a human tendency to occupy, and, if necessary, defend territory—in essence, the
meaning of territoriality. In other words, two states that border another used aggressive
displays to establish boundaries in areas where they meet (Vasquez, 1995; Senese &
Vasquez, 2003). This theory was in direct contrast to realism, which posited that nations
fought to gain power and thereby assure their survival.
Prior to territoriality, the two main factors were proximity and interaction. The
former is nothing more than the distance between states. More pointedly, proximity
correlated with opportunity. Meaning, if states were contiguous there was a higher
probability of war. On the other hand, interaction entailed relationships. Here, Vasquez
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stated, “As the number of interactions between states increases the number of
disagreements is apt to increase.” (Vasquez, 1995, p. 280). These interactions led to
learned behavior on how to settle disputes. Case in point, if a state had previously used
war to settle a conflict, then there was a higher probability it would do so again.
Contrarily, if negotiation or mediation was used, then the opposite would occur. So then,
territoriality concerned the motivation on how to handle territorial disputes.
Research design was straightforward. Vasquez used six propositions that were
cross walked along three fronts: territoriality, proximity, and interaction. For brevity’s
sake, each proposition is not addressed (Vasquez, 1995; Senese et al., 2003). It, however,
is important to remember that a key premise is that humans engage in collective violence
over territory not because of contiguity or relationships but from the learned behavior of
trying to defend borders or acquire new territories. And once those boundaries were fully
accepted by belligerents, then peace would ensue. If not, then violence conflict would
surely continue. To prove these propositions, a mix of descriptive probabilities and linear
regression was used. The key result was indeed interesting (Hensel & Mitchell, 2005,
2015; Johnson &Toft, 2013; Vasquez, 1995).
Vasquez statistically proved that war onset was avoided when there was an
acknowledgment on how to resolve territorial disputes. This finding answered the key
hypothesis that states fight over territory and not changes in power, which debunked the
realists’ claim of power-seeking (Vasquez, 1995). Proximity (i.e., opportunity) and
interaction were not the sole reasons that states fight but rather how they handled
mitigation of territorial disputes. What is important to remember is that Vasquez moved
the correlate of war debate beyond borders into the dispute resolution. The latter was
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critical in the development of peace studies (Hensel et al., 2015; Senese et al., 2003,
2008).
In 2001, Vasquez again with “Mapping the Probability of War Analyzing the
Possibility of Peace: The Role of Territorial Disputes” advanced the territory discussion.
This scholarly article was rooted in criticism. At the time, there was a consensus
amongst international relations scholars that the territory correlate did not actually predict
war onset. They gave three key deficiencies as to why not. First, there were not many
numerical cases of war. Vasquez acknowledged, “[W]ithin the MID data, there are 2034
disputes but only 102 that escalate to war, and several of these disputes that result in the
same war.” (Vasquez, 2001, p.147). This relatively low-N dataset did not lend well to
correlational analysis.
Second, there were just too many independent variables that impacted what
causes war. Of note, this is a major critique afforded by traditional IR theorists who
believed war could not be quantifiably studied (Singer, 1980). Last, war is not usually
instantaneous, rather it is a long process, making it difficult to understand. Vasquez
(2001) begrudgingly acknowledged this shortcoming, stating correlational analysis does
not do well with the longitudinal or stepwise processes. However, taking all of these
knowledge gaps into account, Vasquez countered with the notion that territorial disputes
indeed increased the probability of war, which is different from correlation (Vasquez,
2001; Senese et al., 2003, 2008).
Research design was predicated on testing whether territorial disputes increased
the likelihood of war. To accomplish, Vasquez's research methodology entailed
comparing conditional and base probabilities. He stated, “By comparing the conditional
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probability of territorial disputes escalating to war to the overall base probability, one can
make a valid inference about whether territorial disputes increase the probability of war
more than other types of dispute do.” (Vasquez, 2001, p. 150) Vasquez used the COW
project’s MID dataset and a dyadic unit of measure to create a series of probability tables.
The results supplemented his main hypothesis
There were three key findings. It was found that dyads dominated by territorial
disputes had a relatively high probability of having fought one war. In fact, there was a
probability was 25% higher than the base (Vasquez, 2001). Another interesting fact was
that territorial disputes do not make war inevitable, which was shown by the low number
of wars from states characterized by minimum territory-related issues. Lastly, Vasquez
controlled for major powers and regionalism in the context of territorial disputes. What
he found was that regions with a dominant state had fewer territory MIDs. Meaning,
major powers established or enforced the rules and norms that limit the number of
territorial wars (Vasquez, 2001).
In sum, this research had central far-ranging implications. It addressed the
academic criticism that plagued the COW project from its early days, which was there
was no valid method to correlate war. The shift to probability-based quantitative
methods was indeed accurate and repeatable. Equally important, Vasquez statistically
tested how a regional power impacted the territorial conflict with its sphere of influence.
This was a first and became the wellspring for other peace studies, especially the stepsto-war.
Walter (2003) introduced intractability into the territory discussion. In
“Explaining the Intractability of Territorial Conflict”, she focused almost exclusively on
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the intra-state conflict. Until then, previous COW research was almost exclusively on the
interstate war. One should remember that Singer (1972), who was a product of his time,
stressed the importance of determining why nations fought. However, by the early2000s, characterized by the Chechnyan separatist movement, increased extremism in the
Middle East-North Africa (MENA) regions, and other non-state actor violence, the
geopolitical landscape had changed (Huth, 1998). As such, Walter wanted to examine
how governments acted in territorial disputes with non-state actors.
The research design was simple and easy to follow, which afforded readers the
ability to comprehend and synthesis territorial impacts in intrastate conflict. The research
blueprint used both qualitative and quantitative methods. Taking the results from the
Center of International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) global survey,
Walter compiled a robust dataset and operationalize several key variables. They were the
number of ethnopolitical groups, economic value, strategic value, psychological value,
and balance of power. Linear regression was used to test four interlocking hypotheses
that primarily detailed a government’s willingness to accommodate demands for
territorial autonomy (Walter, 2003).
That said, there were three major findings. The first one is the number of ethnic
groups. If there was more than one revisionist subgroup, then the government did not
accommodate. In fact, Walter stated that these situations led to greater intensity because
governmental leaders did not want to set a precedent of being weak. Second are
democracies. Walter’s research delineated that democracies were more willing to
accommodate or seek resolution over territorial issues. Her rationale was that democratic
leader was beholden to an electorate, thereby they could not act without impunity
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(Walter, 2003; Hensel & Mitchell, 2005). Military expenditure was the last finding.
Here, a compromise was based on the monetary cost of war. As costs increased, Walter
(2003) statistically showed that governments were willing to accommodate the demands
of non-state actors. The primary reason was the continuation of war expenditures only
made the state weaker and more susceptible to loss or forced into an undesired outcome.
Although Walter’s work did not involve interstate conflict, it did further the
advancement of territory in the war onset discussion. More so, the simplistic, and yet
elegant design was not cumbersome as several previous COW research studies. Perhaps
most importantly, Walter proclaimed that China with its many contiguous states should
be significantly less willing to negotiate any territorial dispute with its neighbors or the
various ethnic groups residing with the Yellow Kingdom. This summation, according to
her, should be further researched.
Senese (2005) returned to the territorial debate when he released “Territory,
Contiguity, and International Conflict assessing a New Joint Explanation.” In 2005, he
injected the concept of territoriality. Hitherto, there were two territorial explanations for
the onset of war. Contiguity is the first. It is nothing more than two states that are
adjoined by a common border (Senese, 2005; Vasquez, 1995; Senese et al., 2003). Since
these entities were neighbors, then there was a greater possibility of disagreements. The
other explanation was territory. The idea here was that domestic populations were more
concerned with protecting the integrity of their land and willing to fight to do so (Sense,
2005). What Senese aimed to accomplish was to cumulatively examine both contiguity
and territory and how they led to conflict escalation and war.
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Before discussing the research design, it necessary to outlay two important
concepts that were integral to Sense’s hypotheses formulation. Star’s (1978) opportunity
and willingness framework afforded plausibility on how states entered war. Opportunity,
which is dependent on geographical proximity, stipulated that closeness equated to
numerous occasions to enter conflict. Willingness, according to Starr, was the degree to
which an interstate actor would pursue a prescribed policy (Senese, 2005; Starr, 1978).
These constructs were amendable to sequential hypotheses. The first test was dispute
onset, whereby Senese questioned whether contiguity and territorial claims would lead to
a dispute. The next one entailed war onset. Here, the researcher queried if proximity and
geographic conflict would indeed lead to war.
To remain aligned with the sequential nature of the abovementioned hypotheses,
the research framework was stepwise. Senese constructed a two-stage estimation
procedure, which relied on a dyadic unit of measurement, as a primary means of testing
his hypotheses. The first stage used MID data to derive if a dyad had a territorial dispute
and was contiguous, whereas the second included a test to determine if the dispute led to
war. The censored Probit technique produced expected probabilities, whereby a ranking
of four predetermined excursions: 1) not contiguous, no territorial disagreement; 2) Not
contiguous, territorial disagreement; 3) contiguous, no territorial disagreement; and 4)
contiguous, territorial agreement) could occur (Senese, 2005).
The findings were mixed. Based on the presence or absence of contiguity and
territorial claims, dyads that were contiguous and possessed land-based claims had higher
a higher probability of conflict than those without. This meant that bordering states with
territorial issues entered a militarized interstate dispute on a greater frequency. Senese
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(2005) revealed that the second stage result was unexpected. As support, he stated, “[I]t
does not support the explanation’s notion that contiguity will have some positive impact
on the likelihood of MIDs escalating to war.” (Senese, 2005, p. 777). In simple terms,
territorial MIDs escalating into full-scale combat was inconclusive. Why is this article
relevant? Senese clearly linked the territory discussion with MID and war onset. This
joint account is important because previous work was arguably cumbersome and complex
(Senese, 2005; Senese & Vasquez, 2003). Equally significant was highlighting war onset
as it related to national resolve. Research on a state’s willingness to enter war is not new;
there have been numerous qualitative accounts thereof. What Senese managed was a
quantitative outlook on resolve as it pertained to war onset, especially contiguous and
non-contiguous states. Meaning, countries that do not border each other tend not to
engage in territorial MIDs. However, when they do, non-contiguous belligerents clearly
signal their resolve through escalation. This salient point does allow providence on Sino
activity in the South China Sea.
The last territory-related subject area encompassed a multifaceted typology of
territorial linkages to militarized interstate disputes. Gibler (2017) outlaid the
classification of states involved in territorial disputes from 1816 to 2001. He primarily
differentiated between cases where territorial ownership was disputed and instances
whereby the status quo distribution of land is acknowledged. As a refresher, it is
important to remember that MIDs are divided into four specific categories—territory,
policy, regime, and others (Bremer, 1992). Gibler contended this division is important
because a subnational number of studies, over 240 to be exact (Singer, 2002), have
demonstrated that “territorial issues are more difficult to resolve, more likely to repeat,
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more prone to fatalities, and more likely to cause wars than other types of issues” (Gibler,
2017, p. 194).
In “What They Fit For: Specific Territorial Issues in Militarized Interstate
Dispute, 1816-2001”, Giber (2017) had two main goals. First, he provided an extensive
listing of the types of territorial issues that countries fight over, which he divided between
location and uncertainty levels of ownership. Homelands, islands, and colonies were
examples. Second, the scholar showcased which land-related issues were more serious
than others. The types of territorial issues in military disputes were expansive. However,
there were five subcategories that necessitate further analysis. The first one was disputed
ownership of a territory. Gibler expounded that border areas, islands, colonies, and
maritime areas constituted this conflict category. Of significance, the delineation of seabased conflict was new to the COW project. Second is the time-tested border issues,
which was straightforward. Opportunity-based territorial conflict was third. It is
characterized by revanchism, weak states, predatory states, and general. Fourth is state
system changes, which is comprised of new and disintegrating states. Gibler’s last
territorial conflict classification was border violations. Land, maritime, and air
personified this subset (Gibler, 2017). To analyze the territorial issue distribution, a
simple frequency technique was used. There were three cases in which conflict incidents
were binned: number of disputes, the number of fatal MIDs, and the number of wars. As
expected, disputed ownership, particularly over border areas, resulted in the highest
percentage (21%) of fatalities. What was unexpected, according to Gibler, was that
island disputed resulted in the highest number of wars (Gibler, 2017).
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The research design to test the seriousness of land-related issues was more
sophisticated than the distribution type. Gibler relied on dyadic analysis and multi-linear
regression to examine five distinct outcome variables, which were purposefully aligned to
the distribution list. The predictor variables were contiguity, democracy, defense pacts,
and capability differentials. The results were enlightening and because of its statistical
significance across all outcome variables, contiguity, by far, was the best predictor of
conflict. In fact, Gibler correlated that territory related MIDs did escalate to fatal
disputes and war. Democracies had a negative effect on conflict onset. Meaning,
democratic government was less likely to enter an opportunity-based territorial conflict,
which is consistent with most peace study literature. Capability mattered in opportunity
cases; however, it did not impact any other cases. Defense pacts were not significant in
any category (Gibler, 2017; Jones et al., 1996). In sum, Gibler's major contribution to
territorial disputes was the expansion of knowledge. His subdivision of the territorial
MID into numerous variables showed how ownership and opportunity were integral to
the onset of violent conflict. Furthermore, his use of state status—i.e., new or
disintegrating was a fresh look at the international system as it pertains to territorial
issues.
Rivalry
Rivalries are the second essential topic associated with the steps-to-war theory. In
the early-1990s, the term was conceptualized by COW stalwarts Gary Goertz and Paul
Diehl. At its crux, a rivalry is recurrent-conflict between states that significantly impact
interstate-relationships and -behavior is primarily a negative manner (Goertz & Diehl,
1993; Klein, Goertz, & Diehl, 2006). Although it comes in my forms, here, interstate
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competitiveness is manifested in four dimensions: spatial, duration, competition severity,
and repeated conflict (Mitchell & Vasquez, 2014). For most states, rivalries are expensive
in terms of economic and opportunity cost because of the need to increase military and
other power capabilities. More importantly, interstate enmities have been statistically
linked to war onset. Below is a 35-year account of the rival-war correlation research
organized by key rivalry-war researchers. It starts with enduring conflict in the spatial
and positional domains, moves to strategic long-term competitions, and finally ends with
rivalry maintenance and recurring issues (Goertz et al., 1993; Klein et al, 2006, Sarkees,
2000).
Goertz and Diehl (1993) sought to define and explore the concept of enduring
rivalries. The latter was described as a competition between states that is comprised of
various degrees of competitiveness, time, and spatial aspects. The contest is militaryoriented and geared towards either obtaining a tangible good, such as territory, or an
intangible one akin to prestige. Time, in this case, has a far-ranging temporal aspect
(Goertz et al., 1993; Goertz et al., 2000; Wayman, 2000). Goertz et al. (1993) posited it
was greater than three to five years. More so, enduring rivalries do not endure forever
but have a beginning and end. With a few exceptions, the spatial attributes were mostly
dyadic. But the scholars were clear to point out that a good definition of rivalries should
not have a limit on the number of belligerent and should account for multi-lateral
interstate conflict.
That said, this qualitative study was an exercise in comparing the operational
definition of rivalry from various authors using a framework of time, dispute number, and
termination comparison metrics. Prior to analyzing the results, it is necessary to identify
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and provide a succinct overview of the four selected authors’ definitions. Wayman (1990)
is the first. He used a minimum of 11 years, two disputes, and termination of the rivalry
of 10 years without disputes to operationalize rivalry. Next, there was Diehl. He defined
rivalry as no minimum length of disputes, three disputes, and rivalry termination as 10
years without conflict (Diehl, 1985). Then, there was Gochman and Maoz (1984) whose
definition had no minimum length, included seven MIDs, and no time period for
termination. Finally, the COW project articulated rivalry as 25 years of conflict, a
minimum of 5 disputes, and 10 years with no open hostility. All in all, Goertz et al.
(1993) clearly articulated the various rivalry definitions. It is now time to examine their
results and the findings were undeniably informative. Based on the above criteria, there
were numerous rivalry totals. Wayman led the list with 276 dyads. He was followed by
Diehl whose tally was 148 rivalries. Gochman and Maoz were third with 52 cases and
followed by the COW project relatively low 30 enduring competitions (Gochman et al.
1984; Goertz et al., 1993).
Equally important was Goertz and Diehl's synopsis on these definitions and
suitability for research. According to them, Gochman and Maoz were the worst because
of the lack of a temporal aspect and inability to delineate the start and finish of rivalries.
Both Diehl and Wayman’s operational definitions were best suited for research where
rivalries are the background material (Goertz et al., 1993). Unsurprisingly, Goertz and
Diehl (2003) proclaimed that the COW definition was for studies where enduring
rivalries were the focus. In sum, what is important to remember is that Goertz and Diehl
(1993) closed knowledge gaps by clearly articulating what rivalry definitions were best
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suited for requisite studies. This effort was an attempt to lessen some of the criticism
over rivalries in the context of war causation.
Colaresi and Thompson (2002) further explored the rivalry debate with their
analysis of how protracted conflict was relevant in crisis escalation. It is important to
remember that Colaresi's focus area was conflict escalation, whereas Thompson
purported strategic rivalries. When teamed together, the researchers argued for the idea
of rivalry possessing fewer limitations than protracted conflict (Colaresi & Thompson,
2002). There were two key tenets to the abovementioned supposition. Strategic rivalry,
which is the proclaimed enmity between countries, is one (Thompson, 2001). Equally
important was escalation. When merged, the key hypothesis was that rivalry crises are
more likely to become violent.
To test this support, the research design was quantitative in nature. Brecher and
Wilkenfeld's (Colaresi et al., 2002) escalation model, which used to identify 16
independent variables, to account for war. After deriving several propositions, chi-square
tests of independence were used to explore bivariate relationships. The test results
showcased that out of 204 identified rivalries, 94 of them were strategic, which is an
astounding 67%. More interestingly, there were two key findings. The researchers
determined a small number of dyads were responsible for a disproportionate amount of
total conflict in the international system. Second, a crisis between rival dyads as
compared to non-rival crises was more prone to threats, militarized action, and ultimately
war (Colaresi et al., 2002; Thompson, 2001).
In the same way, Goertz, Jones, and Diehl (2005) posited that rivalries were
maintained through the failure of realist strategies and conflict management techniques.
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This initial exploration study focused on the former. Continuing, the research team
believed that most repeated-conflict studies, which were common in COW research, were
myopic in their persistence in identifying past influences. Moreover, the scholars argued
the time horizons for recurring-conflict studies were perhaps too broad and linear and
therefore should be narrower (Goertz & Diehl, 2000). Goertz et al. further expounded,
“This is often theoretically unappealing because of the connection between conflict,
sometimes more than a hundred years apart, is frequently tenuous.” (Goertz et al., 2005,
p. 766) On top of these viewpoints, rivalry-specific studies were regarded as short-sighted
because of the sole dependence on conflict initiation and outcomes to understanding
rivalry continuation. The research team posited that what between the endpoint was
perhaps more important (Goertz et al., 2005).
Goertz and his colleagues were not proponents of realism as a viable theory to
examine rivalry maintenance. Their rationale is nuanced. Since realist strategies often
included coercive tactics and power politics, it made determining rivalry causality
difficult. Meaning, the issue becomes is rivalry a product of or accelerant for conflictual
behavior between states (Goertz et al., 2000; Goertz et al., 2005). As one can see, this
conundrum does not facilitate valid and reliable research. Therefore, the academics
adopted the punctuated equilibrium theory as an analytical framework to explore conflict
maintenance. The theorem postulated that rivalries go through several stages, invoking
that these competitions follow a path of dependence. Goertz and the other scholars
(Goertz et al., 2005, p. 763) categorized the path into four disparate steps; they were
initiation (first two disputes), lock-in (third through fifth disputes), stasis (sixth dispute
and beyond), and culmination.
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When it came to research design to answer how are rivalries maintained, a twomodel quantitative construct was implemented. Model I centered on the impact of
previous disputes on rivalry maintenance, whereas Model II focused on life cycles. Data
was accessed via the COW rivalry dataset, which at the time was a relatively new
addition to the COW information catalog. A total of 1,166 rivalries were identified for
further testing. The statistical test applied was linear regression. The outcome variable
was dispute recurrence. There were several maintenance predictor variables: stalemate,
victory, severity, territory, and duration (Goertz et al., 2005).
Taking the above-mentioned overview into account, there were a few pertinent
outcomes. Model I proved that stalemates in militarized hostilities are the most
statistically significant indicator as to why rivalries are maintained. It was more than
either victory, severity, or the other predictor variables. The rationale is that a stalemate
signals the conflict strategies have not succeeded and thus disputants continue their
rivalry. Equally pertinent was the fact that disputes mainly occur in rapid fashion, usually
within two years. Regarding Model II, it revealed that dispute outcomes mattered in the
early stages in the rivalry, but quickly dissipated during the later stages. What is most
important was the only clear indicator in the late-stage rivalry maintenance was territory,
which meant that states that fought over geography remained enemies. This result aligned
with most war-study literature (Goertz et al., 2005).
All in all, this study expanded rival-war analysis by investigating interstate
conflict maintenance. To start, the use of the punctuated equilibrium theory was new and
novel. As a reminder, one of the key criticisms of COW research was the lack of theory.
This form of equilibrium theory stressed that hostile interstate relationships enter a stasis
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phase after six or more MIDs, and it would take a political shock to culminate the rivalry
(Goertz et al., 2005). Second, this study illuminated that indeed rivalry context mattered
in predicting future disputes. The predictor variables (victory, stalemate, dispute
severity, territory, etc.) were critical indicators as to why nations continue to compete.
The research team stated the only non-statistically significant predictor was a victory. A
fact that is believable because a state winning a military contest does not equate to the
vanquished being pacified. Last, this body of work successfully demonstrated that rivalry
maintenance was not linear, which previous repeated-conflict research ascertained.
Rather, Goertz and his colleagues statistically displaced that rivalry maintenance varied
over the life cycle of the rivalry. When these three findings are combined, the expansion
of knowledge did improve the understanding of rivalry in the war studies context (Goertz
et al, 2005).
One last piece of rivalry literature concerned problem aggregation and militarized
incidence. Dreyer (2010), a major proponent of strategic rivalries, believed issue
accumulation increased the likelihood of militarized conflict. Hitherto, most research
tended to examine and compare disputes in isolation (Bremer, 1992; Senese et al., 2005).
Dreyer contended this technique was not valid became most issues between states
aggregate over time. In fact, he surmised that after an initial conflict, states would
develop an image of “enemy” toward another as multiple issues transpired. This effect
eventually would lead to an enduring strategic rivalry, which Dreyer claimed must be
studied (Dreyer, 2010).
Another reason Dreyer wanted to explore strategic rivalry dynamic was both
temporal and escalatory in nature. The academic was particularly partial to the notion of
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the volcano model as an explanatory justification as to why strategic rivals go to war.
The idea here is that as disputes occur over time they tend to escalate and spiral out of
control. As such, Dreyer argued that tempo was an essential element in issue conflict
accumulation and war onset (Dreyer, 2010).
Using the Issues Correlate of War (ICOW) database, Dreyer amassed four distinct
issues that fuel strategic rivalry (Dreyer, 2010; Hensel & Mitchell, 2015). Spatial issues
involve territory, as mentioned is stable in the war-studies. Positional issues aligned with
realist claims that states seek power to maintain their security (Colaresi et al., 2005;
Thompson, 1995). Third, is ideological. The point here is that states compete in the best
way to organize a global or regional system. The Cold War is a prime example (Dreyer,
2010; Thompson, 1999). The last issue, which was added by Dreyer, is identity. This
contention is based on either ethnic, religious, or racial strife. In all, there were 98
instances of issue accumulation of strategic rivals (Dreyer, 2010).
Dreyer’s research design was commensurate with other rivalry studies; he used
linear regression to test premises. There were four hypotheses developed for statistical
analysis via two models. One excursion assessed issue accumulation, while the other
addressed the tempo of escalation. The key dependent variable was the occurrence of an
interstate war. The independent variables were tenets of the ICOW database, which are
spatial, positional, ideological, and identity. Before covering the results, it is important to
note that the timeframe was from 1816-2000, a substantial expansion from previous
rivalry research (Dreyer, 2010).
The study findings were varied. With respect to issue accumulation, Dreyer
derived, "Overall, moving from a single-issue conflict to the accumulation of two issues,
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the probability of a militarized dispute changes from .091 to .198, an absolute difference
of .107 and a 118% increase over the baseline." (Dreyer, 2010, p. 789). This result
supported the notion that strategic rivals would often bear the burden of developing
military capability and engaging in militarized conflict to overcome their respective
opponents (Wayman, 2000). Another key discovery concerned rapidity, whereby most
states become rivals within in the first year of a MID outcome. In fact, the significance
of long-term issue accumulation is that it demonstrated states become locked-in as they
compete, using tit-for-tat power politics until war breaks out. This result supported the
volcano model in which a gradual increase in issue accumulation tended to increase the
chances of interstate war (Dreyer, 2010).
What is important to remember is that Dreyer's treatise expanded knowledge on
issue accumulation and conflict escalation within a strategic rivalry. The further
development of existing issue typology could impact future research. More so, Dreyer’s
use of the volcano model supported Goertz et al. (2005) viewpoint. Whereas the latter
stipulated that it took six or more disputes for states to enter an enduring rivalry, Dreyer
also empirically showed that salience of the issue extrapolated over a relatively long time
period could lead to interstate armed conflict. A fact that bolstered the steps-to-war
argument that rivalry does increase the probability of war.
Overall, the abovementioned context has delineated considerable gains in rivalry
research. Both Diehl and Goertz (2000) effectively categorized rivalry dimensions,
advancing study techniques beyond dyadic MIDs. Thompson and his colleagues’ body
of work on strategic rivalries was pivotal in expanding the rival-war study field away
from spatial and positional competitions to more conclusive content (Thompson, 1995,
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1999, 2001). Dreyer’s issues research successfully updated and solidified what exactly
entailed a rivalry, effectively bringing the rivalry-war field of study into the modern era.
Perhaps most importantly, the empirical work on rivalry has proven that it instrumental in
bringing about war.
Alliances
Alliances have been a key component and an integral study area for steps-to-war
research. More so, it is the third supporting premise of the STW theory. There remains
debate on whether formal interstate agreements contribute or prevent war. It is also
worth mentioning that several scholars contend that alliance polarization promotes the
commencement of hostilities amongst states (Gibler & Vasquez, 1998; Levy, 1981;
Singer et al., 1972). This section examines some vital literature on alliances as it pertains
to war causation. As with other steps-to-war attributes, most alliance-war analyses have
leaned toward qualitative investigations. This circumstance is not the case here. The
four below-listed scholarly articles are indeed seminal, having created, corrected, or
expanded knowledge with respect to treaties and military conflict. But what is more
relevant is their empirical nature and advanced quantitative research methods. Similar to
other literature review sections, the first treatise is from a long-standing scholar in the
COW project.
One of the seminal alliance studies was performed by Jack Levy, an influential
member of the COW project. He desired to examine whether alliance formation
contributed to peace or war with respect to Great Powers. Up until Levy’s study, alliance
literature was mixed. There was a school that contended alliances promoted peace
because of reduced uncertainty in the international system, thereby alleviating state
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misperception and miscalculation. The other scholar group believed alliances generated
counter-alliances, which furthered mistrust and tensions between states, leading to arms
races and ultimately war (Levy, 1981; Singer et al, 1972; Small & Singer, 1990). With
this mind, Levy argued recent empirical studies were rendered inconclusive. A situation
in which he wanted to rectify.
Levy concentrated on relational theories the balance of power and power
transition, to ascertain war causation. He, therefore, focused on the Great Powers
because they were the primary actors in most interstate wars. As such, a succinct
summary of what entails a Great Power is warranted here. According to Levy, a Great
Power is a state that played a major role in international security-related politics. Key
attributes are possession of a high-level of power capabilities; participation in the
international system; recognition by that system as a Great Power. (Levy, 1981).
To start, the research question queried whether high periods of alliance formation
were followed by war. The chronological aspect was an expansive 500 years. Levy went
further left in time to the 1500s to start his analysis, which was different from the 1815
timestamp that was prevalent amongst war studies at the time. He advocated, “A more
extended temporal domain would increase the number of cases and, by increasing the
variation in underly international conditions, facilitate comparative historical analysis”
(Levy, 1981, p. 585).
With the COW dataset as the repository, Levy chose the occurrence of interstate
war as the independent variable. There were several dummy variables operationalized to
broaden examination. These war indicators were frequency, duration, extent, magnitude,
severity, intensity, etc. all of which were transcribed from Singer's Handbook of War
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(Levy, 1981; Singer et al., 1972). Although there were other war types, Great Power
military action was deemed more statistically important. This conflict form was derived
from historical accounts and COW's power capability index. The dependent variable was
the international alliance formation. It is necessary to mention the sole alliance type
tested was defensive in character. That said, the research design was correlation analysis
(i.e., Kendall's tau b). Here, Levy conducted a statistical analysis to test the relational
strength between the independent variable and the prescribed dependent variables. The
results, at the time, were groundbreaking (Gibler & Sarkees, 2004; Levy, 1981).
Levy’s study encompassed two key findings. The first concerned the relationship
between alliance and war. According to him, nearly 80% of the great power treaty
formation was followed by war. This outcome was aligned with power transition
theorists and those scholars that contended alliances destabilized the international system.
Even more profound was Levy’s other finding that delineated alliance formation was
associated with peace, especially in the 19th and 20th centuries, rather than war. These
results were duplicitous. Levy gave no formal justification as to why they were not
conclusive, which would further “muddy” the alliance and war onset debate (Gibler et al.,
2004; Levy, 1981).
Although arguably inconclusive, Levy’s study did have three salient
accomplishments within the alliance-war study field. First, it expanded the modern-day
international state system from 1815 to the late-15th century. This action added further
historical context and increased the number of cases. Second, Levy focused on the Great
Powers. This explicit emphasis was one of the first of its kind in empirical war causation
research within the confines of dominant state interaction. Last, according to Levy, his

61
work expanded research techniques from simple correlation analysis toward more
advance descriptive forms that afforded greater refinement in alliance-war research
(Levy, 1981).
In 2000, the alliance-war research became more intricate and expansive when
Leeds, Long, and Mitchell aimed to explore alliance reliability under a revised set of
obligations. Upfront, this study is a replica of Alan Sabrosky's, an acolyte of the COW
project movement during the early days, work on alliances wherein the premise was that
alliance reliability is predicated on war performance opportunity. Meaning, treaties were
measured on whether the respective allies fought together in a war (Leeds, Long, &
Mitchell, 2000; Sabrosky, 1980).
For clarification's sake, it is necessary to offer a brief overview of this
foundational study. Data collection and research design were straightforward. The COW
dataset was the information bank used to obtain treaty data. Alliances were divided into
three categories: defensive, non-aggression, and entente. Sabrosky coded each war
participant as one who belonged to an alliance and subsequently fought in a war as either
honored, violated, or abstained. The overall results were 27% of the time allies fought
for one another; neutrality was prevalent 61%, which left 12% of the identified cases as
allies who fought against another. More pointedly, the key takeaway from Sabrosky’s
research was that alliance obligations were only met 24% of the time (Gibler, 2000;
Sabrosky, 1980). This discovery cast a long shadow on the alliance study, and to a
greater extent, war causation research, for years. Leeds and his fellow researcher desired
to illuminate and resolve Sabrosky’s unintentional research shortfalls.
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Concerning alliances and war onset, Leeds et al. (2000) believed there was a gap
between theory and empirical evidence. Meaning, with only 24% treaty obligation
completion rates, then why would any sane state leader enter an alliance with another
country. More so, Sabrosky's work did not account for the differences between neutrality
and consultation, treating both the same (Leeds et al., 2000). Another shortfall was the
assumption made that alliance requires a fight, thereby taking into consideration that war
context matters. As such, Leeds and his colleagues deemed it necessary to redo
Sabrosky’s seminal study (Gibler, 2000; Leeds et al., 2000).
There were two major research modifications. The first one necessitated a new
alliance dataset. Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) was created to
improve information on alliance treaties. To clarify, Leeds et al. (2000) defined alliance
as a written agreement, signed by official representatives of at least two independent
states, with three key tenets: 1) promise to aid an ally in military conflict; 2) remain
neutral; 3) refrain from military conflict, or 4) consult one another before fighting. This
construct was more detailed that Sabrosky’s defensive, neutral, and entente typology.
After operationalization, there was also a case difference. Or rather, the COW data
repository included 146 recorded alliances between 1815 and 1944, whereas ATOP
contained a more robust 213 cases (Leeds et al., 200).
The second alteration involved adding context. Leeds et al. (2000) argued there
was a level of assistance with associated treaty conditions, which meant there were more
attributes than COW’s three types of pacts. Therefore, they created five dummy variables
of defense, offense, neutrality, nonaggression, or consultation to help examine treaty
provision. Alliance obligations were the other added framework. They were
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substantially more numerous in the updated study; however, there were some key ones.
Specific adversaries, specified locations, and pertinent ongoing conflict are a few
examples of different types of obligations that shape alliance formation (Leeds et al.,
2000).
Keeping the previous research methodology constant, Leeds et al. (2000)
discovered a sole, distinct finding from Sabrosky. The addition and examination of
obligation into the research technique revealed that 75% of alliance obligations were
indeed met, which is a significant difference from 24%. What is perhaps more important
is that a key knowledge gap on alliance reliability was filled by delineating the relevance
of treaty obligations. By updating Sabrosky's work with a new alliance classification and
more robust dataset, Leeds et al. (2000) corrected some spurious data within the COW
dataset and help bring consensus that alliances do matter in war causation studies (Gibler
et al., 2004; Kimball, 2006; Leeds et al., 2000).
Leeds returned to alliance-war debate, in 2003, when he published his second
study. The main research aim was to examine the different types of alliance
commitments and the probability of military conflict. There were several factors as to
why Leeds felt his study was relevant. Since scholars could not establish a robust
empirical relationship between alliances and war, the alliance-war political scientist
believed this knowledge shortfall should be addressed (Leeds, 2003). According to
Leeds, there were two main reasons for this deficiency. Alliance behavior is undeniably
duplicitous, encouraging some states to embark on military conflict while deterring
others. The other flaw entailed the dichotomy between targets and challengers. Targeted
states with allies are mistakenly less willing to concede to challengers. Challengers with
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alliances are less easily deterred from war. What is interesting is that both cases might be
in the best interests of these states (Leeds, 2003).
A key component of this study is how Leeds characterized alliances. He
contended, they were "written agreements, signed by official representatives of at least
two independent states, which include promises to aid a partner in the event of military
conflict, to remain neutral in the event of a conflict, to refrain from a military conflict
with one another, or to consult in the event of international crises that create a potential
for military conflict." (Leeds, 2003, p. 429) This definition was reminiscent of his
previous research with the addition of an international crisis segment—an attempt to
stymy criticism.
To accomplish the study objectives, there were three hypotheses. Here is a brief
description of each. The first one opined that challengers would not initiate conflict with
a target if the latter had allies. Conversely, Leeds tested if a challenger would start a
military conflict with a target if they had offensive allies. The last one, centered on
neutrality interstate neutrality pledges, involved a case in which the challenger would
remain neutral and not instigate conflict upon a target (Leeds, 2003).
Hypotheses were assessed with two primary statistical tests. Inferential techniques
used regression with MIDs as the outcome variables. Power capability, democratic
regime, contiguity, and alliances were the predictors. On the other hand, descriptive
tests, which primarily centered on the percentage differentiation in probability, measured
states with dispute initiation against various alliance types. Of significance, alliance and
conflict data was pulled from the ATOP dataset (Leeds et al., 2000; Leeds, 2003).
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For greater clarity, results are addressed by the statistical test. There were two
inferential findings. First, strong challengers who possessed credible power capabilities
and were contiguous with the target state are more likely to start a military conflict.
Second, states with similar alliance types were less likely to initiate conflict amidst
themselves or against others. The tenet that states with a small number of capable allies
often exist in a relatively stable geopolitical environment is arguably applicable in this
case (Leeds, 2003).
Differential test results were equally profound. Leeds proved target states with
defensive alliance agreements had a 28% lower probability of being attacked. Another
outcome illustrated that a challenger that was a signatory of an offensive alliance treaty
had a 48% higher chance of starting a conflict with another country (Leeds, 2003).
Perhaps the most illuminating finding was that challengers with neutrality agreements
from outside states have a 58% higher probability of initiating a war. This result
coincides with the premise that states enter neutrality alliances to keep external states
from interfering with the former's military and political aims against a target state (Leeds,
2003).
According to Leeds (2003), he achieved two key goals in this study. He
adequately expanded the knowledge on the theory of alliances beyond the normative
deterrence models. By that, the research showed that states were often encouraged to
initiate conflict based on treaty obligation. The other accomplishment was the provision
of empirical support that alliances do indeed influence interstate behavior and
relationships as it pertains to war onset.
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In totality, it was made clear that alliances do contribute to war initiation. What
this section has illuminated is that treaty obligations and the level of agreement are
integral to quantifying if, and when, a state enters a defense pact (Levy, 1981; Siverson &
King, 1980). From there, the literature also purported the clarification if warfare would
soon follow alliance formations (Gibler & Vasquez, 1998; Gibler et al., 2004; Leeds,
2000, 2003). More importantly, some of the validity issues associated with the earlier
alliance-war research and spurious data were either reduced, clarified, or outright
eliminated.
Arms Races
Arms races are the last key indicator of war onset addressed and premise of the
steps-to-war theory. In 1979, peace researcher Michael Wallace, an original member of
the COW project, conducted a study on arms buildups. The main research objective was
to determine whether arms races affected the probability that serious dispute between
Major Powers would occur, especially as it pertained to conflict escalation (Wallace,
1979; Siverson & Diehl, 1989). One of the first items, Wallace had to accomplish was
defining an arms race, which was controversial at that time. His definition was two-fold.
According to Wallace (1979, 1982), a buildup amongst states involved an abnormal,
simultaneous increase in expenditure on war materiel coupled with a competitive rivalry.
From here, Wallace examined militarized disputes between major states from 1816 to
1965, thereby creating an intricate index that encapsulated MIDs, arms buildups, and war.
To answer the research question, a simplistic analysis design was used. Wallace
used 2x2 contingency tables to determine whether arms race escalated to war (i.e.,
dependent variable). The predictors (i.e., independent variables), ascertained from his
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index, were domain, serious disputes, and war. What Wallace discovered was that 23 of
the 26 disputes that escalated to war were preceded by arms races (Wallace, 1979;
Sample, 1997). In another context, there was an 82% chance that if an arms race was
ongoing between two countries when a MID materialized, then they went war (Wallace,
1979).
There was much criticism on Wallace's findings because of its challenges to
traditional assumptions about political relations between states. Siverson and Diehl
(1989) reported that Weede, a major political science scholar circa 1980, had two major
objections. First, Wallace’s sample did not account for the two World Wars, which
overweighed arms buildups and escalation. Second, the study did not account for
unilateral buildups. Meaning, some countries increased their military capability
independent of rivalry and this is based on the need to protect their newfound prosperity.
Weede contended that this circumstance was “roped” into Wallace’s index. Last, there
was a critique that Wallace's initial work was not theoretically based or used an accepted
model to test. In short, there were serious concerns regarding the validity and reliability
of Wallace’s initial work (Sample, 1997; Siverson et al., 1989).
Despite these shortcomings, Wallace’s initial studies accomplished three things.
It was the first serious empirical analysis on the impact of arms races and war causation.
The stepwise examination on how countries’ military expenditures and hostile relations
were indeed revolutionary, expanding the knowledge gap in war studies. Second, and
perhaps most interesting, Wallace’s treatise dominated the war and peace study field as it
pertained to arms races for nearly 20 years. It prompted near-constant debate and
criticism from a host of scholars (Sample, 1997; Wallace, 1979, 1982).
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In the late-1990s, Susan Sample (1997, 1998, 2002) forayed into the arms race
debate. She resolved much of the debate with several studies. One of her first goals was
to end the Wallace logjam in arms buildup discourse. She stressed, “Far too much time
was spent arguing about minor methodological issues rather than resolving those and
progressing naturally to the questions now addressed.” (Sample, 1998, p. 122).
To this end, her first major study’s main research objective was to test whether
ongoing military buildups increased the chances of a MID. More importantly, the
professor stressed the necessity to move beyond bivariate to multivariate analysis
techniques. With slight modifications to the arms race definition in which acceleration
and a ten-year year military growth period were interjected, Sample (1998) setup a
multilinear regression. The independent variables were territory, defense burden, nuclear
weapons, and power transition, whereas the dependent one entailed escalation. Of
significance, both variable forms were dichotomous, rendering familiar outcomes.
Research results were conventional. First, countries involved in on-going arms
races and disputes are more than twice as likely to escalate to higher conflict. More so,
the probability of a dispute escalating to war with the stepwise addition of territory,
defense expenditures, and weapons of mass destruction, was 59%. When power parity
and transition are added, the percentage increased to 69% (Sample 1997b, 1998). More
importantly, Sample did two key things for the advancement of knowledge. Although
dichotomous and therefore somewhat simple, the switch from bivariate to multivariate
analysis incorporated other factors in which not only impacted the outcome variable but
also relationships between predictors. Another key accomplishment was finally

69
advancing the arms race debate beyond Wallace’s seminal 1979 article (Sample, 1997,
1998).
A few years later, Sample (2002) again enhanced upon earlier military buildup
research in the context of the balance of power and deterrence theory, particularly in the
post-World War era. Sample’s (1997b, 2002) main aim was to identify different domains
influenced by arms races and conflict escalation. The former can be viewed as the
dichotomy between major and minor states, including the combination of both. Using a
logit regression model to test numerous propositions, Sample’s key finding was that
mutual arms races increased the escalation of war for both major (i.e., major-major) and
minor (i.e., minor-minor) state disputes, but not for mixed conflict (i.e., Major-Minor).
Aside from this monumental finding, Sample expanded the war study field. Her
examination of post-World War II escalation between interstate domains was pathsetting. More pointedly, she contended the notions of balance of power and deterrence
strategy were not limited to major states and hegemons but require a concerted
recognition that minor states have a role in conflict escalation (Sample, 2002).
In sum, Sample helped resolve much of the arms race controversy by conducting
myriad tests, holding the military buildups constant, while simultaneously controlling for
other key factors such as territory, nuclear weapons, and domain status. He findings led
to numerous scholars, in both international relations and war studies, to admit that arms
races have a modest, positive, and significant association with conflict escalation (Sample
1997a, 1997b; Colaresi et al., 2005; Rider, Findley, & Diehl, 2011).
If Sample dominated the arms buildup dialogue in the 2000s, then Rider propelled
it for the 2010s. Rider's first study dealt with arms race onset. Particularly, he contended
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states entered arms buildup over salient issues, which are rivalry, threat, and territorial
competition (Rider, 2009). This supposition is because arms races are costly endeavors,
prone to escalation. Rider argued the impacts were two-fold. Short term impacts are
spent resources; the long term is economic decline. Gibler, Rider, and Hutchison (2005)
defined arms race as an “interactive competition between two rival nations using their
military. This definition is what Gibler used to test his two prime hypotheses. The first
test sought to discern if heightened threat levels equated to greater probability for arms
races. Similarly, the second one contended territorial threat correlated to rivals entering a
military buildup versus other disputes, such as policy and regime (Gibler et al., 2005;
Rider, 2009).
The research methodology was more intricate compared to earlier studies. Rider
developed a time-series cross-sectional design to determine if indeed arms race onset
(i.e., outcome variable) was predicated on revisionist tendencies. The latter is
categorized as territory, policy, and regime, which are the predictor variable. In addition,
control variables such as contiguity, parity, joint democracy, and joint alliance were used
to help alleviate confounding variables. They were chosen because of their momentous
influence within the international system. For example, most states share a border and
therefore contiguity is relevant. Another case is that power capability amongst nations is
a key attribute in interstate relations. Both hypotheses arguably necessitated control
variables, thereby preventing faulty results (Rider, 2009).
Rider’s two models provided some insightful results. The first one tested the
threat hypothesis. Through analysis, the researcher delineated that at least one MID
experienced within the last five years is a positive and significant attribute for arms
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buildup onset (Rider, 2009). The second model tested the territorial threat hypothesis. As
stated, states experiencing intimidations are more likely to engage in arms races.
However, it is only one type of threat that produced one, territorial. Rider explained,
“This is because high costs of arms races, both immediate and potential, discourage states
from using them as a tool of competition except in circumstances where the stakes are
particularly salient.” (Rider, 2009, p. 700). What is key to remember from this research
is that military buildup was not assessed as an outcome condition, but rather as a
precursor. The importance, according to Rider, is that if one knew the onset conditions,
then policy could be developed to prevent the actual occurrence of a multilateral arms
buildup (Gibler et al., 2005; Rider, 2009).
Rider’s next analysis dealt with arms races as they pertained to rivalry. The main
research aim was to see if military buildups are more prevalent in rivalries and are a
consequence thereof (Rider, 2011). Although this study was a replica of Wallace (1979)
and Diehl's (1982) earlier work, it was more aggressive than his previous one because
there were three propositions. Rider (2011) sought to assess if arms races were more
frequent in rivalries, followed by the timing of such buildups, and finally if that
relationship with war onset is spurious.
The research framework was advanced, characterized by curvilinear relationship
and Probit regression analysis. One of the first tasks was to define rivalry, which was
characterized by Political Relevant Dyads (PRDs) that encapsulated states with divergent
goals (Diehl, 1992). The analysis proved insightful. First, Rider demonstrated that arms
races do occur more frequently in state-based competitions. Second, he showed how
military buildups usually happen in the middle and late stages of rivalry. Lastly,
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frequencies of arms races are especially higher in war dyads than non-war dyads. More
importantly, only when they occur in rivalry latter stages does the probability of war
increased (Diehl, 1992; Rider, 2011; Wallace, 1979).
In totality, these disparate studies; specifically, territory, rivalry, alliances, and
arms races have expanded knowledge of why states go to war. They provided strong
theoretical and statistical evidence on who fights whom, and why, closing a critical
knowledge gap.

Furthermore, the correlates of war were examined in a disaggregated

manner. Meaning, each one was primarily reviewed as a single factor versus the sum of
parts. For instance, Bremer (1992) and Vasquez (1995, 2001, 2008) posited that MIDs
over territory and revisionism lead to war. Diehl and Goertz (1993, 2006) believed
rivalry were the omnipotent factor in why states fight. Levy et al. contended that
alliance-making increased the likelihood of interstate violence, whereas Sample (1997a,
1997b, 2002) and Rider (2009) proclaimed that arms-races was the main reason. Most IR
and conflict scholars would agree that interstate war is not a single event but rather a
cumulative pathway of counter-balancing activities and power politics that manage to
spiral out of control (Singer, 1972; Senese et al., 2008). That said, the next section
discusses how the aggregation of interstate MIDs over territorial revisions, lead to rivalry
and alliance-making amongst disputes, and the massive buildup of military capability,
which culminates in war onset. can lead to war. were the critical enablers that would lead
to the formulation of the steps-to-war theory.
Steps-To-War Theory
First and foremost, the steps-to-war theory's main aim was to study war to create a
more peaceful world. According to COW researchers, it fits neither into liberalism nor
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realism, the two primary international categories. The STW is not liberal in the sense
that it does not consider international organizations and interstate cooperation as the
panacea for world peace. It should not be taken as a realist theory because STW does not
adhere to principles of power and global anarchy. In fact, Vasquez (2005) proclaimed his
theory was essentially anti-realism. That said, a brief historical overview is a must.
If one had to make a historical assessment of the STW theory, it should be varied.
Rooted in peace as it pertained to war causation, the theory was an outgrowth of the
Correlates of War project. Singer and Small initial forays into war studies should be
characterized by correlation (Singer et al., 1972; Singer & Diehl, 1990). What they
wanted to achieve was to codify the correlates that led to the commencement of war.
Both scholars, after numerous research projects, were able to derive several recurrent
factors in which precluded war. However, Singer admittedly concluded war correlation
was not possible based on the scientific research method (Singer, 1979; Suzuki et al,
2002; Vasquez, 1987). Instead, the COW researcher settled on the term proximate,
which meant that the correlates of war were not valid enough to be considered as a causal
factor.
Throughout the 1980s, empirical patterns emerged that COW researchers hoped
would lead to theoretical proof of war causation. For example, territory, militarized
disputes, and alliances were heavily researched for validity (Diehl et al., 1988; Jones et
al., 1996; Levy, 1981; Sabrosky, 1980). Knowledge and comprehension were indeed
increased. However, because of the lack of sound quantitative and statistical techniques,
the causes and paths to warfare remained elusive until the 1990s.
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Bremer (1992) broke through the analytical logjam. In 1992, he was the first to
use dyadic analysis. This approach had two revolutionary impacts on war theory. First,
the analysis was shifted from individual- to behavior-based, meaning relational. To
clarify, interstate dyads could be arranged to determine interaction, which then allowed
researchers to adequately examine disputes—one of the major covariates (Bremer, 1992,
Maoz et al., 2018). Second, Bremer changed the research paradigm from correlation to
probability. Without much success with causation, his approach allowed COW scholars
to explore the likelihood of war based on the factors. Using inferential test methods, such
as variance analysis and regression, researchers derived conditional probabilities of war
onset centered on certain predictors (i.e., correlates of war). This breakthrough led to the
formulation of the STW theory.
Vasquez is considered the founder of the STW theory. His focus involved
illuminating a path to war versus trying to find correlatory factors. This subtle difference
in the research approach had major implications. Vasquez combined the abovementioned
empirical patterns and Bremer’s inferential statistics work to prove war had a path. In
2005, and later in 2008, Vasquez, and his colleague Paul Senese, were finally able to
breakthrough. The net result was a rudimentary empirically based theory on how wars
could start based on a set of conditions. With this background information, it is time to
examine the key tenets to the steps-to-war theory (Singer et al., 1990; Vasquez, 1987).
Overarching Premises
The STW premises were riddled with controversy, especially with the realist
school of thought. Realists believed since the geopolitical world was fundamentally
unordered therefore a state must use power to guarantee security. Power accumulation
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resulted in an increase in economic and military capability, thereby allowing a state to
become so powerful that potential adversaries would hesitate to attack. More so, when
all states within a regional possessed symmetric capability symmetry then a lasting peace
would ensue (Waltz, 1997; Senese et al, 2008). That said, the STW was counterfactual to
this assertion.
Vasquez argued that realism and power accumulation did not lead to peace but to
war. His STW theory was a testament to this argument; it was based on three premises.
The first was the issues. States are a collective group of individuals with myriad
interests, which are at times divergent. When one state contested the needs and wants of
another, an issue ensues. The point of contention could range from territory to
government. What is germane is that if these interests cannot be peacefully resolved then
conflict increased (Owsiak, 2017; Senese et al, 2008; Vasquez, 2005).
The second premise entailed disputes. Unable to revolve their issues, states
would engage in aggressive behavior towards another. Vasquez codified this tit-for-tat
interaction as a dyadic dispute. These interstate conflicts were manifested by the issuing
of threats, display, and use of force, and finally open warfare. To deal with the ordinal
nature of these conflicts, a state used prescribed realism-based behaviors, which led to the
last premise (Jones et al., 1996; Senese et al., 2008; Vasquez, 1987).
Power politics are the norms, rooted in realism, a state adhered to change the
behavior of another country when both were involved in a militarized interstate dispute.
According to Vasquez (1987, 2004, 2008), there were three. Rivalry was dependent on
the perception of threat, competition, and enmity between dyad members. It was usually
the first escalatory step countries after a dispute had transpired. Next, states feeling
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uneasy about their security situation would look to form alliances. This political move
would usually exacerbate the issue, increasing instability. As the rivalry escalated and
alliance-making became tenuous, threatened states embarked on a military buildup of war
capability. The overall endstate was a stepwise increase in the probability of war. For
clarity, the novelty of this STW concept requires another explanatory framework
(Owsiak, 2017; Senese et al, 2008).
Prior to explaining the steps-to-war theoretical principles, a comparison against
realism would help increase understanding. There are four main differences between the
steps-to-war and realist schools of thought. First, STW scholars claimed that power
politics behavior leads to war versus peace. The aggressive, escalatory effect of repeated
interstate disputes and arm builds creates a security dilemma. This conflict prescribed
that when a state feels insecure, they increase their military capability, thereby making
either their rival or neighbors feel insecure and increase their security posture. The
overall result is the increase in instability and a decrease in security, creating a volatile
and uncertain environment (Kennedy, 1987; Owsiak, 2017; Senese et al., 2008; Vasquez,
2004).
On the other hand, realist subject matter experts deemed that power politics
created either a preponderance or balance of power within the global and regional system
that kept states in check. For example, a realist would say the U.S.’s dominance and
relative security within the international order is due to its preponderance of military
capability. It would be foolhardy for another country to challenge the U.S., according to
realist logic (Senese et al., 2008; Vasquez, 1987, 2004).

77
Second, STW theorists considered the international system is not anarchic, rather
it is controlled by dominant states who dictate the norms and rules. Senese et al. (2008)
contended that the international system is dominated by major powers. The latter are
mainly status quo countries that enjoy the benefits of the current system and therefore
enact policies that promote it. Conversely, Realists believed the global order is without
higher authority. This notion entailed power accumulation and real politick to acquire
security (Kennedy, 1987; Senese et al, 2008).
Third, steps-to-war enthusiasts contended war is a learned behavior that states
enact to get what they want. Realism proponent stressed war is the reflection of power
and national capabilities that guaranteed survival of the state and its interests (Senese et
al, 2008; Vasquez, 1987, 2004). Lastly, STW theory is explicitly and empirically based
on territorial issues, while realism concerned almost entirely power and the manifestation
thereof. With this side-by-side analysis complete, a more detailed description of the
steps-to-war theory is in order.
Theoretical Description
Upfront, the STW theory contended state-related issues (or revisions) were the
catalyst for military conflict. Although these revisions could be wide-ranging, three
stood out. For example, countries could disagree over a specific policy, such as either
support for state-sponsored terrorism or currency manipulation. Another common
revision concerned regime-type where the form of government is the point of contention.
The hostile discord between democratic Taiwan and communist China is one such
example. (Dreyer, 2010); Senese et al., 2008).
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Last, and perhaps most important, are revisions based on territory. Vasquez’s
research, which was aligned with other COW scholars, posited that land disputes were
the most salient revisions that led to interstate violence (Frederic, Hensel, & Macaulay,
2017; Gibler, 2017; Senese et al., 2008; Vasquez, 1987, 1996). STW research has also
shown territory holds the highest instances of war outbreak than other issues. Even more,
territorial conflicts are for the most part likely to be reciprocated and more apt to have
higher fatalities (Senese, 1996; Hensel & Mitchell, 2005). It is worth mentioning that
policy issues occur with greater frequency than territorial ones; however, the former is
not statistically likely to end in intestate warfare (Bremer, 1992; Frederick et al., 2017;
Vasquez, 1992, 2004).
For greater clarification, an example is warranted. State A wants to change the
status quo of its relationship and position with respect to State B. There is an oil field
situated along the interstate border. Of significance, both countries lay claim to the oil
field. State A, however, has decided to act, which has led to conflict. To rehash, revisions
are salient issues based on territory, policy, or regime, which states are willing to pursue
actions to resolve. It is, however, territorial revisions that sets the STW theory into
motion and this is a foundational takeaway.
Next in the path to war are militarized interstate disputes. Since states could not
amicably settle the territorial revision, they soon found themselves in greater turbulent
circumstances, characterized by aggressive, escalatory interactions. Threat issuance and
military force displays categorized the low end of the conflict spectrum. When coupled
with timing and salience magnitude, disputant states could intensify their actions to either
use of military force or even open warfare. Another example could perhaps afford better
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comprehension. Up until this point, the STW theory would posit that State A has a
revision over a salient issue (i.e., territory) and therefore entered a militarized dispute
with State B over it. This situation forces each country to address the dispute in a certain
way. The realist purview of power politics was how most states chose to behave
(Frederick et al., 2017; Owsiak, 2017; Senese et al., 2008; Vasquez, 2004).
The interaction of power politics is the final premise of the steps-to-war theory.
When interstate rivalry, alliance-making, and arms buildups are addressed in a
disaggregated manner, they are classified as the correlates of war. However, when
aggregated into the STW framework, these three correlates embody the attributes of
realpolitik (i.e., power politics). This new paradigm has an additive quality that impacts
war onset. More so, this entire process is stepwise and escalatory, and each move
enhances the chance that there will be bloodshed.
Rivalry between states, according to Vasquez, is the first power politics move in
the STW theory. It is initially manifested after a single dispute over a territorial revision
has occurred. Gibler (2017) further contended territorial issues are based on either
resource allocation, strategic locale, or symbolic means. The most contentious disputes
possessed more than one attribute (DIA, 2017; Senese et al., 2008). Equally important is
the tit-for-tat behavior and activity by the disputants. For example, when State A acts on
a territorial revision, State B feels compelled to react, which thereby increased the
number of militarized interstate disputes. The overall result is a dyadic relationship
characterized by spiraling conflict (Owsiak, 2017). What is germane here is the power
politics backbone is now formed, defined by an enduring, hostile relationship between
two states (Goertz et al., 1993; Thompson, 2001).
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Alliance-making is next in the sequence. It occurred when a country feels
sufficiently threatened or at risk, then it will seek an alliance with other governments.
The act of joining a coalition caused the other state to feel more threatened and it
responded in kind (Leeds, 2003). For instance, State B is the target of State A’s
territorial revision. The former feels it is in a vulnerable position and allies itself with
State C to bolster defenses. State A, now feeling more threatened, partners itself with
State D to alleviate the duress. Again, the net result is an increase in the likelihood of war
because there are more than two potential belligerents, ever-increasing the volatility and
complexity within the strategic environment. Of greater significance, if either one of the
dyad members or its partners is a major power, then the chances of war increased even
more. One must remember that major powers have the national capability to wage war
(Gibler, 2004; Kimball, 2006; Senese et al, 2008).
Arms build-up is the last power politics move. According to Vasquez (2008),
because arms races show the highest level of commitment, therefore, is the most
intractable behavior for both internal and external audiences. Meaning, building up one’s
military forces is a major endeavor, often consuming significant resources and time,
which means the political elite and populace writ large must comply. Also, entering an
arms race with a rival further exacerbates the security dilemma for which they have no
alternative but to increase their military capability and capacity. Case in point, State A
and State B are enduring rivals who have engaged in over eight militarized disputes over
territory. After making outside alliances, there remains a significant level of enmity and
distrust between them. To alleviate, both disputants began a massive arms build-up to
deter one another, which renders an already tenuous situation into a fait accompli for war.
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Taking the above in totality, Vasquez’s research supported the validity of his
steps-to-war theory. Using the COW dataset, which codified almost 2000 MIDs from
1815 to 1965, the empirical findings reflected a stepwise increase in the predicted
probability of interstate war. Here is a succinct overview. Starting with a dispute over a
revision, data showed territorial revisions (.15) had a higher possibility for war than the
more numerous policy-based revisions (.09). Next, the research illustrated enduring
rivalries increased the likelihood of war onset (.45) when combined with a territorial
dispute (.15). Then, with the addition of alliances, characterized by outside partners and
major powers, the findings indicated war likelihood (.65) further increased by nearly 20
percent. The last power politics behavior of arms buildups depicted a 25 percent increase
in the probability of interstate war onset (.90) when included (Colaresi et al., 2002;
Owsiak, 2017; Senese et al. 2008; Vasquez, 1987, 2004). What is key here is that the war
probability increased with each subsequent realpolitik behavior, meaning the aggregation
of the correlates of war had a positive correlation whether states went to war.
After multiple runs and permutations of different paths, two conclusions became
evident. First, territorial issues, especially symbolic and strategic, had the highest
percentage of war no matter the number of combinations. Second, Senese et al. (2008)
tested four alternative logic paths to war, it was the above-mentioned sequence that
produced both additive and multiplicative results. The former meant that each step
magnified war onset probability. The latter entailed the aggregation of power politics
behavior also increased the probability of interstate warfare. Senese and Vasquez did,
however, caution, “What is not crucial is not the sequence of the steps, but that they are
mutually reinforcing. Alliances may precede or follow military buildups…” (Senese et
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al., 2008, p 23). In short, one should remember the steps-to-war theory is grounded on
the behavioral and relational impacts of when two states, who are initially involved in a
territorial dispute, experience repeated conflict, form alliances and increase military
capability, all of which intensifies the likelihood of war onset (Senese & Vasquez, 2005,
2008).
Critique of Steps-To-War Theory
So far, this dissertation has mentioned several criticisms as to why the COW
project and associated research were lacking in some areas. Vasquez and the steps-towar theory also have their share of criticisms in which there are four. Sampling bias is
first. In most statistical research, proper randomization is almost a proverb. Since
dispute dyads were selected based on time and their conflict-laden attributes, and not
randomization, these samples could be viewed as biased. Some researcher’s fault the
steps-to-war theory because of this circumstance (Singer, 1996; Vasquez, 1996; Senese et
al., 2008).
Another critique of steps-to-war is that it cannot be applied to qualitative studies,
especially historical case studies. This critique arose from those scholars, which outside
of World War I, could not find other examples of interstate wars that followed the
theory’s premise. This gap was acknowledged and registered for future research within
the COW network (Senese et al, 2008). The third critique entailed the dyadic approach.
Croco and Teo (2005) contended that steps-to-war heavy reliance on dichotomous
continuous variables, such as MIDs and war onset, resulted in both conceptual and
problems and loss of statistical information. This shortfall is especially visible in the
alliance “step”. Case in point, Croco and Teo stated, “We think both the statistical
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inference and the inductive argument depicted above are in part driven by the assumption
that bilateral interactions always underpin alliance formation, when the latter occurs both
bilaterally and multilaterally” (Croco & Teo, 2005, p 8). In short, by operationalizing
sophisticated concepts, such as alliances and war, into simpler forms, led to distorted and
invalid findings.
Equally detrimental to the steps-to-war validity was the COW research cohort's
inability to definitively proclaim issues and power politics (i.e., steps-to-war) were indeed
causal factors for war onset. In fact, most realist scholars’ criticism was based on this
notion: since war is a human endeavor, making the premonitions of war too vast to
quantitatively derive (Singer, 1996, Vasquez, 1996; Waltz, 1997. Even more, this
situation was exacerbated when from 1979 to early 2000, there was no testable theory for
most COW research. Many academics viewed this as a major shortfall in scientific
research. In fact, the only real attempt at proving STW theory came at the expense of
realism.
Sixth, and last, is steps-to-war loyalist perceived attacks on the balance of power
theory, a realism cornerstone. Waltz (1997), the founder of the balance of power theory,
response to Vasquez was scathing. The former contended the latter conflated new and
old forms of realism into one, which is not accurate or responsible. One such example is
that Waltz thought the balance of power was a byproduct versus Mearsheimer’s
viewpoint that balance was the goal. The realism professor, therefore, accused Vasquez
of purposefully misrepresenting this key distinction to support his STW work. In short,
above are several acknowledge criticisms of the STW theory. Individually, these
critiques are perhaps valid and were addressed by Vasquez and other COW disciples.
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That said, taken as a whole, this dissertation contends these criticisms are not enough to
either stop or void research on the steps-to-war theory. The rationale is straightforward:
the search for peace in a world plagued by hostile Great Powers is a must.
All in all, step-to-war is a novel and insightful theory to use in studying peace and
war. One should remember the theory contended war results from issues and disputes
that are managed by the realist school of thought—power politics. Territorial issues, by
far the most common, festers into greater hostility. According to Owsiak (2017), this
circumstance caused recurring MIDs, which led to enduring rivalries. When alliancemaking and arms races are added, a geopolitical environment riddled with volatility,
uncertainty, and chaos is produce or war-prone. More importantly, each part of the
sequence; specifically, territorial dispute to rivalry to alliances to the procurement of
weapons empirically increased the probability that there will be interstate warfare
(Owsiak, 2017; Senese et al., 2008; Vasquez 1987, 1996).
Conclusion
All things considered, the empirical study of war for the purposes of peace is
novel and steady expanding. The four above-mentioned sections are a testament to this
adage. Wright and Richardson’s work opened the realm of the possible. One of their
signature achievements brought both biological and physical research techniques into the
social disciplines. Another contribution was the classification of wars based on empirical
data. Variables such us belligerent identification, battle frequency and deaths, and dyadic
timelines were instrumental, influencing other pertinent peace scholars.
Equally important was that the COW project and its founding researchers
provided pertinent context on the correlates of war and the onset of war. Content-wise,
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Singer’s creation of the initial COW dataset forever changed the scientific study of war.
By determining the correlates of war, a host of research topics were introduced into war
study and peace research fields. Empirically, ideas and techniques on dataset creation,
dyadic analytics, and methodologies were explained. Bremer’s use of dyads and the
advanced statistical test was revolutionary. Years later, Vasquez’s employment of
stepwise logistic regression in testing the steps-to-war theory further expanded the peace
research field.
Another key section regarded the foundational COW studies, there are a few
salient findings that should be remembered. First, territorial issues are the most salient
indicators of impending militarized interstate disputes and subsequent war. Resources,
strategic locations, and culture are some factors that outline territory-rooted conflict.
Second, revisions are effective in determining why states embark on such risky endeavors
such as war. Territory, policy, and regime preferences are indeed explanatory in dispute
onset. Third, because of their robust national capabilities, major powers are almost
always involved in interstate war. Their ability to procure arms and entangle other
nations into their sphere of influence often increased volatility and uncertainty within
dyads. The last section formed the research backbone. The articulation of the steps-towar theory; this is the first of its kind an illuminated depiction of how interstate conflict
and power politics increased the probability of war. Going forward, it is imperative to
remember the key premise is that territorial militarized disputes between states, lead to
realism-based behavior, which often culminates in a higher chance of open warfare.
Overall, the meticulous evaluation of five decades of literature, covered in four
sections, was undeniably insightful. It explained previous research and the linkage
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between them. More so, the knowledge framework on the scientific study of war was
clearly established, identifying the main COW research techniques and such. However,
the literary review did illuminate one crucial knowledge gap in the COW project and
associated peace research. What is missing is a regional viewpoint in which a specific
country could be scientifically analyzed based on its proclivity for war. This dissertation
should be viewed as an opportunity to address this shortfall. For simplification, a better
justification is perhaps warranted. If the literature review chapter is considered as the
“who”, “what”, “when” and “where”, then the next chapter delineates the “how”.

87
Chapter 3: Methodology
Some scholars would argue there is a quantitative shortfall in the analytical study
of conflict. More specifically, the academic fields of international relations, peace
research, and conflict resolution have not sufficiently investigated in what way
regionalism, major powers, and real politick interact within a specific geographic locale.
This dissertation will attempt to mitigate by quantitatively analyzing how interstate
revisionism, armed disputes, and war correlates can conflate into a violent maelstrom. It
will do so by using large-n datasets, testable hypotheses, and advanced statistics. To be
clear, the methodological aim here is to properly outline the data management
requirements, research processes, and propositional test that will afford a synthesis on the
extent to which the COW covariates associate with the People’s Republic of China’s
revisionist tendencies. Prior to methodology delineation, it is necessary to consider
scope. This chapter is structured into four subsections. The fist is data management.
Wherein is a thorough discussion on COW datasets and the computer software used to
either create or manipulate them. Equally important is that both variable
operationalization and data collection are addressed therein.
Second is domain analysis. This dissertation is predicated on four domains,
which form the analytical backbone for how data is accumulated and culled. Temporal
and spatial aspects, as well as selected units of analysis are several topics that will guide
how content is aggregated for analysis. The third section spells out the overall research
design. Methodology is the focus, whereby information on the overarching process is
illuminated. Important content, such as data collection, variable operationalization,
hypothesis formulation, and analytical test section, are revealed in a linear sequence.
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The last subsection, which is the cornerstone, overlays prescribed research
questions onto the research design. Each question, including the main and three key
ones, are meticulously explored in a stepwise manner outlaid over the research design.
The result is a properly outlined research process that should foster the quantitative
analysis of three key questions. With the roadmap revealed, it now time to shape how this
dissertation will seek to explore the correlates of war attributes and Sino revisionism.
Overall Data Management
One of the main utilities of the COW project is its extensive datasets. Izmirlioglu
(2017) reported that the 13 data repositories, which encompassed 395 variables, is a
critical enabler in quantitative conflict research. Furthermore, interstate topics extend
from dispute geographic location, instances of threats and force displays, national
material capabilities, trade flows, to alliances (Izmirlioglu, 2017; Sarkees, 2000).
Each dataset has a common set of attributes. The temporal range is from the postNapoleonic era to the late-2010s. The data tabs are organized into subdivisions and
shown in either text or comma-separated values (CSV) files, with accompanying
information presented in PDF files. The variables typified by either interval, categorical,
dichotomous, or scale cover material such as population, belligerents, battle death, and so
forth with each being displayed in a corresponding column. The COW dataset has an
astonishing 395 variables. More importantly, this setup affords conflict resolution
researchers the ability to manipulate and examine pertinent data to discern descriptive,
correlatory, and explanatory scholarly work (Izmirlioglu, 2017; Maoz, Johnson, Kaplan,
Ogunkoya, & Shreve, 2018).
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Out of the 13 available COW datasets, this dissertation relies predominantly on
three. National Material Capability (NMC) version 5.0 is the first. This dataset codifies
the six elements of national power. According to Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey (1972),
military expenditure, military personnel, energy consumption, iron/steel production,
urban population, and total population are critical indicators for a state’s material
capability, a mainstay in most international relations analysis. It is also important to
highlight that these indicators make up Singer’s Composite Index of Nation Capability
(CINC). This statistical tool averages a country’s demographics, economic, ad military
strength into a single numerical measure (Singer, Bremer, & Stuckey, 1972).
The second dataset is Militarized Interstate Disputes version 4.3 (MID_v4.3). As
a reminder, MIDs are conflict incidents that were a threat, display, military force use, and
open war by one state explicitly towards another state. These historical datums range the
full spectrum of conflict, from verbal threats to warfare. This repository is expansive
containing information on over 2,000 disputes from 1816 to 2010, which are classified
into four hostility levels. Akin to other COW datasets, MID_v4.3 has various tabs and
subsets. For example, threat MIDs are further categorized as the warnings to either use
of force, blockade, occupy territory, or even use nuclear weapons. Displays of force
MIDs are equally subdivided into alerts, mobilizations, and border violations. Another
hostility variable is the use of force. It is subcategorized into military actions such as
blockades, occupation, seizures, and raids. The last MID is hostility, which is the
declaration of war. The above-mentioned afford basic context. Later in this section, there
is a more robust explanation of MID_v4.3 variables as they relate to the dissertation’s
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research questions. Before continuing, it is important to note that MIDs allows complex
phenomena, such as war, to be broken down into basic interactions that can be studied.
Combining two datasets is a cumbersome and error-prone process. According to
Bennet and Stam (2007), studying international relations within a quantitative framework
relies on the availability and comprehensive, pliable datasets. Large-N statistical tests—
common in most numerical studies—often require computer code to manipulate data, a
time-consuming process. The EUGene_v3.2 (the Expected Utility Generation and Data
Management Program) software program, created by political scientists Scott Bennet and
Allan Stam, is a step in the right direction. The researchers stated, “EUGene serves as a
tool to facilitate and simplify the process of margining and creating datasets in
international relations, especially datasets created with the directed dyad as the unit of
analysis” (Bennet & Stam, 2007, p. 3).
EUGene_v3.2 often serves as a mainstay for conflict scholars because of its
dyadic interaction qualities. For example, the dyadic-year inquiry could include variables
on the individual-, dyadic-, and system level. Subject areas such as polity type, the
balance of forces, and alliances have used dyad year as the unit of analysis (Bennet &
Stam, 2007; Bremer, 1997; Levy, 1981; Maoz et al., 2018).
Although there are myriad utility aspects, EUGene affords this dissertation three
key qualities. First, it allows the construction of single datasets from different repositories
and units of analysis. More so, researchers can convert the data into a distinct unit of
analysis. This advantage is used to construct datasets applicable to the dissertation’s
three secondary research questions. Second, the software reduces the need for manually
writing code. Again, this process is time-consuming and requires an advanced skillset in
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database programming. One must remember that the COW datasets have over 395
variables available for a researcher (Izmirlioglu, 2017). The ability to select pertinent
dependent and independent variables is key. Last, EUGene facilitates the selection of data
based on common criteria such as time period, domain, great power status, and region. In
sum, these functions allow a conflict researcher to properly frame and delimit data into
functional variables (Bennet & Stam, 2007).
Domain of Analysis
To create a framework, this paper employs four key domains. Most war studies
examine states on the international level (Braumoeller, 2008; Buzan, 2012; Singer, 2002;
Kim, 2002). That said, a major dissertation aim is to examine state systematic interaction
at the regional level. And since China is the focal point, it is, therefore, necessary to
bound the dataset to the Asian continent. As with most of the COW research, there is a
temporal aspect. For example, Singer et. al (1972) used 1815 to 1965, whereas Vasquez
(2004) extended the timeframe out to 1992. This dissertation contracts the time domain
to 1949 and 2001. The rationale is that Mao Zedong declared the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) into existence on this date (DIA, 2019). The right lateral limit is 2010.
This period was chosen because of data availability. The most recent and comprehensive
COW dataset on militarized disputes ended in 2001.
With the timeframe set, it now necessary to explain the third domain. This
dissertation uses a dyadic interstate approach. More specifically, this spatial domain is
based on non-directed disputes, whereby outcomes are defined by dispute interaction
between two states. This pairwise technique affords the opportunity to accurately test the
behavior and interactions between country pairs (Senese et al., 2008). As a reference
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point, a directed dispute is codified by both an initiator country and target country, a
divergent construct for the needs of this research. As such, disputing dyads are simply
referred to by country code. For example, RUS and JPN are a dyad that fought a war in
1905 (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). The states used in the dyad generation are the
international system members identified by the COW project (Small & Singer, 1982).
The dyads are generated suing EUGene_v3.2, which a dataset generator that aggregates
various databases into an applicable, user-friendly data repository.
Unit of analysis is the fourth domain. There are three. Dyad-dispute is the first. It
is characterized by each observation representing a militarized dispute. This unit of
analysis is most prevalent in research that compares those MIDs that go to war from
those that do not (Bremer, 1992; Senese et al, 2008). Dyad-year is used to analyze what a
prescribed dyad does over a year’s timeframe. An example is warranted for clarification.
A dyad between the U.S. and China would have observations for every year they were in
existence. Of significance, dyadic years record when states are involved in a dispute and
not. According to Senese et al. (2008), some datasets that use dyadic year as the unit of
analysis can total upwards to 500,000 observations. On the contrary, the true benefit of
dyad-year is the ability to ascertain war and peace periods between the dyad and not the
large N dataset (Diehl & Goertz, 2000; Senese et al, 2008; Sample, 2016).
Last is dyad history. This unit of analysis is comprehensive, representing one
dyad per the history of the dyad. The observations recorded are myriad, including 1) type
and the total number of MIDs, 2) whether dyad has fought a war, 3) are the dyads
engaged in a rivalry, etc. Vasquez (2008) mastered this concept in his peace research. In
fact, dyadic history is the cornerstone of analysis within the STW theoretical and
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investigative approaches. Unlike the other two units of analyses, dyad-history is
researcher-defined versus EUGene_v3.2 generated. This fact means that considerable
work is required to create the dyad. To adequately quantify and then codify these dyads
will require a significant amount of time. However, the insight is indeed worth the effort.
That said, it is now time to address some key design specifics.
Overall Research Design
The overall research design is predicated on the four key steps that are interwoven
with each respective below-annotated research question. Hypothesis or propositional
discernment is the first step. The subject material is deliberated to provide relevance and
context. The “what” and “why” are explained for each supposition. As a refresher, the
three supporting research questions are: 1) What is the probability of war onset based on
associated militarized interstate disputes in Asia? 2) What revision type causes the
greatest propensity of war in Asia? And 3) What does the war onset covariates imply for
chances of war in Asia?
Normally, most doctoral dissertations have data collection as the next step in
research design. This paper primarily follows this construct but with one major caveat:
collection is substituted with management. The main reason is the multitude of tasks
required to collect data from various COW datasets, operationalize them, and construct
new datasets. And since each sub-question has distinct data repository requirements, it is
better to describe data collection within the management framework.
What is important to remember is two salient points. First, the EUGene_v3.2
dataset generator is mostly employed to derive a data repository for statistical testing or
create a new user-made one. Second, test variables are usually operationalized. By that,
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they are first defined as a concept and then transformed into either quantifiable or
measured indicators prior to collecting data (Allen, 2017). There is a key difference,
however. This dissertation uses established variables from the COW project; thus, the
focus here is on explaining how the test variables where originally operationalized
(Singer et al, 1972; Mitchell and Vasquez, 2014; Senese and Vasquez, 2008).
Model articulation is the third step. As with most COW research, models are
either bivariate or multivariate constructs. The first research question and its associated
hypotheses will use the former. The second utilizes multiple covariates. The last question
is predicated on a comparative construct, facilitating the contrasting of China with other
major powers. Variable setup is equally important in this step. This task involves
arranging the test variables into dependent and independent categories (Allen, 2017;
Glazek, n.d., AMBOSS, n.d.). Of significance, war onset is the most prevalent dependent
variable in COW research and remains the case here. (Mitchell et al., 2014). The takeaway is that research models are heavily dependent on analytical tests.
The last overall design stage entails determining the appropriate statistical test.
Both inferential and descriptive techniques are used. The former correlates or predicts,
whereas the other measures and describes collected data. Based on the test hypothesis
and model design, the first two research questions (i.e., RQ1 and RQ2) will use either
conditional probabilities, predicted probabilities, or logistic regression. The last question
is solely descriptive, concentrating on mode, median, and means. Assumptions are also
integral in statistical tests. The goal is to ensure covariates are indeed valid, and the
chosen test is the correct fit.
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In short, the overall research design is straight forward. With each respective
question, there are four requisite events. The hypothesis and data management are the
first two. Model design and statistical tests are the others. The pertinent details like
variable operationalization, dataset generation, and test procedures are addressed in
greater detail within respective research questions.
Research Questions
Since the late-1990s, China has embarked on a set-piece revisionist strategy. The
DIA (2018) stated Sino aspirations are two-fold: 1) achieving great power status and 2)
defense of national sovereignty and territorial sovereignty. The CCP has stated that
possessing a “world-class” military is the means to success. The strategic ways are
myriad. China uses its diplomatic and economic prowess to entice regional neighbors
into accepting their hegemony. On the information front, Sino acumen in discrediting
rivals, which are mainly the U.S., Japan, and South Korea, on the international stage is
noteworthy. But most important of all and germane to this dissertation is the fact that
China has shown a willingness to embark on militarized disputes short of war to achieve
their national security aims.
Chain of conflict is important in understanding what the Chinese are trying to
strategically accomplish. Revisionism is the prime catalyst. As stated, the PRC wants to
achieve great power status and reclaim near-aboard territory. These goals are steeped in
territory and policy revisionism. The former is manifested by the “One China” policy,
which entails the assimilation of Taiwan, the Spratly Islands, and the Senkaku Island.
The latter is characterized by challenging the status quo within the Asia-Pacific region,
which involves Sino confrontation with other major powers on various issues.
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Militarized disputes are the second link in the chain. Here, China has
implemented an aggressive use of its armed forces to coerce potential allies and rivals
alike. It has been documented that China has threatened, harassed, and in some cases,
used violent force to alter the status quo. In fact, the repeated threats and stand-offs with
Japan, Taiwan, and the U.S. have been well documented in the press and international
relations circles (DIA, 2019; OSD, 2018; The Asia Foundation, 2017).
The correlates of war, or power politics, is the final link in the chain. Singer et al.
(1972) believed states used realist-based behaviors, such as militarized disputes, alliance
making, and arms buildup, to both guarantee security and achieve geopolitical
aspirations. What makes the correlates germane is the combination of war causation
factors (i.e., revisionism) and realpolitik behavior (i.e., power politics) under one
“umbrella”, creating a ripe environment for scholarly study.
Taking these conditions into account, this dissertation desires to explore the
interaction of intestate revisionism and militarized disputes in the Asia-Pacific region as
they relate to China’s national security strategy. That said, the main research question is:
Main: What is the relationship between the correlates of war and China’s revisionist
strategy in Asia?
Good research should include various aspects that bolster and validate
comprehension and analysis. Arguably, a more clarifying way to explain this decree is a
“three-legged stool” analogy. The main research question has been framed in the context
of revisionism, militarized disputes, and the correlates of war. It is, therefore, only
logical to examine these “legs” of inquiry in a paradoxical manner, meaning the research
is disparate yet reinforcing. This construct equates to three key research questions that
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when independently analyzed should answer the pertinent question of whether correlates
of war and China’s current strategy could possibly lead to conflict. Hereafter, the
methodology section delineates the study design and quantitative statistical tests deemed
necessary to explore this bold proposition.
RQ1: What is the probability of war onset based on associated militarized interstate
disputes in Asia?
Militarize interstates disputes are complex. On one hand, threats and use of
military forces often have an escalatory effect on conflict. Case in point, the British and
German interactions during the 1930s, prior to World War II. The two countries engaged
in massive displays of military prowess, which was filmed and distributed across the
globe. After a tumultuous period of volatility, the maritime power and continental
hegemon force display ended in perhaps the most catastrophic war in human history
(Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). On the other hand, there is an argument, when done
properly, threats and military use can serve as an effective deterrent. The Soviet
conciliation in the Cuban Missile Crisis is one such example. When the latter emplaced
nuclear ballistic missiles on the island of Cuba, the United States began a serious of
military force displays to discourage the behavior. After much escalation, the Soviets
acquiesced from the pressure of a full-scale U.S. troop mobilization, along with a naval
blockade (Huth, 1998). As shown, military disputes can lead to either peace or war.
However, COW researchers are ardent opponents of the latter, instead, they contend that
MIDs are primary factors in war initiation (Bremer, 1992; Singer, 1979). That said, the
aim here is to see if their supposition holds true in Asia.
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An in-depth review of peace and war study literature has revealed there is a
shortfall of quantitative analysis using COW research principles on the Asian continent
(Hensel, 1994; Kim, 2002). This section will help change this circumstance by exploring
MID impacts on war probability. Bivariate and univariate analysis will illuminate the
factors and impacts of interstate behavior. on perceived security threats. More so, this
question is one leg of the hypothetical three-legged stool on which depicts Sino strategic
behavior in the sphere of influence. (Sample, 2016; Singer, 1972).
Data Management
Of the three main questions, this one is simplest with respect to design. There are
several subparts to data collection and management. This first entails the unit of analysis.
Dyadic dispute within the context of MIDs is what this question is attempting to measure.
Therefore, this unit is selected in the user-generated dataset list. Next is the creation of a
dataset that accounts for the geographic and temporal domains. The EUGene_v3.2, using
COW MID_v4.3 data, will provide an appropriate baseline for research design (Bennet &
Stan, 2007). Of significance, there are four researcher-defined variables added to each
dyad that will assist statistical analysis. Below is an overview of each variable:
•

WAR_ONSET is a binary variable. It is operationalized by cwhost_5. If
hostility is annotated within a dyad, then “1” is coded, replicating the war has
commenced. To cross-check validity, each EUGene_v3.2 war dyad is
compared to the COW War Data_v4.0 data. The later has a complete list of
interstate wars since 1816 (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).
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•

NO_WAR is a dichotomous variable, which is also operationalized by
cwhost_5. For all dyads that do not have cwhost_5, a “0” is entered into the
dataset. This number represents that no war has occurred from MIDs.

•

VIO_CON is a dichotomous variable. It measures the occurrence of military
use within a dyad that has escalated to violence. It is operationalized by
cwhost_4 and coded “1”.

•

NO_VIO is a binary variable and the antheses of VIO_CON. It represents
that no violence has occurred. It is operationalized by observing that the
absence of cwhost_4 within an interstate dyad. In sum, if there is no use of
military force, then “1” is coded for that respective dyad.

Equally important are several other pertinent researcher-defined variables. These
indicators are primarily operationalized by tallying subsets of cwhost. These count
variables are key to descriptive research techniques. A description of each is listed
below.
•

TOT_NUM_MID is a discrete variable. It is operationalized by counting the
total number of MIDs, which are ascertained by tallying cwhost_1 through
cwhost_5.

•

TOT_NUM_WAR accounts for the total number of interstate dyadic wars. It
is measured by counting the number of cwhost_5 within each dyad.

•

TOT_DYAD_YEARS is a continuous variable. It is derived in two steps.
First, the duration of each dispute is totaled. The EUGene variable dyaddur,
which measures dispute duration in days, is used in the calculation. Then,
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durations days are divided by 365, effectively operationalizing the dyad into
years.
The combination of the EUGene generated dataset and new operationalized variables are
critical to hypotheses testing, which leads to the second subpart.
H1: Threats (cwhost_2) impacts the chances of war onset.
There are three hypotheses associated with this research question. Below
annotated is an articulation of each one. Hypothesis 1investigates war probability as an
outcome from issued threats. Declaration of hostile intent by a challenger is intended to
serve as a warning to the target state. Threats have an escalatory effect on interstate
dyads. This dissertation contends that threats do impact the probability of war on the
Asian continent. To this end, Hypothesis 1 (H1) tests if threats enhance the possibility of
war.
As mentioned, each proposition outlays the variable arrangement as it pertains to
the measurement. Glazek (n.d.), in his quantitative framework, contended that hypothesis
statement format should assign independent variables as the subject and dependent
variables as the object. An example is warranted to help illustrate his point. Looking at
H1’s format from above, the independent variable is cwhost_ 2, which is at the beginning
of the statement. The dependent variable, WAR_ONSET, is near the end. The
independent variable indicates issued threats between the dyad, whereas the dependent
variable measures the likelihood of war onset based on those threats.

The EUGene_v3.2

dataset generates the number of threats MIDs, whereas the researcher-defined variable
WAR_ONSET ascertains war commencement.
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H2: Force display (cwhost_3) impacts the chance of war.
Hypothesis 2 inserts interstate force displays into the research discourse. The
display of force, as of late, is common within the Asiatic region, particularly in the East
and South China Seas (DIA, 2019). Depending on the state, force displays could be
perceived as either an act of deterrence or aggression. Regardless, the net effect often
increases miscalculation between states, setting off a conflict spiral. Hypothesis 2 (H2)
aims to test if displays of force influence the likelihood of interstate war in Asia.
Bivariate analyses dictate two key variables. WAR_ONSET, the dependent
variable, indicates the presence of interstate hostilities. Cwhost_3 is the covariate
variable, representing the instances of force displays amongst Asian countries. The
dependent variable is researcher-generated, while the independent (cwhost_3) is defined
by EUGene_v3.2
H3: Use of force (cwhost_4) impacts the probability of war.
Hypothesis 3 is characterized by dyadic use of force as it influences war. The
highest MID short of war is the use of force. Here, states employ their armed forces to
either blockade, seize territory, or even conduct raids to achieve their political aims.
Unlike the threats and force displays, force use could result in battle deaths, an
occurrence that has the propensity to lead to tit-for-tat military engagements (Maoz, et al.,
2018). That said, Hypothesis 3 (H3) examines if the use of force between Asians states
effect war onset.
The last hypothesis is aligned with Glazek’s decision matrix for the quantitative
analysis framework. Meaning, the bivariate setup is akin to the previous suppositions:
dependent variable (WAR_ONSET) and independent variable (cwhost_4). In totality,
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these three hypotheses should illustrate the relationship between militarized interstate
disputes and war onset within the dyad.
Research Design
Delineating the research model is the third subpart. To determine if MIDs do
indeed influence war necessitates three essential tasks. In a similar study, Bremer (1992)
used foundational likelihoods on whether war would ensue based on the number of
MIDs. This portion of the model follows his methodology. The base probability of war
onset applies the ratio between TOT_NUM_WAR and TOT_DYAD_YEAR. This
quotient should provide an understanding of the prospect of war as it relates to total
dispute dyad-years.
Next, the model derives the percentage of war onset based on the number of
MIDs that have transpired. This fraction involves TOT_NUM_WAR divided by
TOT_NUM_MID. It is worth mentioning this measurement differs from probability,
mainly because of the denominator. One uses time, whereas the other frequency of
incidence. Both numbers provide greater insight on how MIDs impact war’s
commencement. Of note, this technique differs from Bremer. He did not use MIDs per
se instead of focusing on land contiguity, government type, and power domain on a
global. The focus here is strictly on the military interstate disputes on the Asiatic
continent (Bremer, 1992; Mitchell et al., 2014).
Lastly, this final step examines the occurrence of war against the multitude of
MIDs that have occurred in Asia. Bivariate comparison affords the opportunity to
determine what specific MID escalates to interstate war. Important to this assessment is
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determining the total number of threats, force displays, and use of force from 1949
onward.
Statistical Test
Illuminating the statistical test needed to fulfill the abovementioned research
design is the final area. Since this dissertation question relies on univariate and bivariate
analysis, the primary research techniques are both descriptive and inferential analysis.
For univariate analysis, it is addressed in the first two tasks of the research design where
a simple descriptive test function that determines mean, mode, and standard deviation is
conducted. These results should help scope magnitude and frequencies. Regarding
bivariate relationships or Task 2 in research design, IBM SPSS’s crosstab function will
assist in determining conditional probabilities, which are the chances an event occurs
given that another event has transpired. In other words, what are the chances of war
given a military dispute between two Asian states has occurred?
According to Field (2013), crosstabs are vital because they summarize
information about bivariate relationships. Crosstabs are characterized by rows and
columns. Test setup protocol entails dependent variables entered as rows and
independent variables as columns. This dissertation follows that sequence. For
clarification, H1 variables will be entered as follows. WAR_ONSET is checked as the
dependent variable and cwhost_2 as the independent variable in IBM SPSS’s call-down
box. This procedure is enacted for each supposition, equating to a total of three times.
The results are illustrated in a table matrix.
Equally relevant is a discussion on why crosstabs are appropriate to build
foundational knowledge. First, it is a method that conveys percentages and probabilities
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in a relatively straightforward manner. Second, crosstab caters to discrete, categorical
variables, usually measured on nominal or ordinals scales. The variables used in this
research question fit that assumption. Third, initial assessments predict that the dispute
dyads range upwards to 1,200 cases, which perhaps prove troublesome for certain
descriptive methods like scattergrams. The crosstab table is a better way of viewing the
test results. Finally, IBM SPSS has a Z score and Chi-Square test functionality. Z-scores
help determine deviation from the mean, especially outliers, which helps with test
synthesis. Chi-Square delineates statistical impacts that support proving hypotheses. It
worth mentioning that descriptive statistics are usually not enough to properly prove a
hypothesis, which is why inferential statistics are so important (Field, 2013).
To address Task 3 in the research design, Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) is the
most effective statistical procedure. It is used to quantify the differences between two or
more groups by comparing means (Sawyer, n.d.). One group, as an example, is dyads
that experience war, and the other is those experiences MIDs. Simply put, the ANOVA
here is essentially a point-biserial inferential test. Like many impact analyses, there is a
dependent and independent variable set up. WAR_ONSET is the dependent variable and
relatively straightforward, whereas MIDs are represented by cwhost. Since cwhost are
categorical variables identified by non-ordinal numbers, it is necessary to transform them
into distinct nominal variables, a major ANOVA assumption. IBM SPSS allows a
researcher to accomplish this task by reassigning text to numeric values. That said, the
ANOVA factors used in hypotheses testing are NONE, THREAT, DISPLAY, and USE,
which are the transformed categorical variables from cwhost. The Post Hoc results will
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explain the statistical power of the measurement, size of effect, and sample size (Field,
2013; Sawyer, n.d.).
In short, there are a few items to remember regarding this research question. Its
main aim is to identify how states respond to an issue, militarized interstate disputes.
COW researchers contend that evaluating MIDs is perhaps the best way to illustrate those
behaviors (Bremer, 1992; Maoz et al, 2018). This above-mentioned material attempts to
follow this mindset by testing MIDs and if they escalate to war. Data is collected and
managed with the EUGene_v3.2 dataset generator, which allows variable
operationalization to test the prescribed hypothesis. More so, albeit with some
modifications, the research design basically follows Bremer’s dyadic analysis circa 1992.
The main difference is that this research explores only four pertinent MIDs (i.e., threat,
force display, use of force, and hostility) and refrains from other covariates such as
democracies and contiguity. Equally relevant is that both descriptive and inferential
testing techniques are employed. Crosstabs afford basic knowledge on MIDs and war
onset with respect to scope and frequency. Point-biserial testing should facilitate the
linkage of state behavior in the initial phases of war onset. The research totality is that
one essential part of Sino revisionism as it pertains to the correlates of war is analyzed for
validity.
RQ2: What revision type causes the greatest propensity of war in Asia?
Revisionism is the second metaphorical research leg in this dissertation. It is an
important topic in both peace research and war studies because of its implications. When
states are dissatisfied with the status quo in their circumstance, and if they have the
means to do so, they will attempt to alter it (DiCicco, 2017; Geller, 2000). That said, this
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research question’s objective is to analyze the impacts and relationships of interstate
revisionisms in Asia. It is the logical sequence to evaluating how war correlates associate
with Sino revisionist strategy.
Before moving on, there are a few preliminary details that should be mentioned.
Not only is territory salient in MID initiation, but it has also proved most volatile and
quite prevalent in revisionism (Braithwaite & Lemke, 2018; Senese, 2005; Vasquez &
Henehan, 2001). According to COW, there are four types of revision and most research
contend territory is the number one factor in wars (Mitchell & Vasquez, 2008; Senese &
Vasquez, 2008). First, territory is a proven motivator for which nations choose to impact
the current geopolitical environment. It is considered the most common covariate of war
onset and therefore is categorized by itself. Territory is represented by cwrev = 1 in most
COW datasets.
Second, policy concerned disagreements on one or more salient issues. China's
belief that Taiwan is essentially part of the PRC is one example (Fravel, 2010).
EUGene_v3.2 indicate policy revision as “cwrev = 2”. Third, regime entailed
governments. This revision is the removal of a target’s governing body. The U.S.
disposal of Iraqi Dictator Saddam Hussein and the Baath Party is an instance (Kaplan,
2013). Regime is signaled by “cwrev = 3” in the databases. Last, other is a catchall. It
represented revisions that cannot be binned in either territory, policy, or regime. It is
codified as “cwrev = 4”. Of note, this category is rare. With revisionism explored, it is
now appropriate to discuss major powers.
There is a belief that major powers are more prone to war—simply because they
can (Corbetta & Dixon, 2004; Sample, 2002). Research Question 2 explores this
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supposition, a key method is investigating a state’s national capability index and domain
status against the onset of war. Lastly, Small and Singer (1982) strongly believed this
measurement was a key factor in war initiation. Even though capability studies within
the COW framework has gradually subsided over the last few decades, this dissertation
will once again bring it to the forefront. With the overview complete, it is now time to
examine RQ2’s second section.
Data Management
Data management is perhaps more complex than the previous research question.
There are two key subsegments entailed in this section, with the first being data
collection. It is perhaps best to cover comparable collection methods from RQ1 and then
migrate to those attributes that differ. The unit of analysis, which is a dyadic dispute,
remains the same in this question. Also, utilizing EUGene_v3.2, a similar dataset is
created that allocates for country codes, interstate disputes, national capabilities, power
status, and politically relevant dyads. To clarify, these COW-defined, software-generated
factors are identical to those housed in RQ1.
Continuing, the differences are most prevalent in researcher-defined variables. As
a reminder, revision is the central theme in this research question. Since the COW
dataset has only one variable that measures revisions, it is necessary to create more to
adequately address the study question. That said, there are two requisite lots to further
define state-based revisionism. One batch is power domain-oriented; the other pertains to
national capability percentiles. Starting with the power domain, it is a dichotomous
variable (i.e., POW_COM) that measures interstate dyad power status. There are three
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levels to POW_DOM that are essential for hypothesis testing. A succinct overview is
provided below:
•

MAJ-MAJ is a dichotomous, discrete variable. It represents that a dyad is
comprised of two major powers. This discrete factor is operationalized by
sorting the EUGene_v3.2 generated dyads for ones that are comprised of two
major powers. Once the criteria are met, a “1” is coded.

•

MAJ-MIN is a binary variable that signifies that a dispute dyad contains one
major and one minor power, a “1” represents this case. It is discrete and
ascertained by separating software-generated dyads for this criterion.

•

MIN-MIN is a discrete variable. Dyads that contain no major powers are
classified as minor minor. A “1” is coded to represent this measurement.

National capability is the other researcher-defined group. Since it involves
capability and quartiles, it is appropriately titled CAP_QUAR. Unlike POW_COM, this
categorical variable is ordinal, numerically ranging from 1 to 4. Here is a brief synopsis
of each one:
•

CAP_QUAR_1 is a discrete variable. It symbolizes that the dyad has one
state with a capability inside the first quartile. This factor is operationalized
by performing a descriptive statistics function on capindex (N = 193). IBM
SPSS provides 5, 10, 25, 50, 75, and 95 percentiles. Taking these figures into
account, the top quartile (0 to 25%) will equate to “1”.

•

CAP_QUAR_2 is an ordinal variable. It is operationalized by the second
quartile in the national composite index (25% to 50%) and thereby codes as a
“2”.
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•

CAP_QUAR_3 is a discrete variable. It includes dyads who fall into the third
quartile (50% to 75%) on the national composite index scale. A “3” represent
this level of measurement.

•

CAPI_QUAR_4 is an ordinal variable. It measures the bottom (75% to
100%) of the composite index and subsequently coded as a “4”.

These two researcher-defined variable groups are important for several reasons.
First and foremost, they are essential to hypothesis testing. Most correlatory statistical
techniques require categorical variables that are nominal or ordinal. Second, the binary
nature of these variables affords transformation. Meaning, numerical values can be
recoded to reflect text. This feature is critical to ANOVA and crosstab analysis. Since
data collection is explained, it is now appropriate to address the next subarea in the
framework.
Delineation of the hypotheses is the other data management section. For
clarification, this question has two propositions and two hypotheses, totaling four testable
suppositions. It is important to remember that there is a subtle difference between them
both. Hypotheses are, as a rule, testable and measurable and thereby subject to
falsification. Whereas a proposition is not, instead it suggests a linkage between two
concepts that cannot be adequately proven (Glazek, n.d.; Mourougan & Sethuraman,
2017). Following each discussion on test suppositions, both dependent and independent
variables are outlaid to foreshadow suitable statistical tests, which are revealed in the next
section. Continuing, since interstate war remains a rarity in human history and its
volatility does not lend itself to adequate quantification, a considerable amount of war
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onset research remains in the propositional realm. This shortfall was identified decades
earlier by Singer and his colleagues (Singer & Diehl, 1990; Vasquez, 1987, 1993).
P1: Territorial revision has the highest probability of violent conflict
Territory is unique in that it appears both steps to war covariates and revision
type. A fact that arguably supports the saliency of this issue as a harbinger to war. Asia,
like many other global regions, has its share of territorial disputes. China’s dispute with
Taiwan over unification and Pakistan and India's longstanding violent clashes over the
Hindu Kush territory are a few examples. More so, it well documented by many leading
war study scholars that territorial disputes possess the necessary conditions for interstate
disputes to escalate to violent conflict (Rasler & Thompson, 2006; Vasquez, J. &
Henehan, M., 2001).
Since wars in Asia are characterized as low (N =13), perhaps a more thorough
examination entails military use of force as an analysis factor (Sarkees & Wayman,
2010). Of significance, most COW research focuses on war onset, which is perhaps
shortsighted. Instead, an intermediate step that explores violence short of war is required.
As such, this dissertation proposes that territory is more violence-prone than policy,
regime, and other revisions on the Asian continent.
Proposition 1 variable arrangement is nuanced. The dependent variable is
VIO_CON, which is a researcher-defined dichotomous variable. To use in the statistical
test, it is transformed into a categorical variable (VIO_CON = Violent Conflict). The
independent variables commensurate with cwrew_1 through cwrev_4, reflecting COW’s
four revision types. Because these revision variables are discrete, they require
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transformation. For clarification, the process is cwrev_1 = Territory, cwrev_2 = Policy,
cwrev_3 = Regime, and cwrev_4 = Other.
P2: Territorial revision has the highest probability of war
War and revisionism go together. Vasquez (2009) contended interstate war is
learned behavior. For instance, through the course of history, states have realized that a
costly, but viable method of guaranteeing their security and achieving strategic goals
entails warfare. These goals often take the form of revisions. Through some initial
analysis with the EUGene-generated dataset, policy (N = 476) is the highest. Despite this
fact, steps-to-war theory and peace researcher has proven that territory, not policy
revisions create the conditions for war (Bremer, 1992; Diehl, 2000; Fravel, 2017; Yoon,
2003). Even though the study findings were on the global domain, this dissertation offers
that territorial revisions do in fact lead to war on the Asian continent. And that, Asia, is
aligned with previous research.
Proposition 2 variable structure has similarities with its counterpart. The
independent factors remain the same. Cwrev is transformed into categorical variables
that represent the revision type. The dependent variable is WAR_ONSET. These
adjustments could be used in either descriptive or inferential statistical tests.
H4: National capability has no impact on war onset
Equally important is that economic prosperity has increased national capability in
all Asian subregions for nearly twenty years (Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development, April 2019). An occurrence that has boosted military spending and
expanded the industrial base in China, Japan, Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, and
numerous other countries. Reviewing the COW National Material Capabilities dataset, it
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is not surprising that 15 out of the top 25 countries were in Asia. (DIA, 2019; Singer et
al., 1972). Within this context, this dissertation paper contends that national capability
does impact war initiation.
Hypothesis 4 variable construct leans towards correlation. WAR_ONSET, the
dependent variable, is a categorical variable. The independent factor is researcherdefined. CAP_QUAR is an ordinal-scale variable, operationalized by a numerical range
from 1 to 4, with one being the highest. Each sub-level represents dyad national
composite index scores categorized into quartiles. Since CAP_QUAR is ordinal, a
variable transformation using IBM SPSS is in order. The respective numbers are
substituted with CAP_QUAR_1, CAP_QUAR_2, CAP_QUAR_3, and CAP_QUAR_4.
H5: Dyad classification has impacts on war onset
Keeping within the same thread, power domains are essential indicators in IR
studies. There have been numerous studies that reflect that major powers are more likely
to engage in war than other nations. Sample (2002) contended that arms build-ups were
unique to major powers. Chiba et a. (2012) argued that major powers had the means to
operate as foreign policy activists in both international and regional context. Starr (1978)
claimed that major powers often possessed the willingness to exploit opportunities that
enhanced their security. If these claims are true, then dyads that incorporate major
powers should be more war-prone than others on the Asian continent. Consequently,
this paper hypothesizes that dyad classification does impact war onset.
Hypothesis 5 variable setup is straightforward. Since the aim here is
determination if war occurs, WAR_ONSET is the applicable dependent variable. It is
dichotomous and categorical in the level of measurement. Following suit, the
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independent factor is POW_DOM. This researcher-defined variable is nominally
quantified as MAJ-MAJ, MAJ-MIN, and MIN-MIN. Both WAR_ONSET and
POW_DOM are categorical, which should steer testing towards correlational analysis.
In most national security circles, there is the cliché-ish Ends-Ways-Means mantra.
Ends equate to strategic objectives, ways are the methods, and means involves
capabilities. Arguably, the most relevant attribute is the latter. The rationale is that
having a preponderance in ability and resources is preferable than not. Before the COW
project, Singer’s main contribution to war study research was his in-depth analysis of
national capabilities and war-making. He posited that national capability equated to
opportunity. Meaning, countries with relatively strong economies and defense forces
could indeed impose their will on others (Small & Singer, 1982, Singer et al., 1972,
Singer et al, 1982).
P3: Major powers with territorial issues are more prone to war
Major powers are predominantly involved in interstate wars than most. More
interestingly, territory is a constant factor in a nation’s strategic calculus whether to ware
war or not. Asia is home to share of global violence. In fact, The Asia Foundation
(2017) promulgated that conflict and violence are prevalent in every country in Asia.
The hangover from European colonialism, the Cold War, and old interstate rivalries when
coupled with territorial volatility is a recipe for war onset. The Asian continent contains
nearly 8 major powers (Chiba, Machain, & Reed, 2012). Each with their revisionist
ideals of territorial adjustments centered on what they believe is rightfully theirs. So, this
dissertation proposes that major power with territorial revisionist beliefs are more war
prong.
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Proposition 3 variables need modification. The dependent variable is
WAR_ONSET, indicating its namesake within a dyad. The primary independent
variables are majpower and cwrev. Both are categorical with numeric identifiers. Given
that P2 hints at relational statistics, cwrev will have to be altered into dummy variables.
Altogether, Research Question 2’s data management is somewhat substantive.
There was a total of two hypotheses and three propositions delineated for the test. The
former will examine revisionism, low-end conflict, and war onset, whereas the
propositions explore major powers and national capability. Equally important was the
EUGene_v3.2 generated dataset where key covariates were identified. More so, this
section meticulously discussed researcher-defined variables and their criticality to
facilitating analytical rigor. Operationalization of national capability, for example, into
quartiles is novel and should provide some interesting findings. To achieve that end, the
research methodology must be sound.
Research Design
An optimal way to discuss research design is a bifurcation into revisionism and
major powers subject areas. The former is comprised of two tasks that explore violence
and war onset as they pertain to revisionism. Proposition 1, or task one, entails revision
type and dyadic violence. Task two, or Proposition 2, investigates how dyadic
revisionism corresponds to war onset. To test these suggestions, bivariate analysis is
perhaps the best technique. The rationale is that this method depicts all revision types
while affording the flexibility to compare them to multiple outcomes. Frequency
distribution, measures of dispersion, and the central tendency will set the foundation for
revisionism as it pertains to Asia.
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The other part of the research design is delineating relational aspects between
Asiatic major powers and territorial revisionism as they apply to conflict onset. There are
three prescribed sequences needed. The first subsequence (i.e., Hypothesis 4) is to
determine if the national capability is an important determinant of warfare. The second
subsequence (i.e., Hypothesis 5) also involves connectivity. Ascertaining what dyads are
war-prone is critical to proving that major powers are more likely to wage war, which
previous research has proved (Fravel, 2007; Fravel, 2010; Lebow, 2010). Equally
relevant is that both H4 and H5 aim to show impacts, which is necessary for determining
the power domain. The last subsequence is fusing major powers involvement with
territorial revisionism. Here, Proposition 3 is the focus. What is important to recall is that
these research steps showcase a vital linkage to the Sino-revisionism argument.
In brief, RQ2’s research design is straightforward. It is a two-step process. The
first sequence looks to examine Asian countries’ revisionist tendencies as they relate to
both military violence short of war and full-scale interstate war. Bivariate analysis was
deemed best suited to achieve this goal. The second sequence includes major powers, the
concept of national capabilities, and territorial revisionism. Likewise, this step relies on
bivariate analysis in which there are several available techniques are discussed in the next
section.
Statistical Test
Revisionism relies on both descriptive univariate and bivariate tests. Prior to
examining Proposition 1 and 2 for correlation, univariate analysis on revision types will
occur. Descriptive, univariate tests afford relative and cumulative frequency
distributions on territory, policy, and regime revisions, whereby numerical totals and
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percentages are denoted. More importantly, the main purpose of this test is to outlay
some foundational knowledge on revisionism on the Asian continent, which is critical to
deriving the implications for China’s strategy.
Proposition 1 and 2 are also subjected to bivariate analysis that further induces on
how important territory is to violence and war. The central technique here is crosstab
analysis, a rudimentary form of bivariate inquiry. That said, some particulars on
crosstabs are in order. First, this technique is used to test significance as well as
showcase the central tendency. Crosstabs are used to aggregate and display the
distribution of two more variables (Field, 2013). Within this research question, there are
two crosstab tables. The first illustrates violence onset against how many dyadic
revisions are observed, as well as percentages, which will be displayed in a matrix table.
Second, crosstabs have a simple setup. Dependent variables are assigned to
columns, and independent variables are aligned with rows. For example, P1’s setup is as
follows: violent conflict (VIO_CON) and no violent conflict (NO_VIO) are annotated on
the top of the table and revisions (Territory, Policy, Regime, and Other) across the left
side. In a similar manner, P2 will have war onset (WAR_ONSET) and no war
(NO_WAR) as columns and revision categories depicted as rows. Each proposition will
then be displayed in a 2X4 contingency table (Field, 2013).
Third, crosstabs require categorical variables. Or rather, they must pass two
assumptions. The first is that test variables are either ordinal or nominal. The second is
that variables must consist of two or more categorical, independent groups (Field, 2013).
Since both P1 and P2 test variables are labeled as discrete in the dataset, IBM SPSS is
used to transform them into the requisite categorical format (Field, 2013).
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Last, there are two tests that will afford synthesis on crosstab results. For the
scope portion, Z scores are utilized to conceptualize the difference between the observed
revision and the mean. where revision types lie in the greater distribution. The main
assumptions are: 1) Data is continuous and 2) Data aligns with the normal distribution.
In short, Z scores afford conceptualization of the difference between the observed
revisions and overall mean.
For the magnitude aspect, Pearson chi-square is the most common form of test
that answers whether a crosstab result is statistically significant. More so, Pearson chisquare indicates the strength of that association. The parametric test delineates the
association between war (or violence) and revision type. There are four key assumptions:
1) Randomness, 2) Large N dataset, 3) Observations are independent, and 4)
Observations have the same distribution. Of significance, this research dataset met all
assumptions. The results are depicted in a table format, annotating value, and
significance.
In sum, testing revision type involves both descriptive univariate and bivariate.
By design, both tests are kept to a rudimentary level to provide a solid foundational
knowledge base. Frequency distribution and crosstabs will outlay how violence and war
are associated with dyadic revision on Asia. Now, it is time to ascertain how respective
nations interact with these findings.
To address major powers, statistical testing is more comprehensive. As stated, the
research design specifies that investigating whether national capability has any impact on
war onset is sequence one. Inferential statistical methods, especially hypothesis testing,
is the preferred method here. The main reason concerns the fact that there has been
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considerable work on national capabilities impact on war onset to constitute it as bona
fide theory. Arguably, this classification is a rarity in most war studies (Senese et al.,
2008; Singer, 1972; Singer, 1979).
Hypothesis 4 is determining the impact of national capabilities on warfare. Here
is how the dissertation attempts to achieve this goal. First, a point-biserial is the
preferred technique here. The analysis of variance between war and capabilities reveals
if any significant difference exists between war and capability. By examining the delta, a
synthesis could be made if the hypothesis holds true (Fields, 2013; Murphy, n.d.).
Second, H4’s setup mirrors crosstabs. The columns are marked by war
(WAR_ONSET, NO_WAR) and rows depict dyad capability quartiles (CAPI_1,
CAPI_2, CAPI_3, CAPI_4). Whereas the rows are dependent variables, the latter
comprises of independent variables. Of note, independent variables are called factors in
ANOVA testing. So, this test is a four-factor analysis (Field, 2013; Murphy, n.d.).
Third, the crosstabs' assumptions are straightforward. The first two are that
datasets are random and large N. Observations between the onset of war and capabilities
are equally important. What this means is that the amount of data dispersion needs to be
comparable and independent between the groups. The last assumption is that capability
quartiles are indeed independent (Fields, 2013; Murphy, n.d.).
Last, crosstabs results are checked by Pearson chi-square. Murphy (n.d.) stated
that chi-square is used to infer whether the relationships between groups (i.e., war onset
and capabilities) are significant. The procedure used in statistical hypothesis testing,
where the Null equates to no correlations and alternative implies there is an association.
For clarification, the Null hypothesis is rejected when p < 0.05 and the Alternative is
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accepted. Regarding this test, the aim is to determine if war onset is associated with
greater national capability. The post hoc power analysis should reveal the statistical
power, the extent of the effect, and sample size (Field, 2013; Murphy, n.d.). With dyadic
capability in Asia addressed, it is time to analyze power domains.
Hypothesis 5 is tested with binary logistic regions. First, the aim here is to derive
if Asian dyads that go to war are associated with the three categorical power domains.
Second, the testing arrangement is three-fold. The outcome variable is WAR_ONSET.
The independent factors are dyad type (i.e., MAJ-MAJ, MAJ-MIN, MIN-MIN).
Third, H5 assumptions entail five key assumptions. The outcome variable must
be continuous and dichotomous are the first two parameters. Next, the dataset should
contain no outliers. The final two assumptions require the continuous variable is both
normally distributed and of equal variance. It is worth mentioning that after the initial
analysis that H5 variables meet the assumption requirements. Last, null hypothesis
testing and post hoc tests remain in effect. In particular, the research wants to evaluate
the magnitude that dyad power domains have on war commencement. This threecovariate test should reflect those specified parameters (Field, 2013; Murphy, n.d.).
Proposition 3 is the last item of inquiry for this research question. That said, the
following details are key to how P3 is examined. First, the statistical test used is
regression. The latter is a common technique in STW research where an outcome
variable is predicted based on one or more predictor variables (Field, 2013; Schroeder,
Sjoquist, & Stephan, 2017).
Second, the regression setup is somewhat nuanced. The outcome variable is war
onset (i.e., WAR_ONSET). The predictors are major power (i.e., majpower) and revision
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types (i.e., cwrev). Since there are several predictors, a simple test that can analysis
multiple independent variables is necessary. Based on COW research, the more
opportune approach to regression is logit techniques (Bremer, 1992; Mitchell & Vasquez,
2014; Senese et al., 2008).
Logit regression requires a reference group when categorical variables are divided
into a series of dummy variables. In IBM SPSS, this method is contingent on
dichotomous or binary variables. Although majpower is binary, cwrev is categorical, an
assumption that logit does not support. As such, cwrev is transformed into dummy
variables, whereby the numerical values are assigned to the level of categorical variables.
For example, cwrev = “2” equates to a policy revision in the EUGene generated dataset.
To create a dummy variable, cwrev = “2” is transformed into a “1” and all other variables
are coded as a “0”. This construct allows the statistical package to perform a logit
regression a total of four times, which equates to the number of COW revision types.
(Field, 2013).
It is also important to note that each regression is subject to four independent
runs. For example, in the first run, the variables are major power and territory, and the
second is major power and rivalry, continuing until the last revision is regressed. One
must remember the aim here is a simple bivariate analysis that identifies if war ensues
based on major power status and their respective revisions.
Equally pertinent is the assumption of logit regression. There are four key
assumptions that apply here (Field, 2013). First, the dependent or outcome variable must
be binary. The dataset and model framework ensure this requirement. Second,
observations must be independent of another. The COW datasets use the dyad construct
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which is indeed independent. Third, the predictor variable should be linearly related to
the log odds—i.e., the log of odds of an event occurring. Last, logistic regression implies
a large sample size. After preliminary sort of the COW datasets using EUGene_v4.3,
dispute dyads range upwards of 800 in the Asian geographic region. This number is well
within logistical criteria (Bennet et al., 2000; Field, 2013; Glazek, n.d., Grace-Martin,
n.d.).
Last, the logit regression test used is Walds. The statistic determines whether a
predictor variable is significant in relation to the outcome. Like many regression tests,
Wald statistics use null hypothesis testing. If the number is p > .05 or greater, then the
predictor is summarily rejected. All post hoc information is presented by IBM SPSS in a
simple matrix table (Field, 2013; Schroeder et al., 2017).
In any event, Research Question 2 is a critical component to COW covariate and
Sino strategy discussion. The main goal here was to quantitatively derive what revision
type causes the greatest propensity for a war on the Asian continent, which can be
summarized into two subject areas. Revisionism on the Asian continent has not been
adequately studied to claim the STW theory is indeed valid here. So, this dissertation
used propositions to both describe and infer how war and violence are impacted by a
nation’s revisionist ideas. The chosen test method is bivariate crosstabs. Major powers
are the other subject area. Here, the research methods were to show a correlation
between state national capability and power domains with respect to dyadic violent
conflict and interstate war. Analysis of variance and regression are the statistical tests
that will provide insight. When these quantitative aspects of Asian regional armed
disputes are considered in totality, a greater understanding of China should be attained.
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RQ3: What does the war onset covariates imply for chances of war in Asia?
Research Question 3 is the last leg of the research stool. The purpose of this
question is to test war onset in the Asian spatial domain with the Steps-To-War theory.
This is accomplished in a two-fold effort. The first involves investigating the entire
Asian continent writ large, which includes war-torn areas such as Iraq and Afghanistan.
The second is a more detailed look entails East Asia with its major powers, such as
China, Russia, Japan, South Korea, and the United States. With some minor adjustments,
the research design replicates Paul Senese and John Vasquez’s STW model and
regression techniques (Senese et al, 2008; Vasquez, 2009). As mentioned, there has been
no research on war onset on the Asian continent using the COW dataset and research
techniques (Senese et al. 2008, Mitchell et al., 2014). Below is a major attempt to
address this knowledge gap.
Data Management
Research Question 3 data management is the most complex of all dissertation
questions. It is a three-part effort. The first involves observation. Unlike RQ1 and RQ2,
where the dyadic-dispute measurement was appropriate, it is insufficient here. The main
reason is the lack of a long-range outlook in which MIDs and intergovernmental
interaction are encapsulated. Furthermore, since this research is primarily based on
retrodiction rather than prediction, a historical purview is indeed necessary. A dyad
history is the more valid unit of analysis. That said, the issue becomes COW databases
do not account for dyad histories (Senese & Vasquez, 2008).
Equally, there is a high degree of data manipulation to create a suitable dataset.
COW dataset utility caters to dyad analysis with respect to dispute event and year, which
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does not support this proposition’s unit of analysis. As such, a dataset must be created
that accounts for dyad history. This task is accomplished in two steps. First, EUGene
software generates a base dataset from MID_v4.3 and Formal Alliances_v4.1, forming a
data collection backbone. Initial analysis indicates a total of 13 researcher-defined
variables are requisite for this new dataset. Here is succinct synopsis:
•

TOT_NUM_MID is an integer variable, measuring the total number of MIDs
that have occurred within a dyad. This number is achieved by counting (Diehl
& Goertz, 2000; Senese & Vasquez, 2008, 70). The variable is essential in the
determination of rivalry.

•

TOT_NUM_TERRIT_MID is an interval variable. It accounts for the total
number of territorial MIDs within a dyad and denoted by merely counting.

•

TERRIT_OCCUR is a binary variable. It uses cwhost_1 to delineate if a
dyadic territorial militarized interstate dispute occurred, which is coded as a
“1”. This predictor is a primary input into the STW model.

•

RIV_CLASS is a categorical variable meant to annotate rivalry typology.
Like other variables in this dataset, it requires a few intermittent steps. First,
dyads are divided into 20-year time blocks. Second, within each block, the
total number is of MIDs is accounted for and classified based on 1 = Isolated,
2 = Proto, 3 = Enduring. Diehl and Goetz (2000) interstate rivalry typology
are used here, where isolated rivalry is two or fewer MIDs, proto is two to six,
and enduring is greater than six disputes. In sum, this variable is a numerical,
categorical variable that can be transformed into a test if the need arises.
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•

END_RIV is a binary variable. This number explains whether a dyadic
enduring rivalry is present. It uses RIV_CLASS and codes a “1” if an
enduring rivalry is present. This covariate is the second key predictor in the
STW model.

•

ALLIED_PATTERNS is an ordinal variable that represents a state’s alliance
status. To ascertain this variable requires three events. Using COW Formal
Alliance_v4.1, the dyad variable type is identified. Next, the alliances are
recoded as follows: 0 = None; 1 = Allied to each other; 2 = One outside; 3 =
Both outside; and 4 = Allied to each other but with outside (Senese &
Vasquez, 2008, 68). Finally, the dyad alliance patterns are tallied. The total
effect is a numerical, categoric variable that can be transformed using IBM
SPSS.

•

HR_ALLY is a dichotomous variable, which stands for a high-risk ally. It is
based on two parameters. First, ALLIED_PATTERNS is used. The criteria
here is that both belligerents are allied to other states. The second parameter
entails majpow, which infers this ally possesses the high national material
capability and the willingness to act. If there is a “3”, then HR_ALLY is
coded as “1”. This covariate is one of the primary predictors in the STW
model.

•

ARMS_RACE is also a dichotomous variable. It represents if an arms race
between two countries has occurred. As with other complex variables in
COW, it needs further operationalization. Using Sample’s (2002) data and
coding technique, there is a two-step process or rather criteria. The first task
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is to ascertain the military build-up of personnel within a dispute dyad. This
entails counting the increase in armed force size. If an increase is present, the
first criteria are met. The second task is based on military spending. Similar to
army growth, it is a comparison of a state’s defense budget at the beginning of
the decade to that of the end. If the budget increased, then the second
criterion is achieved. When both criteria are present, a “1” is entered into the
dataset, annotating that an arms race did occur.
All of the above are key covariates to the STW model. With data collection and
management now addressed, it is time to outlay the dissertation’s seminal arguments.
P4: War onset on the Asian continent is congruent with COW power politics
behavior
Asia has a history of conflict.
Colonial aftereffects, religious intolerance, territorial disputes, political
differences, and economic disparity are several factors (Asia Foundation, 2017). Asian
states, like Europe and Africa, deal with these issues in power politics fashion, which
entails conflict escalation, alliance building, and military buildups. It is also worth noting
that region location more than the international system arguably dictates interstate
behavior (Buzan, Weaver, & Wilde,1998; Buzan & Weaver, 2012). China, as a member
state within Asia, embodies these above-mentioned attributes and behavior. With closer
examination, both are closely related to COW politics behavior of territory, rivalry,
alliance making, and military buildup (Senese & Vasquez, 2008). This statement is
qualitative conjecture, which does not meet the rigor need for in-depth analysis. To that
end, here is the first proposition that attempts to placate this analytical shortfall:
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Proposition 4 variable arrangement must cater to congruency. The outcome
variable is WAR_ONSET, which represents war onset on the Asian continent. There is a
total of four predictor variables: 1) Territory_Rev (cwrevt11 = 1), 2) END_RIV, 3)
HR_ALLY, and 4) ARMS_RACE. Of significance, unlike the other research questions,
this proposition relies solely on researcher-defined variables.
Research Design (P4)
Model design is next in the propositional framework. As a reminder, this outline
follows suite with STW’s four models. Previous research has shown this combination
was indeed additive. What this research question is trying to determine is if these four
critical steps hold true in Asia. That said, it is time to replicate Senese and Vasquez’s
theory. The first model is a base comparison of dyads with territorial disputes versus
other revision types (Senese et al., 2008; Mitchell et al., 2014)). This step is necessary
for logit regression research tests. The independent variable, which is the same for all
four models, is war onset. It is represented by WAR_ONSET. The dependent variable is
Territory_Rev. As a reminder, the purpose of this model is to establish a baseline
probability of war onset based on territorial disputes against other interstate disputes.
This design steps closely follow Senese and Vasquez’s research methodology (Senese et
al., 2008).
Model 2 involves alliances. Unlike Senese et al. (2008), this segment only tests
for relevant alliances where both states having outside partnerships. The outcome
variable is WAR_ONSET. The predictor covariate is HR_ALLY. The research goal
here is to look at the effect of alliance configuration within a dyad and the probability of
war.
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Model 3 pertains to rivalry. This research is altered from the original design.
Senese et al. (2008) used several categorical variables that were scaled to explain rivalry,
essentially ranging from an isolated event to multiple incidents. This dissertation refrains
from using that methodology instead of concentrating on dyads that have an enduring
quality. That said, the dependent variable is WAR_ONSET, whereas the independent
variable is END_RIV. The chief aim is to examine the impacts of enduring rivalry on the
possibility of war onset on the Asian continent.
Model 4 is the last step in the process, addressing how war initiation is influenced
by interstate arms build-ups. The researcher-defined operationalization of arms races
combines the effects of war materiel increase and defense spending into a single
dichotomous variable. So, in this model, the dependent variable remains WAR_ONSET
and the independent variable is ARMS_RACE. Of significance, this model was the most
difficult to construct and should provide some useful insight into the steps to war on the
Asian continent.
In short, it is important to account for a few things. First, the testing of the STW
theory is a replica of Senese and Vasquez’s research design (2008) Their design hinges
on dichotomous variables, stepwise regression, and additive. Second, these models are
additive, which means as each one is added the probability of war should increase.
Lastly, Vasquez stressed that the STW is not necessarily about the steps, but the
cumulative addition of power politics behavior within the dyad annotated here by each
model (Senese et al., 2008; Vasquez et al. 2001). That said, it is time to discuss
numerical tests.
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Statistical Test (P4)
As a result of this research design’s complexity and the simplicity of the variable
measurement, a multivariate inferential approach is a necessity. Logit regression, both
predicted probabilities and odds ratios, is the main technique. Logistic analysis is
specifically designed for dichotomous variables. Within this dataset, each covariate has
been operationalized into a binary number, where “1” equals yes, and “0” equates to no.
According to Grace-Martin (n.d.), logistic or logit regressions estimate the probability an
outcome falls into one of those two possible categories. For example, logistic regression
is common in politics where pollsters want to determine if a candidate will win an
election. Meaning, “yes” the candidate wins the vote and “no” they lose. In this
dissertation, whether war occurs or not is the primary research aim and logit regression
affords valuable insight (Field, 2013; Senese et al, 2008).
Continuing, odds ratios are useful exploratory research. It is the estimation of
occurrence given an independent, categorical variable and quantification of the strength
of association between outcome and predictors. The odds ratio is commonly reported as
a magnitude. For clarification, an example is warranted here. Say after running a logit
regression that territory is assigned an odds ratio of 7.32, it would mean that Territorial
MID is seven times more likely to end in war compared to the baseline model, which was
Policy MID. What is key to remember is that logit testing will be repeated four times to
account for each step in the war onset process.
Equally pertinent is the assumption of logit regression. There are four key
assumptions that apply here. First, the dependent or outcome variable must be binary.
The dataset and model framework ensure this requirement. Second, observations must be
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independent of another. The COW datasets use the dyad construct which is indeed
independent. Third, the predictor variable should be linearly related to the log odds—i.e.,
the log of odds of an event occurring. Last, logistic regression implies a large sample
size. After preliminary sort of the COW datasets using EUGene_v4.3, dispute dyads
range upwards of 800 in the Asian geographic region. This number is well within
logistical criteria (Bennet et al., 2000; Glazek, n.d., Grace-Martin, n.d.)
To summarize, Proposition 4 main purpose is to test if war onset in Asia is
congruent with COW power politics. The latter entails territorial disputes, alliance,
rivalry, and arms races. Each covariate is modeled as a step to war. Where Model 1 and
2 examine how revision type and alliance making impact war, and the other two models
explore dyadic rivalry and arms buildup. Logit regression is used in a stepwise manner to
investigate if the addition of one covariate does, in fact, increase the probability of war.
P5: East and Southeast Asia subregions are more prone to conflict than Asia write
large
East and Southeast Asia is a hotbed for conflict. As stated, there are five major
powers, including the United States that are active in the subregion. More so, nearly
every power there has an active territorial dispute. For instance, South Korea is at odds
with the Democratic Republic of Korea, which is commonly known as North Korea, over
peninsula unification. The Peoples’ Republic of China is hostile towards the Government
of Japan concerning the Senkaku Islands. Also, the latter is greatly concerned with
Taiwan’s independence and the “One China” policy. Equally relevant in East Asia is
alliances. The U.S. has a signed defense pact with South Korea, Japan, and the
Philippines. China has defense and trade agreements with North Korea.
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Perhaps most dangerous is the fact there are multiple ongoing arms races. It is
well-known that the U.S. and China are actively increasing their military capability and
capacity. However, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan have also increased
military spending. In fact, defense spending per GDP has risen above the normal 3%
threshold. Taking all these attributes into account, Proposition 5 contends:
Proposition 5 variable arrangement is like Proposition 4. The variable
arrangement still caters towards congruency. The outcome variable is WAR_ONSET
and the four outcome variables are: 1) Territory_Rev (cwrevt11 = 1), 2) END_RIV, 3)
HR_ALLY, and 4) ARMS_RACE.
Data Management (P5)
With most of the explanation provided in the previous proposition discussion,
there is no need to go into detail. Therefore, data management is by exception. One of
the first changes is spatial domains. Proposition 5 concerns the 15 countries that make up
the subregions of East and Southeast Asia. Another adjustment entails the EUGene_v3.2
dataset and the researcher-defined variables. This proposition requires one more
researcher variable to operationalize. Here is a succinct explanation:
•

ASIA_SUB is a numerical, categorical variable. It describes what Asian
subregions that a dyad belongs to, according to the COW dataset. Of note, the
Middle East, although technically part of Asia, is its own category. The
COW-defined subregions are southeast, south, east, central, and Oceania.
Within IBM SPSS, the categories are coded as (1 = Southeast, 2 = South, 3 =
East, 4 = Central, 5 = Oceania). Of note, this variable arrangement affords
transformation into dummy variables, key enablers in logit regression.
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This additional variable setup is indeed critical. It allows for a relatively seamless
comparison between East and Southeast Asia and the entire Asian continent. This task is
done by filtering the prescribed subregions from the EUGene_v3.2 dataset. The
cumulative effect is fundamental in this research framework.
Research Design (P5)
Research design leverages the existing work on the previous research questions.
Proposition 5’s framework is a straightforward three-step process. The first step involves
establishing a foundation baseline of conflict with the East and Southeast subregions.
Here, the research will explore both MIDs and revision types as they relate to military
violence and war onset.
The second step involves using the four STW models and the modified subregion
dataset to determine war probability. As before, Senese and Vasquez’s research
techniques are used.
The final step is a simple comparison between Proposition 4 and 5 statistical
results. The goal is to build a mental and statistical model that allows a quantitativebased inference whether the subregions that China routinely uses power politics is indeed
ripe for warfare.
Statistical Test (P5)
To gain some insight, Proposition 5 is subject to both descriptive and inferential
tests. Crosstabs are used in univariate analysis, determining central tendencies, scope,
and magnitudes. As with the other test questions, the bivariate analysis will examine war
onset as it pertains to both militarized interstate disputes and revisions. For MIDs, the
rows are marked by WAR_ONSET and NO_WAR and columns by cwhost 1 through
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cwhost 4. The crosstab on revision uses the same variable arrangement but substituting
the cwrev 1 through cwrev 4 as independent variables. The net effect is a solid
understanding of observed and expected counts and strength of association between the
war onset and the prescribed correlates of war (Field, 2013; Murphy, n.d.).
Inferential analysis is a replication of the logistic regression used to test the steps
to war in the previous proposition. It entails regressing war probability against the
additive effects of territorial dispute, alliance, rivalry, and an arms race. As a reminder,
assumptions and tests for fit remain the same from earlier analysis.
In sum, Proposition 5 is perhaps the most illuminating supposition of this
dissertation. It narrows in on the Asian subregions that have the greatest propensity for
conflict with regards to the Peoples Republic of China. The overall research framework
was efficient. Data management leveraged the EUGene dataset and another researcherdefined determinant. Equally pertinent was research design and the applicable statistical
tests. The three-step sequence, which included both propositions, was invaluable in
establishing a testable conflict model. The total outcome is a thorough process in which
key findings can indeed be ascertained.
Conclusion
All-in-all, this chapter is arguably the most vital to this dissertation based on two
key reasons. Because this research is quantitative, which is not frequent in peace research
and conflict resolution fields, there is a considerable amount of energy expended on
outlaying the data requirement, hypotheses formulation, and statistical test. The net
result is a comprehensive, research roadmap, which should lead to insightful and
impactful results.
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Another reason for this chapter’s importance pertains to Sino revisionism and war
causal attributes, which were covered in three supporting research questions. The first
goal was to illustrate the relationship between war onset and militarized disputes. Central
tendencies and variance analysis are used to both describe and infer facets of that
interaction. The second question’s aim is to ascertain how Asiatic revisionism correlates
to interstate military violence and warfare. Bivariate analysis will be instrumental in
assessing the concept of major powers, national capability, and power domains as they
correspond to war. Last, and the centerpiece of this research is exploring war onset as it
corresponds to the steps to war theory. Stepwise, logistic regression is imperative in
testing if Asia is congruent with the other COW research. The totality of these questions
is illuminated in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4: Findings
Quantitative research in which analyzes and evaluates pertinent factors
concerning interstate war and violence are essential to the conflict resolution field. The
empirical study of war onset, and its applicable attributes, on the Asian continent could
provide newfound synthesis on how best to avoid regional conflict, particularly with the
Peoples Republic of China. In addition to three supporting research questions, this
dissertation chapter showcased the results from main questions: What is the relationship
between the correlates of war and China’s revisionist strategy in Asia?
Scope
Prior to continuing, a brief review of data management activities is in order. A
researcher-defined dataset was constructed using applicable Correlations of War data
depositories and the EUGeneve_v3.2 dataset generator. Within temporal confines from
1949 to 2001, a total of 460 dispute dyads were identified within the Asian subregion.
Next, each case was modified to create a dyadic-dispute history that included militarized
disputes, revision type, national material capability, as well as other vital COW-defined
war correlates.
Using descriptive analysis, which primarily focused on central tendencies and
frequencies, and various inferential statistical tests, three supporting research questions
were used to address how the correlates of war are linked to Sino revisionism in Asia.
The questions had an inductive quality that once answered formulated synthesis and
provided insight on the next research inquiry. The culmination was an objective
inference on whether China was susceptible to war given the current geopolitical climate.
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To answer the main research question, Chapter 4’s framework was both inductive
and straightforward. The discussion layout was predicated on each respective supporting
research question. What is the probability of war onset based on associated MIDs in
Asia? Research Question 1(RQ 1) contained three hypotheses. They were instrumental
in deriving non-directional impacts that militarized interstate disputes had on war onset.
One should recall that MIDs are the cornerstone of any empirical COW peace research on
war.
What revision type caused the greatest propensity of war in Asia? Research
Question 2 (RQ 2) addressed two hypotheses and three propositions. In most realist
thought, state revisionism often led to interstate war, a supposition that was necessary to
explore within the context of Asia. Equally, the inferential statistical tests illuminated the
direction and magnitude that revision-type had on armed conflict.
What does the war onset covariates imply for chances of war in Asia? Research
Question 3 (RQ 3) objectively linked MIDs and revisionism to the Steps-To-War theory.
The purpose here was to arrive at a scholarly consensus on whether the empirical data
afforded insight and context on how a country’s needs and wants and associated
escalatory techniques used to achieve them could possibly end on a path to war.
Before discussing the findings from RQ 1, it also required to address how each
question is answered. There are four topic areas. The first portion involves the
restatement of either hypothesis or proposition. As a benefit, the rationale and how the
test parameters fit into the larger analytical picture is also reviewed. Second is the
descriptive analysis results. Central tendencies and dispersion attributes are the focus,
here.
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The third subsection outlays inferential findings. For this to occur, a review of the
variables and prescribed statistical tests are necessary. Last is synthesis, which is
essentially an inference on the applicability of this research as it pertains to war onset,
Sino revisionism, and the correlates of war.
Supporting Research Questions
Context is critical in any correlatory endeavor. As such, there are three
supporting research questions that are framed in an inductive manner that when examined
should offer better synthesis and understanding. The first question aimed to establish the
relationship between militarized disputes and war onset. The second looked to examine
the relevance of revisionism on the Asia continent. The last supporting research question
involved the testing of the steps-to-war theory. Annotated below are those questions,
associated hypothesis/propositions, and key findings.
RQ1: What is the probability of war onset based on associated MID in Asia?
Research Question 1’s purpose was to determine the influence that militarized
interstate disputes had on war onset in Asia. More relevant is the fact that MIDs
provided context on how turbulent and conflict-prone a region could be. MIDs are
considered ordinal, meaning threats are the lowest intensity, whereas hostility is the
highest. Since war onset is essentially hostility, any meaningful testing of war onset
versus interstate hostility would be erroneous because the correlation is one hundred
percent. Therefore, the category is not included in the analysis. One last point to consider
concerned directionality. The below-annotated hypotheses test only for the association
and not whether variable relationships are positive or negative. By design, this inductive
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approach established foundational correlations, which is necessary for addressing the
other research questions.

Figure 3. Asian MID Chart.
Upfront, there were several findings from IBM SPSS descriptive analysis that
afforded solid essential knowledge. First, there was a total of 460 interstate disputes in
the data sample. Equally relevant was that the Asian MID average (M = 3.74, SD = .554)
was within one standard deviation of the global metric (M=3.66, SD = .599). For clarity,
the rest of the descriptive results are addressed in the appropriate hypotheses, which are
below listed.
H1: Threats MID impact the chances of war. Hypothesis 1 concerned the
chances of war based on the frequency of threats issued by a state. This analysis was
non-directional, meaning it was agnostic to whether impacts were positive or negative.
To continue, there are two main descriptive analysis takeaways from this hypothesis.
Threats (N=12) have the lowest frequency amongst all militarized interstate disputes
within Asia. The second point is that between Asia and other regions threats are the
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lowest percentagewise with the former (3%) slightly lower than the latter (4.8%). In
short, since 1949, Asian threat MIDs occurrences are mostly congruent with that of the
international order.
The inferential statistical test results were nuanced. To ascertain H1, a pointbiserial correlation was performed. The dependent variable was war onset; the
independent was threat based MIDs. As a reminder, this statistical test works best with a
dichotomous dependent variable that correlates with either other nominal or scale
variables. There was no significant correlation between war onset and threat MIDs (r = .029, N = 460, p = .535). Of consequence, this finding was not expected. Based on
Vasquez (1996, 2001, 2008) and Singer (1972, 1981), threats were determined to
correlate with war commencement. The analysis here showed a tentative implication
regarding the utility of threats. Because of the low frequency and no significant statistical
correlation, it is conceivable that most Asian states do not bother to make threats since
they are ignored. As such, Hypothesis 1 is rejected because threat MIDs were shown not
to impact war onset in Asia.
H2: Force display impacts the chance of war. Hypothesis 2 sought to derive if
Asian countries' displays of force impacted the chances of war. To start, there are several
central limit descriptives that should be examined. First, results indicated Asian force
displays (24%) are aligned with international cases (27%). This metric is a percentage of
the total number. Second, states utilized force displays (N = 112) nearly ten times that of
threats (N = 12). Again, the data supported threats are either ignored or simply not used.
The inferential results were unforeseen. A point-biserial correlation was executed.
As depicted in Table 1, the dependent variable was war initiation, whereas force display
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was the independent one. There was a statistically significant correlation between war
onset and display of force (r = -.099, N = 460, p = .033). Previous COW research showed
a positive correlation between the variables (Sample, 2016; Senese et al., 2005, 2008,
Singer et al, 1990). However, further examination presented a slightly negative
correlation, which meant wars decreased when force displays occurred. In sum,
Hypothesis 2 is accepted because statistics displayed that force displays indicated a
decrease in war chances on the Asian continent.
Table 1
War Onset & MIDs Correlations

H3: Use of force impacts the probability of war. Hypothesis 3, which is last
under RQ1, concerned interstate use of military force and war probability. That said,
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there are three key descriptive test findings. Force use MIDs were the highest incidence
(N = 324) out of all Asian interstate disputes, making it 3 times more frequent than
displays of force and 27 that of threats. Another descriptive result was the alignment
between Asian states and international tendencies during the same timeframe. Data
showed that Asian MIDs (70%) paralleled global trends (67%).
Again, inferential discoveries were not expected. A third point-biserial correlation
was conducted with force use as the MID type and dependent variable. There was a
statistically significant correlation between war onset and use of force (r = -.273, N =
460, p = .000). This dyadic finding was converse to most COW research, which posited
a positive relationship between force use and war onset. Here, the correlation is negative.
That said, Hypothesis 3 is accepted because the research illustrated that force use
impacted war onset.
With the abnormal findings, it was determined that more analysis is indeed
required. Violent conflict between states is one step short of war. It worth remembering
that the COW project classified war as a military conflict where there are more than
1,000 battle deaths (Singer et al., 1972). Any number short of that metric was rendered
into the violent conflict category, which bared the question: Does the occurrence of MIDs
relate to the inducement of violent conflict? If properly answered, then this application
would either dispel or support the above findings.
Separate point-biserial correlations were performed on each militarized interstate
dispute category. To accomplish, some modifications were necessary. The independent
variable was changed from war onset to violent conflict. The dependent variables were
taken from the three above-mentioned hypotheses. The first retest involved threat MIDs.
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There was a statistically significant correlation between violent conflict and threats issued
(r = -.272, N = 460, p = .000). Of significance, this finding was different because of the
previous result (r = -.029, N = 460, p = .535) indicated no correlation between war onset
and threats. Another interesting result was the correlation coefficient increased three-fold
(r = -.029 to r = -.272).
Force display was the second MID, which also had illuminating findings. The
point-biserial correlation test showed there was a statistically significant association
between interstate violent clashes and displays of force (r = -.933, N = 460, p = .000).
Table 2 depicted the net result, which was the strengthening of the negative correlation
between the dependent and independent variables. The war onset magnitude (r = -.099)
directionally increased when violent conflict (r = -.272) was substituted, further
cementing the notion that MIDs do not positively impact martial conflict within Asia.
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Table 2
Violent Conflict & MIDs Correlations

The last MID reanalyzed was use of force. After performing the inferential test, it
was determined there was a statistically significant correlation between violent conflict
and the use of force (r = .926, N = 460, p = .01). There are two illuminating implications:
both deal with the correlation coefficient. First, there was a polarity switch. When war
onset (r = -.273) was exchanged with violent conflict (r = .926) as the dichotomous
dependent variable, the factor reversed from a negative to positive. Second, the
coefficient size substantially increased. The order of magnitude increased by four, nearly
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approaching a perfect correlation (r = 1.0) between violence conflict occurrence and
militarized force use. This finding makes sense because violent conflict is predicated on
the military use of force, just not to the magnitude of a full-blown war.
What is the probability of war onset based on associated MID in Asia? At the
question’s surface, Asia was aligned with most COW research. Descriptive results
mirrored those on the international scale. Central tendencies and dispersion were all
within one standard deviation. Based on counts, there were 3.3 wars anticipated from
force displays (N = 110). Equally relevant was that 9.9 interstate wars were expected as
an outcome from force use (N = 324). These descriptives had further implications.
Inferentially, Asia was not aligned with COW research concerning the impact of
MIDs on interstate war. This research exposed a primarily negative correlation. Mitchell
et al. (2014) and Senese et al. (2008), both proved that MIDs had a positive correlation
and influence on how wars started. More so, exchanging war onset for violent conflict
only increased the correlation coefficient magnitude. The use of military force had an
outwardly strong correlation to interstate low-intensity conflict on the Asian continent.
In total, Asia is perhaps war-weary, which explain the low frequency of interstate
conflict. Most of the Asiatic wars were a byproduct of the post-WW II rollback of
colonialism and subsequent Cold War. Wars are expensive and appear to be avoided by
state actors (Bremer, 1992; Singer, 2001). If force use and display are employed within a
militarized dispute, then the odds of war are unlikely. For instance, without MIDs
present, there is a four percent chance of war, which is statistically higher than with
MIDs. This elastic metric could mean that wars within Asia are either spontaneous or
lacking in escalation. It is therefore conceivable that force displays and use, coupled with
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adept diplomacy, have afforded Asian states the ability to obtain their strategic goals
without full-scale interstate war. What is important to remember is that perhaps MIDs are
not a good indicator of war, rather they are a better gauge for the likelihood of lowintensity conflict.
RQ2: What revision type causes the greatest propensity of war in Asia?
Building on the knowledge obtained from the MID analysis, the purpose here was
to ascertain how revisions impact war onset. Revisions are a key step on the path to war.
They often represent the vital issue in which states are willing to resolve with the contest
of arms. Whereas RQ 1 analysis was non-directional, RQ2 sought to employ both
direction and magnitude. The rationale is that some revisions are more salient than others
(Senese et al, 2008; Vasquez, 2001).
Another factor to highlight was that this research question incorporated an
escalatory aspect. The first proposition is used to determine if armed interstate violence
occurred. This step is important because violence is often a precursor to full-scale war.
The next proposition ascertained how territorial revision correlated to war. From here,
the question of national material capability and major powers are entered into the
discussion. Prior to revealing the results, it is necessary to provide some basic descriptive
findings on Asian revisionism.
From 1949 to 2001, Asia (N = 460) had over 400 revisions that corresponded with
interstate militarized disputes. Compared with global numbers (N = 1683), Asian
disputes accounted for nearly one fourth (24%). The central tendencies were aligned
with Asia (M = 1.33, SD = 1.00) within one standard deviation of the international mean
(M = 1.46, SD = .989).
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To refresh, there were five revision categories that recorded 460 militarized
disputes. Figure 4, situated below, depicted a useful descriptive breakout. Territorial
revisions (31%) totaled 144 dyads. Policy (36%) was 164 disputes. Regime revisions
(6%) added up to 28 dyad-disputes. The lowest frequency was revisions categorized as
other (3%) in which there were14 disputes. Perhaps most interesting was that 110
revisions were considered not applicable, which was nearly one-fourth (24%) of the data
sample. Meaning, COW researchers were unable to operationalize some revisions to
specific disputes based on their predetermined criteria (Levy, 1981; Senese et al, 2008).
Taking this limitation into account, this dissertation examined territory, policy, and
regime revisions.
P1: Territorial revision has the highest probability of violent conflict
Proposition 1’s purpose determined if territorial revisions were indeed the highest
probability of ending in military violence between states. The COW scholars and STW
theorists contended that territory was the most salient issue in war. This research
intended to examine this notion in an escalatory manner. Meaning, there is first a test to
see if territorial disputes (i.e., independent variable) end in violence (i.e., dependent
variable), which occurs in this proposition.
Descriptive statistics proved insightful. There were 144 revisions (31%) that
involved territory and 338 disputes (73%) classified as violent conflict. Both metrics
were calculated from a total of 460 dispute cases in Asia. Regarding territorial
revisionism, nearly a third (28%) ended with interstate violence, whereas another third
(39%) did not. This means that more cases than not, violence was avoided. The highest
revision frequency was policy. At 164 disputes, there were 20 more policy revisions than
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territory. Equally informative were the policy revisions that ended in armed violent
conflict. Concerning the latter, conflict was almost equal between violence (36%) and no
violence (35%).
To determine P1’s inferential attributes, three empirical test runs were deemed
necessary. A crosstab was performed with violent conflict as the dependent variable and
territorial revision as the independent. The relationship between violent conflict and
territorial revision was statistically significant chi-square (1,460) = 4.025, p = .045. More
so, the odds of violent conflict were .642 times larger when a revision over territory is
present.
Policy revision was next. Exchanging policy for territory, another crosstab was
completed. The association between violent conflict and policy revision was not
significant chi-square (1,460) = .109, p =.742. Revision was the last dependent variable
tested. The crosstab resulted in a relationship between violent conflict and regime
revision is statistically significant chi-square (1, 460) = 8.058, p = .005. The odds of
violent conflict were 11.02 higher when regime revisions are present.

Figure 4. Asian Revisionism.
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Proposition 1 revealed three salient items. First, territorial revisions indicated a
decrease in violent conflict. The odds ratio (.645) is less than 1, which means a negative
correlation. This finding was divergent from accepted COW thought on the power
politics behavior of most states (Hensel et al., 2004; Senese et al., 2008, Vasquez, 1987).
In fact, nearly all studies used in this dissertation posited that territorial revisions were
both a strong predictor and positive correlation to interstate violence.
Second, policy-related revisions were not statistically significant. One must
remember that at the international level policy revisions were indeed relevant to the onset
of war, and thereby the enduement of violence. This contrast posited that Asia was not
congruent with the other continental regions and previous peace research. (Singer, 1990;
Vasquez, et al., 2010). With policy having a very high-frequency rate, it should have
been more statistically significant.
Third, the discovery that regime revisions had the highest likelihood of military
violence short of war was not expected. The fact that the p-value and odds ratio were
uncharacteristically strong was unforeseen. As stated, the Steps-To-War theory and other
various COW peace research clearly stated that territory was the leading harbinger to
violence (Moaz et al., 2018; Senese et al, 2003, 2008). In this incident, the research
implied that regime change was strongly related to Asiatic militarized violence.
P2: Territorial revision has the highest probability of war
Proposition 2’s goal was to ascertain the direction and likelihood that territorial
revisions had on war onset. Upfront, Asia, compared to other regions, fought the highest
number of wars (N = 14) from 1949 to 2001 time. It is also worth mentioning that 14 is
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considered a relatively low occurrence compared to the 187 total wars since the
Napoleonic Era.
Like Proposition 1, crosstabs were the statistical test of choice. The independent
variables remained revision type, while the onset of war replaced violent conflict. A
crosstab was completed with unanticipated findings. The relationship between war onset
and territorial revision were not significant chi-square (1,460) = .05, p = .823. The
second crosstab proved equally interesting. The relationship between war onset and
policy revision were not significant chi-square (1, 460) = 1.296, p = .255. The last
crosstab inferential finding was unequally foreseen. The relationship between war onset
and regime revision were not statistically significant chi-square (1, N =460) = .028, p
=.867.
Regarding Proposition 2’s palpable finding, there were no relationships
whatsoever between revisions and war. All the crosstab results—territory, policy,
regime—were statistically not significant with relatively high p-values, indicating the
contradictory nature of the findings. More so, when combined with P1 results, the notion
of territorial issues being the catalyst for war is further undermined. One should
remember that crosstabs showed that Asia behaved differently from the previous COW
suppositions when it came to MIDs and territory, a fact that needed further examination.
H4: National capability has no impact on war onset. Hypothesis 4’s aim was
the discernment of how socio-economic and military might influence state behavior in the
context of war onset. To elucidate, the descriptives were informative. Below is Figure f,
which affords a graphical comprehension of the data. The dark blue bar represented
MIDs (N=446) partitioned by national capability that did not end in war. The orange bar
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represented MIDs (N = 12) that led to war. The chart showed two points of note. One is
that Asian states, which were relatively poor, as depicted in the first quartile, had a
relatively high MID rate (N = 132) that led to war (N =7). The other point is that high
capability states, which were mainly major powers, were equally prone to war (N = 7).
The third quartile accounted for nearly half (N = 211) of the total MIDs (N = 460).

Figure 5. NMC Quartiles and Wars Fought.
The inferential test was equally illuminating. A crosstab was performed between national
military capability and war onset. The former is a scale measurement and the
independent variable. The latter was the dependent variable. The test revealed a
relationship between war onset and national capability that was statistically significant
chi-square (2, 460) = 6.010, p = .050.
Asia, again, proved unique in terms of militarized conflict. The data showed that
an equal number of wars were fought between both minor and major powers, suggesting
the need for further investigation. The Asian continent contained major-major, major-
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minor, and minor-minor interstate disputes through the prescribed time. To reiterate,
major powers are in the third quartile. China, Japan, Russia, and the United States fell
into this category. Most rising and medium-capability countries were in the second
quartile. Vietnam and Thailand are such examples. The poorest, in terms of national
military capability, were categorized in the first quartile. The Philippines, circa the 1970s
and 80s, resided in this percentage group. Singer (1972) and Black (2008) proclaimed
because wars required economic resources they were usually fought by more capable
states. This premise is perhaps true but needed further evidential support.
From a monetary standpoint, it is conceivable that the Cold-War did have an
impact on war onset. Both the Korean War (1950-53) and the Vietnam War (1956-1975)
fell under the third and first quartile categories. Russia, China, and the United States,
which are all high on the NMC index, poured war material and other resources into these
policy armed conflicts. South Korea and Vietnam were minor powers who fought
exhausting wars that were by-proxies for great power competition and ideology. The
latter were economic powerhouses that could fund and support numerous wars, which
arguably increased the correlatory factor of national capability.
Another point is that the data suggested wars of colonialism were at hand. During
the 1950s, Vietnam fought a bitter war to dislodge a colonizer from its territory. The
First Indochina war pitted Vietnam against France. One was a minor power that had just
help defeat the Japanese empire in WWII. The other was a declining major power, which
had been conquered by Germany in WWII. This was another example of a first quartile
situation.
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The last point concerned the fallout from major power wars. Vasquez et al.
(2010) claimed that after major power conflict there is a period of numerous smaller
wars, which he equated to state-building wars. These types were considered minor-minor
conflicts. The research data showed that the preponderance of the 1st quartile MIDs was
subject to this premise. Laos and Cambodia are clear examples.
In short, Hypothesis 4 is rejected. Both descriptive and inferential tests showed a
strong correlation between Asian countries’ economic wealth and their propensity for
war. More so, the above-mentioned synthesis provided examples of how national
material capacity did matter in the number and type of wars fought.
H5: Dyad classification has impacts on war onset. Hypothesis 5’s purpose was
the examination if dyad classification influenced war. Figure 6 portrayed descriptives.
As a reminder, most IR theorists divide state power domains into two broad categories:
major and minor (Lake, 2003; Lebow, 2010). Major powers are established, resourcerich, and often activist in the international order. Minor powers are less capable,
resource-constrained, and often restricted to their respective regions. This research
organized Asian states that participated in militarized disputes into three groups. Majormajor dyads (N = 30) were the lowest. Major-minor (N = 204) and minor-minor (N =
246), combined, were considerably more (94%). What was profound was the sheer
number of dyads that included minor powers, which is later addressed.
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Figure 6. Power Dyads & MIDs (1949-2001).
The inferential test results were not anticipated. A binary logistic regression
model was used to determine the relationship between power dyads and war onset. The
dyads were the predictor variables, and war onset was the outcome variable. The
research method entailed three independent model runs with the predictor variable
exchanged on each one. Here are the results.
The first regression model was not statistically significant chi-square (1, 460) =
1.919, p = .166), with a -2LL of 123.432. War onset equation was equal to -3.392 + 17.88 (maj-maj MID), dyad was coded as 1 = Yes, 0 = No. War onset chances decreased
by 17.811 for each MID. As such, a dyad comprised of major powers was not a
significant predictor of war onset. The second regression model was not statistically
significant chi-square (1, 460) = .950, p = .330), with a -2LL of 124.4. War onset
equation was equal to -3.199 + -.531(maj-min MID), dyad was coded as 1 = Yes, 0 = No.
War onset decreased by .531 for each MID. In short, dyads comprised of one major
power, and one minor power were not significant predictors of war initiation.
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Table 3
War Onset & Maj-Min Dyad Regression Results

The last regression model was also not statistically significant, chi-square (1, 460) = .950,
p = .330), with a -2LL of 124.4. War onset equation was equal to -3.199 + -.531(minmin MID), dyad was coded as 1 = Yes, 0 = No. War onset decreased by .531 for each
MID. In totality, Asian power dyads—i.e., major-major, major-minor, minor-minor—
were not significant predictors of war onset. Therefore, Hypothesis 5 was summarily
rejected.
As with previous abnormal findings, the lack of correlation between power dyads
and war onset required further analysis. Using the same regression model, a new series
of binary logistics tests were implemented. Since war onset was inconclusive, the
research leaned toward violent conflict as an outcome variable.
The first regression model was not statistically significant, chi-square (1,460) =
1.591, p = .207, with a -2LL of 530.577. Violent equation was equal to .547 + .509(majmaj MID), dyad was coded as 1 = Yeas, 0 = No. Violent conflict increased by .509 for
each MID. That said, based on p = .207, there remained no relation between major-major
power dyads and militarized interstate violence. The second regression run was
statistically significant, chi-square (1,460) = 5.432, p =.021, with a -2LL of 526.827.
Violent conflict equation was equal to 1.250 + -.490(maj-min MID), dyad was coded as 1
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= Yes, 0 = No. Violent conflict decreased by .490 for each MID, which was supported by
a -.707 in IBM SPSS correlation matrix.
Table 4
Violent Conflict & Min-Min Dyad Regression Results

Regarding violent interstate conflict, the last regression model was statistically
significant, chi-square (1,460) = 5.432, p = .021 with -2LL of 526.827. Violent conflict
equation was equal to .760 + .490(min-min MID), dyad was coded as 1 =Yeas, 0 = No.
Violent conflict increased by .490 for each additional MID.
Hypothesis 5 has three takeaways. COW literature and research purported power
domains were an integral part of whether a state waged war or not (Rummel, 1977,
Sample, 2016). However, this scholarly work provided several alternatives. The notion
of minor powers not waging war because of their low material capability is inconclusive.
Descriptive analysis showed that Asian minor powers were indeed very active with
respect to militarized disputes. From 1949 to 2001, the minor powers were involved in
almost all disputes (94%) in Asia. Yet, there was no clear correlation if their status was
related to war.
Equally relevant was that war onset in Asia was agnostic to power domains.
Based on the high number of major-minor MIDs, there perhaps should have been a
correlation. As mentioned, this finding aligned with neither COW nor STW research
(Bremer, 1992; Senese et al., 2008 Singer, 2001; Vasquez, 1997). More so, all three
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power dyads resulted in relatively high p-values (i.e., p = .166, p = .330, p = .330), which
further supported that a state’s domain classification would not necessarily correlate and
thus lead to war.
Table 5
Violent Conflict & Maj-Min Dyad Regression Results

Lastly, as with earlier MID-related hypotheses, violent conflict and power
domains were correlatory in Asia. Major-minor and minor-minor dyads were statistically
significant. Historical context afforded some tentative answers. Asian major-minor
dyads should have had a positive correlation because of the descriptives results and the
numerous policy wars fought. However, neither the correlation matrix nor regression
results (See Table 5) did not support this finding instead there was a negative correlation.
This could perhaps be connected that the relationship between the major and minor
power in the dyad is one of de-escalation because the minor power acquiesced to the
more powerful state. As for the increase in violent conflict associated with minor-minor
dyads, a tentative answer is that low NMC countries tended to avoid conflict with larger
neighbors, but more than willing to fight a near-peer in capability. Again, martial
contests and war are costly endeavors, and states usually do not partake unless they are
certain of the outcome.
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P3: Major powers with territorial issues are more prone to war
Proposition 3’s purpose was to determine if a conflict dyad that contained a major
power would be suspectable to war when a territorial revision was added. Since this test
necessitates directional and step-increase aspects, a stepwise binary logistical regression
model was created. The latter encapsulated two steps. Step 1 is the first case. The
predictor is a major power, and the outcome variable is war onset. As a reminder, both
variables are dichotomous. In Step 2, major power is swapped for territorial revision,
which is also binary. It is important to remember that this model had an additive
property, whereby the first step results influenced the second.
Table 6
Stage 1 War Onset Regression Results

That said, the two-stage model results were illuminating. The base model of war
onset and major power was not significant, chi-square (1,460) = 2.710, p = .100, with a 2LL of 122.641. War onset equation was equal to -3.863 + .910 (majpower), dyad was
coded as Yes = 1 and No = 0. War onset increased by .910 with each additional MID.
Although this positive correlation between war and major power was deemed not
statistically significant, it is reasonable to ascertain since p = .096 is comparatively close
to p = .05 that there is some correlatory effect.
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Table 7
Stage 2 War Onset Regression Results

Stage 2 of the model of war onset based on major power and territorial revision
was also not statistically significant, chi-square (2, 460) = 2.723, p = .256, with a -2LL of
122.627. War onset equation was equal to -3.863 + .906(majpower) + .069 (territory
revision MID). What is germane here is that the model summary p-values increased
between the stages from p =.100 to p =.256 and both slope coefficients were not
significant. These combined facts meant the model became more questionable when the
territorial revision was added. In sum, the regression finding indicated there was not a
relationship between war onset, major power, and territory that could effectively meet the
criteria to accept Proposition 3. That said, violent conflict has thus far explained a great
deal concerning Asia and COW power politics.
Table 8
Stage 1 Violent Conflict Regression Results
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Keeping within the concept of violent conflict exploration in comparison to war
onset, the above stepwise regression model was again used. The base model of violent
conflict and major powers was statistically significant, chi-square (1,460) = 4.430, p =
.035. Violent conflict equation was equal to 1.170 + -.476(majpower), with a -2LL of
527.739. More importantly, there was a negative correlation between violent conflict and
major powers. Meaning, major powers had a de-escalatory influence on the propensity of
violence.
Stage 2 was equally profound. The second stage of the violent conflict based on
major powers and territory-based issues model was statistically significant chi-square (2,
460) = 9.010, p = .011, with a -2LL of 523.158. Violent conflict equation is equal to .861
+ -.515 (majpower) + .598 (territory_rev). One important item to note is that territory is
additive. For clarity, as violent conflict decreased with the addition of major powers,
territorial revisions caused it to increase.
Table 9
Stage 2 Violent Conflict Regression Results

Proposition 3 contained three salient points. Upfront, outcomes based on power
domains combined with territory could not be statistically correlated to war. This finding
is within the same thread as Research Questions 1 and 2, which also outlaid the
divergence. Equally important was once again violent conflict was strongly related to
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major powers and territorial revision. From the former’s perspective, high capability
states within a dyad decreased the possibility of violent disputes.
In Asia, unlike pre-WW II Europe, most major-minor dyads do not lead to
violence. Instead, it would appear when major powers are involved with lessor countries,
there is a propensity for settlement and thereby de-escalation. Lastly, the research
reflected territorial revisions were escalatory in nature. There was a strong positive
correlation that major power presence and territorial revisionism do increase the
likelihood of violent armed conflict short of war. Although Proposition 3 could not
unanimously be accepted because of the lack of significance concerning war onset, there
should remain a strong acknowledgment that MID and revisionism do play an integral
part in the violence on the Asia continent (Kim, 2002; Singer et al, 1987; Kaplan, 2013).
What revision type causes the greatest propensity of war in Asia? Upfront, the
answer to the research question was overwhelmingly nuanced. War in Asia could not be
correlated with any revisions. Not only were they not statistically relevant, there were so
on a large scale: territory (p = .823), policy (p = .255), and regime (p = .826). This
finding dictated that research should explore other related areas.
Violent conflict is common in Asia and empirically pertinent. Territory and
regime were the two revisions that were statistically significant. Crosstabs were used to
determine these findings. Regime was the highest. In fact, it was 11.82 more likely to
lead to military violence between Asian states. This revelation could have possible
implications as to whether Asian conflict followed the steps-to-war path.
Another point is that a country’s national military capability was a greater
indicator of war onset. In fact, national capability (p = .05) was statistically significant
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compared to all revisions. More so, there was an equal tendency for war between major
and minor powers. This discovery implied that minor powers, not only fought in major
power wars but also against one another.
Of greater significance, the data and statistical tests did not support power
domains and war onset. With Asia, despite the strong relationship between military
capability and war onset, this research only supported violent interstate conflict. Asiatic
dyads that contained major power were not more violence-prone, instead, their presence
decreased the chances. Conversely, minor-minor dyads were positively related to
violence onset.
Lastly, Asian militarized disputes that contained territorial revisions and major
power do not increase the chances of war. There was statistical evidence to prove that
they did. On the other hand, when violence was the dependent variable, there was
empirical support. Despite major power presence dampening effect on violence, the
addition of a territorial dispute did increase the chances of interstate violence.
In sum, there is not a statistical relationship between COW-defined revisions and
the propensity of war in Asia. But there is a relatively strong positive correlation
between the outbreak of interstate violence and regime-based revisions and high national
capability. Since territory was not deemed significant, there perhaps were some
repercussions that would be made apparent in the next section.
RQ3: What does the war onset covariates imply for chances of war in Asia
Research Question 3, this dissertation’s pinnacle inquest examined if the StepsTo-War theory held true for Asia. Vasquez’s theory was based on a very robust sample.
As with most COW studies, the temporal domain is from 1815 to 2001and dispute cases
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pertain to the international order. In short, previous research accounted for disputes in
Europe, Middle East, Africa, and other regions within a two-century timeframe.
Conversely, this dissertation was scoped to a specific region, Asia, and epoch—China’s
founding in 1949 and thereafter. With these parameters, the below content illuminated the
relationship between war initiation and the applicable attributes in which the Steps-To
War theorist contended was necessary.
P4: War onset on the Asian continent is congruent with COW power politics
behavior
Proposition 4 analyzed whether war onset on the Asian continent was congruent
with COW power politics behavior. More importantly, this research methodology and
test are a direct replica of Senese and Vasquez's (2008) steps-to-war theoretical treatise
that codified how the correlates of war (i.e., power politics) increased war likelihood
between states. To elucidate, in the research design, war onset was the outcome variable.
Senese et al. (2008) empirical aim were to determine the direction and magnitude of war
probabilities based on the addition of predictor variables. The first phase involved the
occurrence of a militarized interstate dispute grounded on a territorial revision. The
second stage involved an enduring rivalry between disputants. The third rung was
alliance creation, which was the rivals’ effort to counter one another. Finally, there was
the arms buildup between belligerents. The final effect, according to Vasquez, was an
increase in the probability of war commencement. What is important is that the correlates
are synonymous with the predictor variables, which leads to the statistical model.
To test P4, a four-stage model, using binary logistic regression, was created. The
base model, or Stage 1, pertained to Asian territorial revisions. Next, rivalry was added
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into the regression. This stepwise approach continued until all power politics predictors
were adequately accounted for. The variables are dichotomous, with Yes = 1 and No = 0.
Simply put, if a specific power politic behavior were present in the dyad, it was
empirically analyzed in the inferential test.
The stepwise regression model on war onset and COW power politics was not
statistically significant. For emphasis, here is the stage-by-stage empirical synopsis. The
base model was not significant, chi-square (1, 460) = .045, p = .831. War onset was
equal to -3.339 + .127 (Territory_Rev), p = .539 with a -2LL of 124.894. Stage 2 model,
comprised of territory and rivalry, was not significant, chi-square (2, 460) = .644, p =
.725. War onset was equal to -3.445 + .160(Territory_Rev), p = .790 + -.490(END_RIV,
p = .458, with a -2LL of 124.625.
Table 10
Stage 4 War Onset & Steps-To-War Regression Results

Stage 3 model, which included territory, enduring rivalry, and high-risk alliance,
was not significant, chi-square (3,460) = .692, p = .875. War onset equation was -3.500 +
.172(Territory_Rev), p =.776 + -.507 (END_RIV), p = .603 + .122 (HR_ALLY), p =.825,
with a -2LL of 124.596. Stage 4 model, which incorporated all COW power politic
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variables, was not significant, chi-square (4,460) = 1.455, p = .635. War onset equation
was -3.838 + .158(Territory_Rev), p =.794 + -.294(END_RIV), p = .680 +
.115(HR_ALLY), p = .836 + .518(ARMS_RACE), p = .391, with a -2LL of 123.833.
By now, the above-listed findings were anticipated. Previous hypotheses and
propositions testing illuminated there were neither meaningful statistical nor correlatory
relationships between war onset and Asiatic interstate power politics. Table 10 outlaid
the stepwise regression model and is a testament to these affirmations. In short,
Proposition 4 should be considered invalid as COW power politics pertain to the Asian
continent.
Furthermore, Asia is not aligned with the Steps-To-War theory. This summation
is based on the consistently high p-values and relatively low -2LL numbers on each
model stage. That said, it was undeniably necessary to examine what would be the
outcome if war onset was exchanged for interstate violent conflict.
Using the same stepwise model, regression was again conducted with violent
conflict as the outcome variable. The predictors—territory, enduring rivalry, high-risk
alliance, and arms race—also remained the same. Overall, the regression model on
violent conflict and Asian states' power politics was statistically significant. Here is a
more detailed report. The base model was significant, chi-square (1,460) = 3.529, p =
.060. Violent conflict equation was .746 + .421(Territory_Rev), p = .058, with a -2LL of
525.978.
Stage 2 was statistically significant, chi-square (2, 460) = 6.115, p = .047.
Equation was equal to .843 + .452(Territory_Rev), p = .044 + -.368 (END_RIV), p
=.105, with a -2LL of 523.393. Stage 3 model, which included territory, enduring rivalry,
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and high-risk alliance, was significant, chi-square (3,460) = 29.067, p = .000. Violent
conflict equated to -3.500 + .551(Territory_Rev), p =.018 + -.511 (END_RIV), p = .030
+ 1.109(HR_ALLY), p =.000, with a -2LL of 500.441.
Table 11
Stage 4 Violent Conflict & Steps-To-War Regression Results

Stage 4 model, which included all COW power politics variables, was significant,
chi-square (4,460) = 29.413, p = .000. Violent conflict equation was .510 + .558
(Territory_Rev), p =.016 + -.574 (END_RIV), p = .027 + 1.117 (HR_ALLY), p = .000 +
-.141 (ARMS_RACE), p = .557, with a -2LL of 500.094.
By large, violent conflict is a better indicator of how COW power politics interact
on the Asian continent. Below is a detailed explanation. Territory was a significant
predictor in violent interstate conflict. It had a positive relationship with violent conflict.
This meant that as territorial revisions increased, so did the propensity for violent
interstate conflict. Equally important was at each stage the p-value decreased, signaling
the relationship between violence and territory revision got stronger. This was also the
case with the regression coefficient, which went from .421 to .558.
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Enduring rivalry also had a substantial influence. There was an unanticipated
negative relationship between the outcome and the predictor variable. From Stage 2 to 4,
the magnitude of the correlation increased, the regression coefficient went from -.368 to .574. In parallel, the significance level increased by sixty percent from p = .105 to p =
.027. What these comparatives revealed was as the additive properties of the steps-towar correlates were manifested the presence of an enduring rivalry within a dyad became
statistically significant. As one recalled, COW research showed that rivalries, particularly
long-lasting ones, did increase the propensity for war, and thereby violence (Mitchell et
al., 2014; Senese et al., 2008). Regarding Asia, this supposition was not wholly
congruent because rivalries became relevant at Stage 3 in the regression model with the
addition of a major power ally.
Having a high-risk ally was empirically significant. In fact, it was the strongest
predictor out of the four. There was an overwhelmingly positive relationship between
violent conflict and dyads having a strong ally. The latter is characterized by major
power status and possessing a high NMC index score. The regression coefficient was
also the largest compared to the other power politic variables.
Arms races were not significant. Although perhaps more relevant than war onset,
the relationship between violent conflict and military buildups remained statistically not
significant (p = .557). In Asia, this research showed that military competition of
capabilities did not necessarily increase the likelihood of violence.

166
P5: East and Southeast Asia subregions are more prone to conflict than Asia writ
large
Proposition 5’s purpose and methodology are a direct replication of Proposition 4.
It analyzed whether war onset within the East and Southeast Asian subregions were
consistent with COW covariates and the Steps-To-War theory. To clarify, Proposition 5
is divided into two subregions, which are examined in order of significance. East Asia is
first, followed by the southeastern states. Starting with the former, the stepwise
regression model on war onset and COW power politics was not statistically significant.
To test P5, the four-stage model binary logistic regression was again used. Below is the
stage-by-stage empirical synopsis of East Asia. Stage 1 model was not significant, chisquare (1, 215) = 1.361, p = .243. War onset was equal to -3.807 + .902 (Territory_Rev),
p = .246 with a -2LL is 60.355.
Stage 2 model, comprised of territory and rivalry, was not significant, chi-square
(2, 215) = 5.315, p = .070. War onset was equal to -3.486 + .847(Territory_Rev), p =
.279 + -18.047(END_RIV), p = .997, with a -2LL of 56.401.
Table 12
Stage 4 War Onset & Steps-To-War Regression Results
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Stage 3 model, which added high-risk alliance, was not significant, chi-square (3,
215) = 7.658, p = .054. War onset equation was -3.733 + .609 (Territory_Rev), p = .451
+ -18.182(END_RIV), p = .997+ .1.310 (HR_ALLY), p =.109, with a -2LL of 54.058.
Stage 4 model, which incorporated all COW power politic variables, was not
significant, chi-square (4, 215) = 8.301, p = .081. War onset equation was -3.517 +
.593(Territory_Rev), p = .465 + -17.890(END_RIV), p = .997+ 1.395(HR_ALLY), p =
.093+ -.674(ARMS_RACE), p = .440, with a -2LL of 53.415. In short, East Asia does
not align with the Steps-To-War theory. War onset did not significantly correlate to
power politics behavior.
Continuing with East Asia, the step binary regression model on violent conflict
and COW power politics was statistically significant. The base model was not
significant, chi-square (1, 215) = 1.361, p = .243. War onset was equal to 1.079 + .347(Territory_Rev), p = .266 with a -2LL of 253.366. Stage 2 model, comprised of
territory and rivalry, was not significant, chi-square (2, 215) = 1.373, p = .503. Violent
conflict was equal to 1.116 + -.354(Territory_Rev), p = .258 + -.135(END_RIV), p =
.699, with a -2LL of 253.218.
Table 13
Stage 4 Violent Conflict & Steps-To-War Regression Results
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Stage 3 model, which included territory, enduring rivalry, and high-risk alliance,
was significant, chi-square (3, 215) = 15.685, p = .001. Violence equation was .953+ .465 (Territory_Rev), p = .151+ -.292 (END_RIV), p = .422 + 1.918 (HR_ALLY), p =
.002, with a -2LL of 238.906.
Stage 4 model, which incorporated all COW power politic variables, was
significant, chi-square (4, 215) = 17.253, p = .002. War onset equation was .798 + -.487
(Territory_Rev), p = .135 + -.534 (END_RIV), p = .200 + 1.932 (HR_ALLY), p = .002+
.448 (ARMS_RACE), p = .215, with a -2LL of 237.338. For further clarification, Table
13, located above, illustrated the Stage 4 research findings. In all, what is important to
remember is East Asian dyads that possessed high-risk alliances were prone to violent
conflict.
Proposition 5’s other subregion was Southeast Asia. Overall, the regression
model on war onset and Southeast Asian states' power politics was not statistically
significant. Here is a more detail. The base model was not significant, chi-square (1,
131) = 2.844, p =.092. War onset equation was -2.793 + -18.410 (Territory_Rev), p =
.998, with a -2LL of 45.879.
Stage 2 was not statistically significant, chi-square (2, 131) = 2.872, p = .238.
War onset equaled -2.741 + -18.414 (Territory_Rev), p = .998 + -.150 (END_RIV), p =
.867, with a -2LL of 45.850. Stage 3 model, which included territory, enduring rivalry,
and high-risk alliance, was not significant, chi-square (3, 131) = 2.909, p = .406. War
equated to -2.782 + -18.434 (Territory_Rev), p = .998+ -.198(END_RIV), p = .831+ .181
(HR_ALLY), p = .846, with a -2LL of 45.813.

169
Table 14
Stage 4 War Onset & Steps-To-War Regression Results

Stage 4 model, which the results are outlaid in Table 14, was not significant, chisquare (4,131) = 3.315, p = .506. War onset equation was -2.617+ -18.417
(Territory_Rev), p = .998 + -.001 (END_RIV), p = .999 + .184 (HR_ALLY), p = .845 + .587 (ARMS_RACE), p = .533, with a -2LL of 45.407. In sum, there is not statistical
correlation with war onset and the power politics associated with SE Asia.
When violent conflict replaced war onset, there were several key changes within
Southeast Asia. Overall, the stepwise regression model on violent conflict and COW
power politics was statistically significant. For emphasis, here is the by-stage empirical
outline. The base model was significant, chi-square (1, 131) = 5.809, p =.016. Violent
conflict was equal to .999 + -1.073 (Territory_Rev), p = .016 with a -2LL of 158.551.
Stage 2 model, which added enduring rivalry, was significant, chi-square (2, 131) =
7.178, p = .028. Violent conflict equated to .836 + -1.070 (Territory_Rev), p = .017 +
.472 (END_RIV), p = .248, with a -2LL of 157.182.
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Table 15
Stage 4 Violent Conflict & Steps-To-War Regression Results

Stage 3 model, which included territory, enduring rivalry, and high-risk alliance,
was significant, chi-square (3, 131) = 9.619, p = .022. Violent conflict was .705 + -1.169
(Territory_Rev), p = .011 + .319 (END_RIV), p = .457 + .694 (HR_ALLY), p = .127,
with a -2LL of 154.741. Stage 4 model, above depicted in Table 15, was significant, chisquare (4,131) = 11.218, p = .024. Violent conflict equation was .896 + -1.163
(Territory_Rev), p = .012 + .515 (END_RIV), p = .261+ .664 (HR_ALLY), p = .145 + .526 (ARMS_RACE), p = .208, with a -2LL of 153.143.
In sum, the above-listed findings were anticipated and indeed nuanced.
Proposition 5 should be considered invalid as correlates of war pertaining to war onset in
the East and Southeast Asian subregions. Moreover, these subregions are not aligned with
the Steps-To-War theory. This summation is based on the consistently high p-values and
relatively low -2LL numbers on each model stage. On the other hand, the research did
show that both subregions were marginally aligned when interstate violence was
substituted for war.
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Although not as numerous as greater Asia, there were two covariates that did
stand out. In East Asia, dyads that contained a high-risk ally (p = 002) were 6.9 times
more susceptible to violence than those with territorial revisions, rivalry MIDs, and arms
races. This finding could be interpreted as major powers are balancing and
counterbalancing one another in the East China Sea region. Descriptive analyses, which
are below discussed, reflect Japan, China, Russia, and the United States were undeniably
active during the 1949-2001 timeframe.
Regarding Southeast Asia, the research outlined that territory was omnipotent.
However, the correlation was divergent, meaning territorial revision had a negative
impact on interstate violence onset. For disclosure's sake, this metric was deemed
erroneous. There was no supporting evidence that explained how and why territorial
related disputes decreased interstate conflict (Mitchell et al., 2014; Senese et al., 2008;
Vasquez, 1993). Finally, the key takeaway here is empirical research illuminated that
East and Southeast Asian subregions were marginally aligned with the Steps-To-War
theory.
What does the war onset covariates imply for chances of war in Asia? In totality,
Research Question 3 was empirically the most thought-provoking of three supporting
questions. First, there is a utility in proceeding with the Steps-To-War theory as an
analytical framework. Despite not be able to assess war onset, the theory did allow
application and evaluation of violent conflict within Asian dyads. Equally pertinent, most
COW peace research is on a global scale and negated regionality. In fact, this knowledge
gap is a key criticism from other IR theorists and scholars, a shortfall this dissertation
addressed.
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Second, Asia was not war-prone but has a high incidence of interstate violence.
The data and research have outlaid this summation. As a result, it was determined that
addressing the main research question should reflect violent conflict as it pertained to
China. It materialized as more applicable. To clarify, the research shifted to Sino
interstate violence versus war onset.
Third, the Steps-To-War model required modification. As one could recall,
military arms buildup was determined to be not significant; therefore, it was removed
from the model. The revised violent conflict equation is now .510 + .558 (Territory_Rev)
+ -.574 (END_RIV) + 1.117 (HR_ALLY). What this modification did was render the
four-stage regression model to a three-stage process.
Fourth, the research reflected that Asian subregions were less influential with
regards to interstate war and violence. The examination of 346 dispute dyads only
afforded two inferences (i.e., high-risk alliances and territorial revisions) concerning East
and Southeast Asia—and one was deemed erroneous. Despite lack of quantitative
evidence, there remained strong qualitative support that Sino aggression does play a
factor in the subregions’ volatility.
Last, China and its power politics behavior would be examined through a more
relevant empirical prism. Culturally, economically, militarily, and politically China is
more attuned with Asia than arguably the international order. Whereas interstate war was
more common worldwide, especially in the Middle East North Africa (MENA) regions,
this is not the case in Asia. Low-intensity conflict, where battle casualties remain below
1,000, best characterized the power politics behavior in the Middle Kingdom. Therefore,
the research should reflect these idiosyncrasies.
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Main Research Question
What is the relationship between the correlates of war and China’s revisionist
strategy in Asia? To answer this question, it perhaps best to do so in two parts.
Retrodiction is empirical analysis primarily based on historical data. So far, this
construct has been the preponderance herein, where the inductive investigation of war
and its correlates has been paramount. Prediction is another analysis technique. It is
forecasting future events based on either quantitative or qualitative methods. Although
this dissertation is overwhelming quantitative, there is a subjective element involved
when current Sino strategic implications are addressed. Furthermore, within each
analysis category, there are two topic areas. The first delineated the Chinese grand
strategy, whereas the second focused on the empirical relationship with correlates of war.
The latter is centered on China, but also greater Asia and its associated state actors and
critical subregions.
Retrodiction
Prior to disclosing research findings, it necessary to provide historical context on
the Chinese grand strategy. Like most major powers, China has a national security plan
that is published for both domestic and foreign consumption. The first “Five-Year” plan
was presented in 1953 and thereafter has been a bellwether. Although there were
numerous Sino national goals during the 50-year period this dissertation analyzed,
research outlaid four that were both enduring and correlatory to the main research
question.
The first goal was to promote internal stability. Centuries of perceived
humiliation by Western major powers, a costly world war, and a protracted revolution led
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the Chinese elite to determined that domestic harmony was first and foremost. For this,
the CCP strengthened communist ideals and eradicated internal socio-political entities not
aligned. Simply put, the Sino government sought to have a monopoly on power and
violence within the Middle Kingdom (Friedberg, 2011; Goddard, 2018).
The second national aim was first the development of agriculture and then
economic capacity. With the highest population on the planet, the Government of China
had to acquire the means to feed their people and make them productive. Economic
development focused on infrastructure, technology, manufacturing, and building a
defense industry. The latter was imperative to the last two security aspirations.
The third objective entailed the near-abroad. Pacifying borders and removal of
neighboring regimes deemed as a threat were the CCP’s two main methods. The means
were a robust economy and a credible military.
The last, and perhaps most important, historical goal was to increase China’s
domain status and position in the international order. Again, economic and martial might
were the necessary conditions (Renshon, 2016). So, from 1949 to 2001, the abovementioned national security goals outlined the overall Sino grand strategy. The belowannotated research findings provide empirical context on how China’s numerous fiveyear plans overlapped with the correlates of war and interstate power politics.
Regarding historical analysis, there are some implied considerations that required
further commentary. Using IBM SPSS’s descriptive and inferential results as a guideline,
research findings and associated implications are therein addressed in sequence. Asiatic
militarized disputes and revisions provided an informative framework for the descriptive
analysis discussion, whereby the Steps-To-War theory afforded an inferential aspect.
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China, from 1949 to 2001, had a total of 61 dispute dyads. The militarized
interstate disputes (M = 3.82, SD = .646) were negatively skewed towards the left, which
meant that threats (N =3), force display (N = 10), and use of force (N =43) were more
common than interstate war (N = 5). Also, the data reflected a leptokurtic distribution
(Kurtosis = 1.841), which indicated a small number of outliers. Force-related MIDs,
which were relatively high, could be interpreted as the PRC favored force displays (16%)
and use of arms (70%) in most of their interstate disputes. It is also conceivable that
China has been quite successful with these strong-arm tactics, which is why they are
repeatedly used.

Figure 7. MID comparison (1949-2001).
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Multi-faceted comparisons were useful in deriving further findings. Upfront, Sino
conflict activities were aligned with Asia. Figure 7 (left side) provides an informative
synthesis. However, when compared to other regional major powers, China’s use of
military force was notedly higher. A possible explanation was that the other major
powers, Japan, South Korea, United States, etc. were beyond prudent in military force
usages because of their democratic government and their populace. Since the CCP is
totalitarian, there were arguably fewer constraints to dampen the Sino proclivity for
aggressive power politics behavior. Figure 7 (right side) depicts this synopsis.
Equally profound are the differences within other key Asian subregions. As
mentioned, East and Southeast Asia are the subregions where the most interstate dispute
has occurred. China, on average, accounted for one-fifth (17%) of the force-associated
MIDs. If one considered East Asia’s volatility, with 141 use of force MIDs, this result’s
weightiness was even more relevant. In short, it should be comprehended that China
does not resort to war often. Instead, the descriptives revealed the Chinese Government
used the PLA in an aggressive manner in many of its interstate disputes, regardless of
whether the opponent was a major or minor power.
Sino revisions (M = 1.16, SD = .934) were another aspect that brought greater
synthesis. Descriptive testing revealed a positive, right-skewed dataset. Non-quantifiable
(N = 13) and territorial (N = 32) revisions were more prevalent than policy (N = 11) and
regime (N = 3). Akin with MIDs, the dataset echoed a leptokurtic distribution (Kurtosis
= 1.506), which signaled limited outliers. Analysis, with respect to the Peoples Republic
of China, revealed that territory (52%) was the highest COW-defined revision type. This
metric could be interpreted that China is indeed concerned with its near abroad. During
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the 1949 to 2001 epoch, Sino conflicts with Vietnam, India, Japan, and Taiwan were
exuberantly frequent and should also be considered as proof. That said, a regional
comparison is nonetheless warranted.

Figure 8. Revision Comparison.
When compared to other regional major powers, China accounted for nearly twothirds (67%) of the territorial revisions (N = 36). Equally informative was Sino policy
revisions made up a third (35%) of major power totals. Taken in the aggregate, this
analysis supported the hypothesis that territory is more salient compared to other
revisions. It appeared that other Asiatic major powers, including the U.S., were more
anxious over policy issues. Nevertheless, there is a key caveat to remember going
forward. Although territory is indeed important, research revealed that regime, not

178
territorial disputes led to violence. This paradox should be comprehended that China for
all its military action over territory, only entered armed conflicts with other states when
the Communist Party felt it was threatened.
In East Asia, characterized by the high presence of major powers and associated
bi-lateral alliance networks, revision comparison was nuanced. These states were most
active over territorial issues, with Sino involvement in 24 of the 77 dyadic disputes,
nearly a third (31%). Policy-wise, the PRC accounted for also a third (37%) of East
Asia’s cases (N = 63). What is important to remember is that China was equally
concerned with territorial and policy issues (See Figure 7).
Regarding Southeast Asia, with its high quantity of minor powers, Sino
disagreements were mainly over territory. China (N = 24) accounted for practically all
territorial revisions (88%) in Southeast Asia (N = 27). What this data revealed was
Chinese geopolitical objectives were disparate between East and Southeast Asia. This
implied that the CCP was willing to risk violent conflict over land-based disputes because
SE Asian states lacked the national material capability to withstand the onslaught.
Further north, Sino ambitions appeared more pliant. South Korea and Japan, with the
U.S. as their respective allies, increased the cost of war, and thereby potentially restrained
Sino political aims and aggression. In totality, the analysis depicted that a territorial
revision coupled with a force related MIDs showed a decrease in violent conflict.
Meaning, China's ardent power politics use either intimidated or compelled target states
to concede, thereby decreasing military conflict.
Inferentially, retrodiction also provided several key findings concerning Chinese
strategy and the correlates of war. Earlier analysis revealed the STW theory was not
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applicable to war onset on the Asian continent, which by default included China. As a
result, Vasquez’s propositions were summarily rejected. The revised STW framework,
which was researcher-defined, substituted violent conflict as the outcome variable.
Because dyads with arms buildups were not statistically significant (p = .557), they were
also removed from the regression equation. The revised equation was violent conflict
equated to .510 + .558 (Territory_Rev), p =.016 + -.574 (END_RIV), p = .027 + 1.117
(HR_ALLY), p = .000. That said, it is necessary to provide an overview of Sino war
correlates (i.e., power politics).
Out of 61 militarized dispute cases, China had 32 characterized as territorial
revisions, 52 possessed an enduring rivalry, and 26 included a high-risk ally. More so,
nearly three-quarters (N = 48) of Sino disputes ended in violent conflict. There are four
takeaways here. First, territorial revisions had an additive effect on the probability of
violence between China and other Asiatic states. In other words, territory was indeed a
gateway to interstate conflict. Second, if the dyad history contained an enduring rivalry
between countries, then the chances of conflict were lowered. It could be considered that
China’s multiple disputes (N = 48) with its neighbors had become ritualized. Meaning,
both belligerents would engage in combative, escalatory behavior up to a predetermined
war threshold and then deescalate.
Third, the presence of high-risk ally, defined by a robust material capability score
and major power status, significantly increased the possibility of violence. This finding
could be supported by the fact that maintain credible armed forces and executing military
operations are expensive, thereby only states with those attributes are able to either risk
or wage war. One could argue that states do not go through the trouble of acquiring
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military might and creating defense pacts unless they felt threatened. So, dispute dyads
with outside defense pact alliances were more susceptible to violence.
There is one final statistic that appropriately summarized whether China's use of
power politics would end in violence. The stepwise binary regression output afforded
predicted probabilities. With respect to China and violent conflict inducement, the
average predicted probability (M =.7868, SD =.160) was relatively high compared to Asia
(M = .6819, SD = .249). Based on the revised pathway to violence sequence, research
showed there was a 78% chance that China would engage in some form of militarized
interstate violence over a territorial revision with a long-standing rival who had a
powerful ally.
Equally germane was a comparison with Vasquez’s findings, which outlaid that
the probability of war onset did increase. As previously mentioned, militarized disputes
of territory had a predicted probability of .15 of leading to war. After multiple MIDs,
dyadic interstate warfare chances increased to .45. With the addition of alliance,
characterized by outside partners and major powers, war likelihood increase to .65. The
final predicted probability rose to .90 when arms buildups were included (Colaresi et al.,
2002; Owsiak, 2017; Senese et al. 2008; Vasquez, 1987, 2004). Taking the STW theory
into account, it is therefore conceivable that the aggregated predicted probability of
interstate violence associated with China’s revisionism (78%) was reasonably aligned
with the COW project and Vasquez’s global findings (65%), when arms build-up was
removed as a covariate.
In total, research showed a historical, empirical connection between the correlates
of war and China’s grand strategy over a 50-year period. Despite having fought two
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interstate wars, China’s aggressive actions should be characterized by interstate violence
that culminated short of war. China’s revisions were based on its strategic goal outlined
in its numerous five-year plans. Sino revisions, which were primarily over territory and
policy issues, were influenced by their near abroad security dilemma and perceived low
domain status within the international order. China routinely entered militarized disputes
with its neighbors, which ultimately led to rivalry. As a result, numerous Asiatic major
powers situated on the East and South China Seas entered bi-lateral defense pacts with
the U.S. Despite the lack of empirical evidence on either war or violence onset, data
indicated that China has steadily increased military capacity in terms of personnel and
war materiel for almost 50 years.
Prediction
For China, all roads lead to revisionism. Meaning, the Chinese Communist Party
intends to upend the current status quo within the international order. This is essentially
China’s strategic aim—the Return to Glory. It is also critical to note the below-listed
inferences diverge from the overall dissertation methodology. Thus far, the research
focus has been characterized by an objective, quantitative analyses. Since the research
aim here is a well-informed prediction, this section calls for a more subjective approach
because of the lack of an updated COW dataset.
The strategic overview from 2001 onward could be separated into two distinct
stages. In the first period (2001 to 2013), China’s strategic goals were to improve
internal stability, continue economic growth, assimilate Taiwan, and increase status
within the international order. For example, slogans such as “Peaceful Rise” and “Win
without fighting”, dominated Sino diplomatic lexicon and were openly linked to former
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Chinese president Hu Jintao’s five-year plans (Bosbotinis, 2010; DIA, 2017;
Heginbotham et al., 2015; Haglund, 2004; Renshon, 2016). In the second stage (2013 to
the present), Sino goals have become more aggressive on the national security front: 1)
domestic stability, 2) the Taiwan dilemma, 3) dominance in the South China Sea, and 4)
Countering Japan (Bosbotinis, 2010; Jones, 2020; Liff & Ikenberry, 2014; OSD, 2019,
Work, 2019). Aligning nationalistic fervor and revisionism from perceived insults was
current President Xi Jinping’s strategic shift from internal concerns to those of a global
nature. Blackwill and Tellis further clarified:
Given this painful history, it is not surprising that China’s primary strategic goal
in contemporary times has been the accumulation of ‘comprehensive national
power’. This pursuit of power in all its dimensions—economic, military,
technology, and diplomatic—is driven by the conviction that China, a great
civilization undone by the hostility of other, could never attain its destiny unless it
amassed the power necessary to ward off the hostility of those opposed to this
quest. (Blackwill & Tellis, 2015, p. 7)
What this quotation implied, according to the authors, was that superior power
alone created order. And more, China’s chances of achieving regional hegemony and
matching the United States as a great power was predicated on the CCP, or political elite,
possessing greater capabilities than any other entity, both internal and external to the
Middle Kingdom (Blackwill et al., 2015).
The correlates of war, or rather power politics behavior, provide key signposts on
the chances of Sino interstate conflict. Revisionism is the first correlate in which two
issues are most germane. First, territory claims dominate the current foreign policy
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landscape. Over the past decade, China has embarked on numerous territorial revisions.
In the East China Sea, both the Peoples Republic of China and the Government of Japan
fight over the Senkaku Islands. Although the international community recognizes the
islands as Nipponese, China maintains the landmasses are part of their cultural heritage
(DIA, 2017; Krepinevich, 2015, 2017, 2020).
To the southeast, China has engaged both the Socialist Republic of Vietnam
(SRV) and the Republic of the Philippines (ROP) over territory. The CCP has laid claim
to both Spratly and Paracel Islands from Vietnam. These two states have engaged in titfor-tat tactics to military and diplomatically force the situation (Kim, 2015; Work, 2018).
Equally important is Sino territorial conflict with the Filipinos. With its predicted
windfall in oil reserves, the Scarborough Reef is a salient issue to both the PRC and ROP.
To reinforce their claims in Vietnam and the Philippines, China has built man-made
islands, which can support military action, throughout the South China Sea. This
construction has threatened freedom of navigation, a major point of contention with the
United States and Japan (Allan, Vucetic, & Hopf, 2018; DIA, 2017; OSD, 2019).
On the other hand, the Taiwan-situation remains a major revision for China. The
Republic of China (ROC and commonly known as Taiwan) is the most salient foreign
policy agenda for the Chinese Communist Party. Many IR scholars contend since
Taiwan is about territory, policy, and regime that it is the most volatile flashpoint within
the region. (Freidman, 2013). China believes the island of Formosa is an extension of the
Chinese mainland and therefore should belong to them. This revision is the territorial
aspect. Politically, since Taiwan is a democratic government, the CCP perceives it as an
existential threat to their legitimacy in both the domestic and international arenas.
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Therefore, the Chinese have diplomatically and militarily isolated the ROC. With Sino
pressure, the United Nations has not recognized the Taiwanese state since 1971
(Friedberg, 2011, 2012; Friedman, 2013).
Perhaps most important is the fact that Taiwan is primarily regarded as a regime
issue for the Chinese elite. The CCP leadership fundamentally believe that the
Taiwanese government, with their democratic ideals and ties to China’s adversaries,
prevents the Middle Kingdom from achieving their power status goal as a global and
regional hegemon. It is important to remember that both large-scale interstate wars that
the Chinese fought involved regime revisionisms. For these reasons, one should consider
that territorial ambitions and Taiwan’s affront are indeed the first steps on a path to future
conflict (Heginbotham et al, 2015; Jalil, 2019).
Rivalry is the second correlate. Currently, China has multiple enduring rivalries.
As a reminder, an enduring rivalry is defined as six or more militarized interstate disputes
between two states. The last decade Chinese rivals have remained constant. They are
Japan, India, Vietnam, the Philippines, South Korea, and the United States (Holmes,
2014; Mohan, 2012; Schweller & Pu, 2011). For brevity, this dissertation does not
explore these relationships. They are arguably to complex and beyond the scope of this
research. However, what is important to remember is that China is actively engaged in
MIDs in three of the five Asian subregions. Border disputes with India monopolize the
southern region. Force displays, in terms of warships and tactical bombers, dominates
both the east and southeastern subregions (Leverett & Bingbing, 2016; Mohan, 2012;
Zhang, 2016).
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Alliances are the third power politics behavior that leads to conflict. Outside of
Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Asia contains the highest
concentration of major powers and alliances. The former mainly reside in the south and
east. India is the key power in the south. Russia, South Korea Japan, and the United
States are active in the east. Unlike Europe, Asian alliances lean toward bi-lateral
defense pacts. There is no overarching construct, but states form ties based on one-onone relationships (Jones, 2020). For example, Japan has a formal defense treaty with the
United States, but not one with South Korea. Seoul has an alliance with Washington but
refuses to form one with Tokyo. Even so, this patchwork has thus far prevented any
large-scale interstate conflict for the last 20 years (Holmes, 2014). However, it also
reinforces rivalry and distrust, ultimately leading to a regional security dilemma in which
most states respond by increasing their military capability.
Lastly, there are interstate arms races. Although not statistically significant within
a historical Asian context, arms buildup is indeed a key predictor of violence (Mitchell,
2014). China, since 1996, has steadily increased its defense spending to nearly $264B
USD, which currently places them globally second in terms of expenditures
(Heginbotham et al., 2015; OSD, 2019). They have either built or procured a surface
fleet of over 300 ships, including three aircraft, carries, rivaling the U.S., which currently
has the largest fleet. The PLA has made the same strides in terms of tactical aircraft,
ballistic missiles, and other high-end equipment (DIA, 2017; Krepinevich, 2015, 2017;
OSD, 2019; Rider, 2011).
Equally important is the people factor. The PLA has transformed its military
units from domestic orientation to expeditionary operations (O’Rourke, 2019). This
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restructuring, coupled with amphibious ships and aerial refueling tankers, afford the PRC
operational reach to effect Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea, thereby increasing the
insecurity and volatility within East Asia. Meaning, these countries have followed the
Sino lead and increased their own capability. Aside from building their own weapons,
GOJ, ROK, and ROC have procured weapons for their biggest ally—the United States of
America (DIA, 2017, Krepinevich, 2015, 2017; Rider, 2011; OSD, 2019).
What is the relationship between the correlates of war and China’s revisionist
strategy in Asia? Fifty years of data outlaid that China relied on force, both displays and
use, to achieve their geopolitical strategic aims. Current Sino activity, which is power
politics at its highest pinnacle, suggests continuity. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s
present five-year strategic plan specifically calls for China to return as a global power.
As a result, the Chinese Communist Party and its instrument of purpose, the People
Liberation Army, have and arguably continue to use aggressive power politics to achieve
this goal. Research has shown that violent interstate conflict, not war, is the Sino way.
China will continue to use the same playbook until there is a fundamental geopolitical
shift that forces abandonment. After all, the Chinese elite does not want to upend
international order but alter it so they can return to their rightful position as a great
power. It is not about prestige; it is only about prestige (Schweller et al., 2011).
Conclusion
In examining Asia’s 461 dispute dyads that covered a fifty-year period, an
inductive method was used to determine the relationship between the correlates of war
and China’s revisionism. This approach had two overarching themes. The first was the
determination of the geopolitical landscape in Asia with respect to disputes, revisionism,
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and war pathways. The supporting research questions provided the necessary
examination framework.
Research Question 1 explored the association between war probability and
militarized disputes. The results were not expected. The literature suggested a positive
correlation between the two variables. With respect to Asia, crosstabs revealed an
opposite effect, however. Force associated disputes (i.e., displays and usage) were
correlated with an inverse relationship—as MIDs increased, then wars decreased. What
this finding suggested was that Asian states, despite the exuberant amount of dispute
cases, primarily avoided war.
Research Question 2 examined what revisions increased the propensity for war.
This finding was most profound. The Correlates of War project and Vasquez’s Steps-ToWar theory proclaimed certain revisions led to war. Inferential tests proved these
propositions would not statistically correspond to Asia and therein, China. When the
outcome variable was switched from war to violence, the revisions became statistically
significant. Another key research discovery was that major powers had a dampening
effect on Asiatic interstate violence. This result was counter to most COW thought.
Research Question 3 determined whether the Steps-To-War theory held true for
Asia. Simply put, there was no statistical evidence that territorial revisions, followed by
rivalry, alliance-making, and arms races increased war onset chances. This finding was
further supported when East and Southeast Asia was examined. However, when war was
substituted for low-intensity violence as an outcome variable, binary regression afforded
considerable results. Territorial revisions and a high-capability ally were proportionally
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increased the chances of interstate violence, whereas enduring rivalry participation was
the opposite.
The other inductive aspect explicitly and implicitly linked China’s current and
past national security strategies to the COW-defined correlates of war. The main
research question resulted in two key implications. Collating previous Sino grand
strategies and using the same research-defined dataset, China was empirically
crosswalked with the research findings ascertained from Asia. This retrodiction
contended China was essentially war-adverse, but violence-prone. The latter was by their
own choosing. The second inference entailed the current strategy of Chinese President
Xi Jinping’s “China Dream”. Although not empirical, this prediction was informed by
the retrodiction analysis. Arguably, the final takeaway here is that China will not seek
war but accept the associated risks of interstate violence to increase their power domain
status and thereby obtain long-sought prestige. The question now moves from one of
analysis to one of mitigation.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
Why war? David Singer’s eloquent question is perhaps the best way to conclude
this dissertation. War onset is arguably the most important variable in war and peace
research. The rationale is that if one could reasonably determine the factors that lead to
war, then it may be possibly avoided. Therefore, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s fiveyear plan calling for the Chinese people to avenge their 100-year humiliation at the hands
of Western major powers and take their rightful place on the global stage as a superpower
is salient. According to Sino national security strategists, not only is the overarching aim
dependent on a strong economy, but it is also evenly predicated on a robust, capable
military and an aggressive, yet balanced foreign policy stance. This proclamation
characterizes the Peoples Republic of China as a revisionist state, a connotation that if not
properly addressed could have devastating consequences. Some could argue this
challenge of the status quo means war. However, this doctoral dissertation posited that
China would continue to use military force; however, this force will be short of open
warfare to achieve their nationalistic dreams. To provide scope and clarity, this chapter is
portioned into two sections. The first provides a summary of this research study, whereas
the second illuminated salient implications.
Summary
Overall, this doctoral study was a comprehensive endeavor. This first section
included four subject areas that when examined in totality should afford requisite
comprehension with regards to the relationship between state-based power politics and
Sino revisionism. Up first, there is the Correlates of War project. This subsection spelled
out the foundations for the empirical study of war and peace, which guided the research.
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Next, there is a theoretical discussion of the steps-to-war theory. The goal here is to
illuminate both the theory’s history and core premises. Another area summarized is the
data overview. Therein, data collection methods and the operationalization of variables
are delineated. Equally germane was the discussion concerning study modifications that
were made in dataset generation and inferential statistical tests. The last subarea
presented the research findings. This dissertation examined ten suppositions, five
hypotheses and five propositions, using an inductive approach. The results were nuanced
because some were divergent from the steps-to-war core premises. With this scope in
mind, it is now appropriate to proceed.
Correlates of War Project
One of the essential and foundational aspects of this dissertation is the Correlates
of War (COW) project. Founded by political scientist John David Singer and historian
Melvin Small in 1963, it is an intellectual movement of peace-based researchers
dedicated to the empirical study war and its onset attributes, i.e., correlates. Initially
charged with data collection on interstate armed conflict, Singer and Small (1972, 1982)
published two seminal books that galvanized the war-studies, peace-research, and
international relations fields. Since its formation, the COW project has substantially
grown. It now consists of 13 datasets that provide empirical information on war correlates
that illuminate why warfare occurs to include interstate, intrastate, and extrastate
conflicts. There have been over 274 empirical scientific studies conducted base on the
concepts and theories of the COW project (Izmirlioglu, 2017). What is important to
remember is that COW research is solely quantitative, which contrasts with the conflict
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resolution and international relations study fields mostly qualitative-based inquiries. A
key point with further implications.
Continuing, this dissertation had two overarching purposes. The first was the
empirical study of interstate conflict at the international, systematic level. The second
was to examine the extent to which the Correlates of War covariates associated with the
People’s Republic of China’s revisionist strategies. Combining these objectives led to
the formulation of the main research question: What is the relationship between the
correlates of war and China’s revisionist strategy in Asia? To that end, there were three
supporting research questions, when inductively researched, provided essential context
on the geopolitical situation in Asia. They are:
RQ1: What is the probability of war onset based on associated MID in Asia?
RQ2: What revision type causes the greatest propensity of war in Asia?
RQ3: What does the war onset covariates imply for chances of war in Asia.
In short, when these queries were aggregated, a clear analytical picture was formulated
the provided greater comprehension and synthesis. An integral part of this scientific goal
was dependent on an applicable theory.
Theoretical Discussion
Using a theoretical framework is foundational in most scientific research studies,
here it was no different. As discussed, The Steps-To-War theory was arguably the most
insightful byproducts of the COW project. Renowned peace researcher John Vasquez,
credited with its creation, claimed that it is grounded on the behavioral and relational
impacts of when two states, who are initially involved in a territorial dispute, experience
repeated conflict, form alliances and increase military capability, all of which intensifies
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the likelihood of war onset (Senese & Vasquez, 2005, 2008). Moreover, there are three
distinct characters that distinguish the STW model from other international relations (IR)
and conflict theories. First, it is empirically based. This construct allows for statistical
evaluation of why interstate interactions are either war-prone or peaceful, Second, it is
dyadic. A characteristic that fosters descriptive and inferential assessment. Last, it is not
exclusively sequential. Meaning, step order is not imperative instead it is their mutual
reinforcement (Mitchell & Vasquez, 2014; Senese et al., 2005).
The key takeaway here is that the STW theory is a novel way to study peace,
especially from an anti-realist point of view. To put it plainly, one should remember the
theory contended war resulted from issues and disputes that are managed by the realist
school of thought; specifically, power politics. Territorial issues, by far the most
common, festers into greater hostility. According to Owsiak (2017), this circumstance
caused recurring MIDs, which led to enduring rivalries. When alliance-making and arms
races are added, a security environment riddled with volatility, uncertainty, and chaos is
produced or war-prone. More importantly, each part of the sequence; specifically,
territorial dispute to rivalry to alliances to the procurement of weapons, empirically
increased the probability of interstate warfare (Owsiak, 2017; Senese et al., 2008;
Vasquez 1987, 1996).
Data overview
Data collection and management was an extensive process. A researcher-defined
dataset was constructed using applicable Correlations of War data depositories and the
EUGeneve_v3.2 dataset generator. Within temporal confines from 1949 to 2001, a total
of 1683 interstate dyads were identified at the systematic level. From there, a query was
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performed, and 461 dispute dyads were linked to Asia. Next, each case was modified to
create a dyadic-dispute history that included militarized disputes, revision type, national
material capability, as well as other vital COW-defined war correlates. Of significance,
dyadic analysis of each disputed case afforded comprehension on the behavior and
interaction between Asiatic states to include China. These attributes were critical to
understanding as to why and how states act on the national and international geopolitical
stage.
The research design was intricate, yet simple. Five hypotheses and five
propositions, evenly spread between the three supporting questions, formed the analytical
framework. Using descriptive analysis, which primarily focused on central tendencies
and frequencies, and various inferential statistical tests, the supporting research questions
were used to address how the correlates of war are linked to Sino revisionism in Asia.
The questions had an inductive quality that once answered formulated synthesis and
provided insight for the next research inquiry. The culmination was an objective
inference on whether China was susceptible to war given the current geopolitical climate.
That said, it is appropriate to review this dissertation’s key findings.
Research Findings
To begin with, research results were comprehensive and informative. In
examining Asia’s 461 dispute dyads that covered a fifty-year period, an inductive method
was used to determine the relationship between the correlates of war and China’s
revisionism. This approach possessed two overarching aims. The first was a
retrodiction. By defining Asia’s geopolitical landscape with regards to disputes,
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revisionism, and war pathways. The three supporting research questions provided the
necessary examination framework.
Research Question 1 explored the association between war probability and
militarized disputes. The results were not expected. The literature suggested a positive
correlation between the two variables (Senese et. al, 2003, 2005, 2008; Vasquez, 1995).
With respect to Asia, the descriptive analysis revealed an opposite effect, however. Force
associated disputes (i.e., displays and usage) were correlated with an inverse relationship
as MIDs increased, then wars decreased. What this finding suggested was that Asian
states, despite the exuberant amount of dispute cases, primarily avoided war.
Research Question 2 examined what revisions increased the propensity for war.
This finding was most profound. The STW theory proclaimed certain revisions led to
war. Inferential tests proved these propositions would not statistically correspond to Asia
and therein, China. When the outcome variable was switched from war to violence, the
revisions became statistically significant. Another key research discovery was that major
powers had a dampening effect on Asiatic interstate violence. This result was counter to
most COW thought (Leeds, 2003; Senese et al., 2005, 2008; Vasquez, 1993).
Research Question 3 determined whether the Steps-To-War theoretical framework
held true for Asia. Simply put, there was no statistical evidence that territorial revisions,
followed by rivalry, alliance-making, and arms races increased war onset chances
(Sample, 1998, 2016; Senese et al., 2005). However, when war was substituted for lowintensity, interstate violence as an outcome variable there were plausible empirical
results. Territorial revisions and an outside alliance with a major power proportionally
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increased the chances of interstate violence, whereas enduring rivalry participation was
the opposite (Leeds, 2003; Levy, 1981; Senese et al., 2008).
The other inductive aspect was predictive in nature. It explicitly and implicitly
linked China’s current national security strategy, which is revisionism to the COWdefined correlates of war. The main research question resulted in two key implications.
Collating previous Sino grand strategies and using the same research-defined dataset,
China was empirically crosswalked with the study results ascertained from Asia. This
retrodiction contended China was essentially war-adverse, but violence-prone. The latter
was by their own choosing. The second inference entailed the current strategy of
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s “China Dream”. Although not empirical, this prediction
was informed by the retrodiction analysis. Arguably, the final takeaway here is that China
will not seek war but accept the associated risks of interstate violence to increase its
power domain status and thereby obtain long-sought prestige. With these findings, there
is trade space for knowledge expansion and policy recommendations.
Implications
One of the most important outgrowths from a doctoral dissertation is the
implications. Specifically, the latter is significant because it links ascertained research
findings to future applications. That said, this section outlaid four areas of connotations.
First are the conflict analysis and resolution field, which posited the cross-pollination
between conflict analysis/resolution and other study disciplines is indeed warranted. The
second subarea entailed both Correlates of War project and the steps-to-war theory. Here
the goal was to expand the knowledge base and theory. Third is policy
recommendations. The aim here was to offer U.S. national security decision-makers
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options that could provide an off-ramp from the path to war with China. And last, there
are future research applications. In short, this dissertation offered several courses of
action to expand the knowledge on the scientific study of war and peace. That said,
below listed is a more thorough examination.
Conflict Analysis and Resolution Study Field
At its crux, this dissertation and associated research is an empirical treatise into
conflict analysis and resolution (CAR). Through the course of this research journey,
there were five distinct implications that became apparent. The first entailed the empirical
study of conflict. The conflict analysis field is considered by most scholars as a subset of
the social sciences (Rioux & Redekop, 2013). Furthermore, Singer (2001) proclaimed
the field lacked a more rigorous empirical research methodology rooted in the scientific
method. Despite the time-tested qualitative methods, which are used in historical case
studies etc., there was a need to “observe the unobservable” (Lear, 2012). And perhaps,
the only way to achieve this stated ideal was to develop propositions and hypotheses,
operationalize behavioral-related variables and then rigorously assess them with
statistical tests. The net result would deliver better comprehension, allowing peace
scholars the ability to move beyond mere extrapolation to correlational knowledge.
Whereby, policy recommendations could be devised to prevent the spread of violence
(Lear, 2012; Rioux et al., 2013). This dissertation arguably accomplished these stated
research ideals and further expanded the empirical study of conflict.
The second connotation, for the conflict resolution area of study, concerned
analysis at the systematic level. There is perhaps a perception that modern conflict
analysis revolves around the individual, group, and societal levels (Bremer, 1995; Rioux
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et al., 2013, Vasquez, 1995b; Wayman, 1995). And perhaps, there is a need for greater
inquiry at the state and systematic level. One of the most tragic outgrowths of conflict, at
all levels, is human suffering. War is perhaps the greatest contributor to that calamity.
As a potential solution, this research outlaid interstate conflict at the regional and to a
lesser extent the global level. More so, the findings could possibly afford why war
occurs, which is one of the COW project’s major charter.
The third implication centered on the cross-pollination of study fields. Many
war/peace scholars contend international relations, both liberalism, and realism, strongly
correlated to the conflict analysis and resolution field of study. Research, here, supported
this notion. More specifically, it purported that Asian states and their leadership who
practiced realist-based practices of power politics—i.e., revisionism, militarized disputes,
alliance making, and arms buildups—did not secure peace, rather increased the
possibility of war. Arguably, this viewpoint should be considered as anti-realism (Singer,
2001) and is aligned with most CAR principles. That is, the distributive nature of
obtaining one’s goals often leads to intractable conflict. By examining this premise
through the prism of IR, the benefits cross-pollination is arguably laid to bare for the
greater conflict resolution community.
The fourth proposition is the addition of a new theoretical framework. As
mentioned, CAR analysis mainly revolved around social conflict theories, such as critical
race theory, grounded theory, feminist theory, and human needs theory. This dissertation
introduced the steps-to-war theory as a suitable construct to examine interstate conflict.
Perhaps most controversial is that the STW theory could be considered as a better
alignment with mainstream CAR scholarly thought versus other IR theories.
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Lastly, this dissertation promulgated the imperativeness of negotiation, a central
tenet within the CAR field. A war between the People’s Republic of China and the
United States and its allies would be disastrous for both belligerents and the international
order. Allison stated, “There is no ‘solution’ for the dramatic resurgence of a 5,000yearold civilization with 1.4 billion people.” (Allison, 2017, 215). His statement should be
comprehended as the military defeat of China would be nearly impossible and foolhardy.
Therefore, this potential conflict should be resolved by negotiation—or diplomacy. In
fact, with the U.S.’s return to great power competition and the escalatory nature of the
current geostrategic environment in the Indo-Pacific, there should be considerable efforts
to expand the knowledge and practice of strategic negotiation at the state-level and above
within the CAR study field. This doctoral research has identified a capability shortfall in
which the CAR community could fulfill.
Correlates of War Project and Steps-To-War theory
Arguably, the Correlates of War project, and to a slightly lesser extent, the StepsTo-War theorist benefited from this doctoral research. There are four suppositions as to
why; first, the benefit entailed interstate war analysis at the regional level. As stated, the
preponderance of COW studies encapsulated the global, systematic level. These efforts
were due to the severity of interstate war and the influence of U.S.-Soviet bipolar
aggressive actions after WWII. For nearly 50 years, global interstate conflict has been
the status quo. The data, research, and scientific analysis focused on determining the
probability of war based on a prolonged temporal aspect and international economies of
scale. To be clear, what this research did was empirical analyze a region based on the

199
COW-defined principles and datasets, which should not be confused with the step-to-war
theory.
Taking the above into consideration, equally germane was the use of the STW
theory to explore a region. Since the founding of the COW project, this theoretical
framework has only been done once. During the mid-1990s, Latin America was the
region, and the study examined relationships between war onset and militarized disputes,
using Bremer’s statistical methods (Bremer, 1993; Hensel, 1994; Singer, 2001). This
research was relevant because policy-based wars of communist ideology were rampant.
Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras all participated in some form of
revolution to overthrow of a government and this led to offensive civil wars. The latter
entailed the secession of a geopolitical entity from the legitimate government, whereby
forming a separate, sovereign state (Lebow, 2010; Vasquez,1986). Arguably, this
dissertation results similarly applicable. Ascertaining that Asia was mildly divergent from
the STW major tenets could have major implications for CAR and IR researchers and
scholars in future research.
Another implication was that militarized disputes are a far more common event,
whereas wars are uncommon. This research indicated that MID occurrence (N = 461)
was significantly higher than wars (N = 14) in Asia, almost 97% higher. Although
common knowledge and the research data reflected this assessment, it is often lost in both
academic and policy circles. Wars are high profile events, which possibly caused the
oversight (Bremer, 1995; Lear, 2012; Rioux et al., 2013; Singer, 2001). That said, COW
research has proved that interstate conflict disputes lead to wars, as such, they should be
studied in greater detail. This dissertation only reinforced this suggestion.
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Last are the implications concerning COW and STW research methodologies.
This doctoral study should prove the scientific study of war and its principles are indeed
sound. For example, Singer stressed data operationalization and sound propositions were
essential in the scientific study of war (Lear, 2012; Star, 1995). Both activities were
meticulously followed, resulting in statistically significant results from both descriptive
and inferential tests. Even more, Vasquez’s suggested road to war was duplicated in this
research within the confines of Asia (Senese et al, 2008). Albeit there were some
nuances, his stepwise conflict model held true. Taken as a whole, this congruence
promotes the steps-to-war as a viable theory for interstate war.
Policy Recommendations
One should not mistake that Sino revisionism is about power and prestige.
Resources are indeed important, and prior to the current Chinese five-year plan, this was
perhaps the case. Nevertheless, President Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party have
opted for a strategy to recapture prestige. The chosen mechanism is power in the form of
military capability (Gompert, Cevallos, & Garafola, 2016; Rioux & Redekop, 2013).
One should ask, what happens when China cannot achieve its strategic aims? Despite the
PLA’s ongoing arms buildup, the U.S. military is better equipped, trained, and by far,
more seasoned as a warfighting organization (Ratner et al., 2019; Roy, 2020). Despite
the rhetoric, this gap will continue to be the case for the foreseeable future, placing the
PRC at a disadvantage. And as earlier stated, the U.S. cannot conquer mainland China,
which leads to a point of common interest.
From a U.S. conflict resolution and national security professional, there are three
prioritized, policy recommendations that annotate plausible solutions to the increased
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hostility within Sino-U.S. relations. First, the United States should look to find ways to
collaborate with the Peoples Republic of China. More pointedly, there must be an
integration of needs and interests between the great powers. Katz and McNutly (1994)
contended collaboration worked best when: 1) Concerns are vital for compromise; 2)
Either party is at lost on how to achieve their objectives, and 3) Resolutions prevent the
feelings of resentment. The current and trending relations between both states perhaps
meet these criteria.
Arguably, Washington should communicate to Beijing that war should be avoided
at all costs, and both countries could develop two peace reinforcing goals. Improving the
global commons is such an area. One way or another, most nations depend on the oceans
and airways to sustain their economies and well-being. The global commons are oft
subject to risk because terrorism, piracy, overfishing, civil war, etc. all of which benefit
neither America nor the Middle Kingdom. The other buttressing idea is for the U.S. to
suggest and support that China becomes the lead on climate control. Of late, the CCP has
begun to understand the devastating repercussions of environmental mismanagement
(OSD, 2019). With China in the lead, it would afford them the status and prestige they
strongly desire from the U.S. The latter gains a strategic partner in promoting
international stability, which ultimately maintains the international order.
Second, if collaboration is untenable, the USG should aim to develop some form
of accommodation with the PRC. The conflict style is predicated on three benchmarks:
1) One party has a better solution; 2) Associated issues and interests are more important
to one state; and 3) Continued competition could further damage the relationship, thereby
escalating the conflict (Katz & McNulty, 1994). Here is a case-by-case justification on
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how the accommodating conflict style overlays over current Sino-U.S. interstate
behavior. Arguably, the U.S. wants a peaceful and satisfied PRC coexisting within the
international order. This should be considered a better solution over China challenging a
status quo that already provides considerable benefits. Another justification is that
China’s quest for regional hegemony and global recognition is more important to them
than it is to the U.S. The fact that Jinping’s five-year plan centers on this strategy goal
should be considered as proof. Lastly, the Sino-U.S. relationship is already strained.
Case in point, the Sino-U.S. conflict escalation in the South and East China Seas and
hardliner foreign policy activism by both states correspond to the environment (Erickson,
2016). These signposts illuminate decision-space in which the U.S. should look to
exploit.
From the U.S. vantage point, the political elite and national security hawks must
accept that neither regime change, nor elimination of the Chinese state will occur in the
near-term. Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea combined could effectively deter Sino
aggression, both in terms of military and economic instruments. Aside from the United
States, China’s top-tiered trading partners are these three countries. More importantly,
the U.S. must acknowledge China is already a great power. This is not necessarily
accommodation, but merely the facts. As stated, the PRC already possesses the national
material capability, military capacity, and power projection instruments that meet the
acceptance criteria as a great power. Therefore, the U.S. officially acknowledging
China’s “greatness”, whether they believe it or not, will perhaps placate Sino
aggressiveness and afford the time to negotiate and discover tradeoffs. Of note, this
recommendation is possibly the hardest to convince the U.S. electorate.
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Last, U.S. policymakers could choose to expand the U.S-Sino competition space
beyond the obligatory defense realm into other areas. This recommendation entails a
three-way approach. Economically, the U.S. worker is far more productive than its
Chinese counterpart. The latter’s competitive advantage is capacity and not capability
(Nacht, 2019; OECD, 2019; Roy, 2020). The USG should implement domestic and
international incentives in which enhances American productive throughput on a massive
scale, essentially grow the “pie” and further bind China to the U.S. Of note, the current
Sino-U.S. policy is distributive. It is defined by the U.S. wants of low-price finished
goods and the Chinese desire to manipulate their currency and steal other states'
technology to maintain a competitive edge. This situation is arguably win-lose for both
parties.
Another contest area is renewable energy. This recommendation’s saliency and
benefits are beyond the scope herein. Nevertheless, wind, solar, and high-end battery
technology improvements could reduce resource consumption, protect the environment,
and afford resource reallocation to more pressing state needs. That said, it is worth noting
the state that master future energy technology would indeed have a competitive
advantage. Although time-tested, the final competition space is military capability.
Here, the U.S. DOD could transparently and rapidly develop and increase defensive
weapons systems. By that, this dissertation ascertains these armaments are purely
defensive, oriented towards the maritime versus land domains, and not expeditionary in
nature. Ballistic Missile Defense, submarines, and fighter aircraft are examples.
Choosing this competition space forces the Chinese into a dilemma. They must continue
to consume resources to build weapons to counter the U.S who has no intention
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whatsoever of invading Chinese sovereign territory or seek outside alliances to balance.
From a CCP vantage, neither of these choices is optimal. The former requires
exponential economic growth, whereby domestic opportunity costs are incurred because
of the need to develop and procure weapons for an opponent that does not seek regime
change. The latter compels the CCP to compromise or accommodate with other powers,
and most of the major powers in Asia are allied with the U.S. When combined, these
dilemmas should induce some form of either collaboration or accommodation with the
U.S. In sum, one must remember these proposals are layered with collaboration deemed
the desired outcome and each subsequent policy goal as a fallback.
Future Research
A key tenet of the doctoral dissertation process is to recommend future research.
Although there were numerous topics and propositions considered during this academic
journey, there are four that warrant further discussion. First is investigating other regions
and subregions with COW research methods and principles. This primary research goal
would both expand and correlate knowledge of war onset using empirical analysis. For
instance, the recent uptick in intra- and inter-state violence in the Middle East- North
Africa region render it apt for empirical analysis. Arguably, there is no shortage of
qualitative assessments on the MENA subregion. What is lacking are the hard-empirical
data analyses that could provide invaluable insight as to why the subregion is excessively
volatile and chaotic.
Within the same thread, a secondary goal would concern advancing the steps-towar theory. After reviewing the literature, the dissertation determined there was only one
credible study on the theory within the last five years (2016). Perhaps, the reason is the
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higher frequency of intra- and extra-state war, thereby making them more relevant. And,
since the steps of war theory are predicated on system states, it is of marginal use to
scholars who study civil and revolutionary war. That said, further developing scholarship
on how the intra-state conflict and wars commence based on the steps-to-war theory
could prove most useful in the conflict analysis and resolution field.
Second is researching how group-based interactions between the government, the
political elites, and the populace writ large impact the decisions on whether to wage an
interstate war would be most useful. The main study goal would be to empirically
ascertain the behavior between the three groups and then correlate it to an outside polity.
Graham Allison accomplished this in his seminal work, Essence of a Decision, which
showcased the relationship between the White House, the Pentagon, the Central
Intelligence Agency, and the Soviet Union (Allison, 2017). His work was a qualitative
case study on the Cuban Missile Crisis, whereby this proposal would be empirical
analysis on modern interstate conflict. Both the Russo-Ukraine and U.S.-Iraq wars are
potential research examples.
Third is ascertaining why states choose to escalate regional conflicts. Using a
two-axis research approach could establish how conflict vertically escalates to war and
horizontally expands to surrounding states. The potential findings could help provide key
policy recommendations on the prevention of multi-state wars, which are the most
destructive in terms of human life and infrastructure. With the ongoing arms races and
territorial disputes in the Western Pacific, there is indeed utility in this research.
Last is expanding the knowledge on war outcomes. Here, the analytic goal would
involve the empirical collection and analysis of all forms of interstate violence and how
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they end, based on the causal factors, means of warfare, and associated risks. Of
significance Lear (2012) inferred that most wars end in stalemate. In fact, his analysis
showed that approximately 64% of intra- and inter-state wars conclude without a clear
victor. Taking this into account, a question could be asked, “Why would a state risk war
onset based on a precarious expected outcome?” Of note, there has been COW work in
this subject area but most of it was retrodiction. This proposal would employ prediction
based on inferential analysis and simulation. In sum, these potential research topics
could expand the knowledge and research techniques for the CAR study field and better
integrate it with other peace research communities, such as war studies and conflict
prevention.
Conclusion
All in all, the notion that China will pursue an interstate war to achieve the “China
Dream” of great power rejuvenation is summarily rejected in the dissertation. History
and empirical evidence do not support a great power war in Asia. More so, China
arguably wants to redefine and not destroy the international order. That said, the issue
soon becomes if the U.S. will muster the resources, willingness, and opportunity to block
those ambitions. Although beyond the scope of this treatise, answering this question is
indeed worth the effort.
The results of this doctoral study suggested that there are five findings that
ascertain how the correlates of war related to Sino revisionist strategy were: 1) Despite
the exuberant amount of militarized dispute cases, Asian states primarily avoided war; 2)
Major power involvement dampened the likelihood of Asiatic interstate violence; 3)
There was no statistical evidence that the STW theory, territorial revisions, followed by
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rivalry, alliance-making, and arms races increased war onset chances; 4) When war onset
was substituted for low-intensity interstate violence as an outcome variable, there was
strong, empirical evidence that the correlates of war were statistical significant; and 5)
China was essentially war-adverse, but violence-prone.
Perhaps most importantly is the idea that great power war in modern times could
be won in a short, violent timeframe. Wars usually last longer than anticipated. Again,
history and data have proved that when states have the economic means, national will,
and wherewithal, they deliver considerable damage to one another. One should
remember that both World Wars were supposed to be short. Despite IR scholars and
DOD strategist proclamations that a U.S.-Sino war would be constrained with
manageable losses, history and data have determined that is not the case. Instead, there
would be substantial suffering for both belligerents and the possible collapse of the
international order.
So, it is in the interest of U.S. policymakers and national security professionals to
absorb a major tenet of the conflict resolution field. That is, it is better to collaborate
than to compete to achieve one’s needs and interests. This holds true for the individual,
the group, the state, and the liberal world order. More so, realist and liberal policies will
not work with the People’s Republic of China because both will lead to war. Realism
does so by escalation; liberalism through miscalculation due to perceived weakness. In
short, the prudent way is for the U.S. to take a hard, objective look at the future,
determine what truly are vital interests, build consensus amongst like-minded states, and
convince the Chinese it is in their interest to cooperate because both countries “can”
coexist.
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